World History: Global and Local Interactions
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Preface

Research on major issues and big topics in world history can take place at the beginning of a historian’s career, and not just as the capstone to many years of working on localized projects. The twelve chapters at the center of this volume are all associated with doctoral dissertations, and hence with entry into the historical profession. These studies show the breadth, imagination, and rigor that can come from specialization in world history from the beginning of a historian’s career.

Most of these studies are revised versions of papers presented at a Boston conference held March 12–14, 2004, on “World History: The Next Ten Years.” The conference celebrated the ten years of activity of the World History Center at Northeastern University, and acknowledged its closing. It was my pleasure to serve as director of the center from beginning to end. In the concluding chapter of this volume I trace the rise and fall of the World History Center and consider future directions of research in world history.

This volume is published with the assistance of the World History Network, Inc., and is the first in what is expected to be a series of volumes supported by the network, as part of its campaign to facilitate research in world history. Two major historical organizations co-sponsored and publicized the conference: the World History Association and the American Historical Association. I am thankful for their support, and especially for the early assistance of WHA President Ralph Croizier. H. Parker James, associate director of the World History Center, was very effective in organizing and directing the conference. The conference, in turn, gave the authors in this volume the enthusiasm to make rapid and effective revisions to their drafts: they were punctual and insightful in completing their chapters. Kirsten Jelliffe worked skillfully as graphic designer for the book. Markus Wiener, a wonderful supporter of publication in world history, gave early encouragement and helpful guidance on how to prepare this volume for publication.

Patrick Manning
Boston, January 2005
The continuing wave of new studies in world history now includes works by an expanding cohort of doctoral students and recent recipients of doctoral degrees. Twelve members of this group present world-historical analyses in this volume: these are early publications by scholars who expect to pursue careers in historical analysis at large scale. All of the authors have formal training in world history, and most of them have further training in disciplines other than history. This volume centers on these authors, their approaches, and their interpretations of history at a global scale.

Only recently has world history become a specialization for scholars entering the historical profession. World history gained its recognition primarily through the efforts of senior scholars. The best-known world historians are scholars who took up world history as a second or subsequent phase of a career that began in another field—most commonly a field in national or regional history, though also in disciplines outside history. These scholars, in adopting global historical studies, became naturalized citizens of the realm of world history. The works of these senior scholars established the relevance and the direction of world history, and led to its recognition as a legitimate subfield of historical studies—more than simply a secondary synthesis of original work in other fields. Their work has been intriguing enough and successful enough to convince younger historians to adopt world history as a field of specialization.
What distinguishes the authors of these chapters is not primarily their youth, but that they have taken world history as their primary field of study: they are specialized world historians from their birth as professionals. If they focus on a region or a discipline, it is subordinate to their primary identity as world historians. Their doctoral specialization in world history was neither an easy nor a readily recognized step. During the 1990s, as these scholars began their graduate study, there were many expressions of doubt about the launching of world history as a primary research field at the doctoral level. Historians working in national and area-studies specializations gave virtually no support to graduate study in world history. Even established world historians objected to the idea of doctoral specialization in world history, preferring to see it as a secondary concern adopted after primary training in a locality. Nevertheless, the prospective specialists in world history persevered, and have now begun to produce analyses of their own. This volume presents tangible results of the approach, the method, and the character of the historical interpretation resulting from formal study in world history. In the years to come, this small but distinctive group of world-history specialists may be expected to produce an expanding corpus of research and publications. We will eventually be able to judge what these new studies have brought to the understanding of world history.

To state it differently, we may hope for two categories of cutting-edge research by world historians in the years to come. The first is that to which we have become accustomed: books and articles by experienced scholars, trained in history or other fields, who have embraced world history and articulate their long experience in global interpretations. Kenneth Pomeranz’s *The Great Divergence* and Jared Diamond’s *Guns, Germs, and Steel* are examples of this category. The second category of cutting-edge work is that included in this volume: studies by those entering the field of world history as specialists, defining the topics on which they may be expected to work for some time. The latter works may not be as deeply researched or as polished in their presentation as the studies of more experienced historians. But they may equal the works of senior scholars in originality of their conceptualization and they may be even better attuned to the issues of our time.

To identify these two categories of cutting-edge work is not to claim that they comprise the sum total of valuable contributions to the study
of world history. The contributions by these two groups—naturalized and specialized world historians—are but part of a much larger discourse and analytical frame in world history. Indeed, there exist no precise boundaries for the field of world history, and the interest of historians in trans-regional and interactive analysis has become recognizable in every subfield of history. Works in Atlantic history, studies of European expansion, area-studies history, and archaeological studies spill relentlessly over the limits of nations and civilizations.  

Current developments in the sociology and philosophy of knowledge require scholars in general to get used to working with overlapping categories of scholarship rather than the discrete categories of analysis emphasized in earlier times. The point of this collection of essays, however, is to draw attention to the particular approaches that will be advanced by historians trained as specialists in analyzing global phenomena, as they add their voices to the interpretive discourse on the human past.

**World-historical Research: Current Strengths and Challenges**

The field of world historical research, into which these new specialists are entering, is already developing a clear profile. This brief overview addresses the strengths and weaknesses of programs of graduate study, the analytical emphasis, current theory, form of presentation, and the need for a stronger statement of research agenda.

*Programs of graduate study.* The twelve authors of the empirical chapters have come from five different doctoral programs. There they gained formal preparation in the field, working with mentors who have become experienced world historians. In each case, their advisors have encouraged them to take up broad and interconnected topics and to develop methodological strength for their investigations. Both students and faculty gain recognition for the distinctiveness of their work in contrast to the prevailing pattern in which historians reproduce earlier orthodoxy.

But the programs in which these new world historians have conducted their study have been limited in resources. They are short on faculty resources, in that none of the programs has had more than two world-history specialists working with graduate students. The new world historians, entering a field that has not yet gained recognition from the major funding agencies, have had to design and execute their research projects without major funding for field trips, language training, or interdisciplinary training. Those in the U.S. have applied
for but have not received fellowships from the U.S. Social Science Research Council, which awards the principal fellowships for area-studies analysis of history beyond the U.S. To the degree that they have learned new languages they are self-trained; their field trips have been short and based on their own funds and on small grants obtained by their professors. Nevertheless, these new world history specialists have become widely read in the literature on world history, have identified significant issues, have accumulated relevant resources, and have assembled broad and thought-provoking interpretations. Their consistent focus on identifying and problematizing global patterns is perhaps their greatest strength. For the future of graduate studies in world history, the main hope lies in collaboration among programs: electronic linkages worldwide among faculty and graduate students may provide the critical mass that has not been achieved at individual universities.

*Analytical focus on the global and local.* For the authors represented in this volume, there has been a remarkable confluence of interest in the type of problem they are addressing: locating and analyzing links between global and local phenomena. Such a focus on multi-level analysis tellingly reflects a more general evolution of debate in world-historical studies. In earlier years, world-historical debate focused on the critique of Eurocentrism and, more generally, the development of global studies in contrast to national studies. The current group of scholars is less preoccupied than its predecessors with debating or maximizing the geographical breadth of their studies. If these analysts are right, they are developing the practice of treating local situations no longer as isolated case studies, but now as parts of a wider world, so that analyses of localities may even provide insights into the operation of the wider world. Developing an understanding of interaction of the global and the local is thus an analytical issue. The same sort of analysis also provides a practical research device, since local data are more accessible than data on the whole world or large parts of it. This focus of new world historians on global-local interactions is sometimes misunderstood by national historians who are reviewing contributions or candidates in world history: innovative global scholars are seen as not really global enough, because they are exploring such specifics as a given region or a given topic in detail. This implies a dogmatic vision of world history, requiring that a study address the whole world at once in order to add to knowledge of the global.
More likely, the current focus on linking global and local phenomena will make it easier to identify the pervasiveness of global influences, but also the importance of local factors in constituting global patterns.

**Theory and methodology.** World historians are becoming increasingly energetic in experimenting with tools to address the problems they have identified. History has long relied on an artisanal methodology emphasizing careful handling of source materials. The expanding scope of historical studies now requires that historians complicate their methodology and address theory more explicitly. In the present volume, the authors make explicit use of literary theory, migration theory, world-system theory, and theory in virology, anthropology, economics and demography. Adding theory to the collection of data and the analysis of complex interactions means that world historians must conduct sophisticated investigations, yet find ways to simplify their problems to make them analytically tractable and understandable for readers. The various theories entail methods of developing and analyzing data. In fuller studies of the issues addressed in these chapters, it is to be expected that the authors will apply new and relevant methods associated with the theories.

**Form of presentation.** World historians, since their work involves new topics, new methods, and new audiences, face questions on how to present their interpretive results. Similarly, readers of world history face the problems of how to absorb and respond to interpretations of such breadth. It will doubtless take a while for readers and writers of world history to develop comfortable ways of communicating. For instance, since new work in world history entails growing methodological sophistication and empirical variety, authors must balance precision and accessibility in their presentation and must anticipate the habits and expectations of readers of various national and social backgrounds. The formats for world-historical presentations may shift, as this communication develops, in the balance among research reports, monographs, syntheses, textbooks, and surveys for general readers.

**Overview of research agenda.** The range of possible issues in world history is so extensive that one hardly knows where to start. For this reason, it is to be hoped that groups of world historians will combine to debate and choose on the best emphases in research. Research agenda conferences, in which recent results, current theories, and society’s need to know can be combined to yield recommendations on the best areas
for world historians to direct their efforts, may lead to more efficient use of the scarce resources now available for study of world history.

Contributions to this Volume: Topics and Arguments

Most of the chapters in this volume are revised versions of papers presented at a Boston conference on “World History: The Next Ten Years,” March 12–14, 2004. The conference brought almost two hundred historians—a congenial mixture of scholars, teachers, and publishers from many sections of the U.S. and eight other countries—together to consider the achievements of world history in the past decade and the possibilities for the decade to come, focusing especially on research in world history. Three additional chapters have been included, two from authors who were unable to attend the conference. The papers were intended to showcase the work of the individual scholars, and to convey a sense of the character and direction of new work in world history.

The first three sections of the book, each including four chapters, center respectively on politics, migration, and interdisciplinary analysis. The fourth section consists of a single chapter providing an overview of the last ten years of world-historical studies and a prospectus on directions in the study of world history for the next ten years.

The first section, “Empire, Province, and Nation,” addresses political history on a global scale. The study of politics has been the historic focus of world history, for instance in the civilizational narratives of Spengler, Toynbee, and McNeill. The four studies in this section, however, are innovative in emphasizing political linkages across the boundaries of nations, empires, and civilizations. In all of these cases the analyses go beyond case studies to treat large and small units in the context of their surroundings. Joshua Weiner begins with an exploration of the functioning of the Spanish empire, using the year 1571 as a moment at which to trace the interaction among monarchy, provincial government, and local subjects in issues of religion, trade, and ceremony. The analysis reveals the forces in addition to military power that held the far-flung empire together. Bin Yang follows with a long-term analysis of a region, Yunnan, as it underwent transformation stage by stage: from autonomous region to center of major states to borderland of expanding Chinese dynasties to province within China. The analysis shows the early participation of Yunnan in Southeast Asian networks, and shows how Yunnan’s incorporation has brought changes to China in general as
well as to Yunnan. In yet another vision of empire, Jeremy Neill traces an aspect of the British Empire in late-nineteenth-century India. As he shows, innovative definitions of race were unexpectedly important in developing and justifying the reorganization of the armies of British India. George Reklaitis focuses on nation-building of the twentieth century, arguing that Lithuania and Eastern Europe exemplify a broader pattern in which the earlier nationalism of “imagined communities” was replaced by a more interactive and more negative nationalism of hatred. World War II and the Cold War only reinforced an atmosphere of fierce national competition set by the aftermath of World War I.

The second section, “Migrations and their Consequences,” helps to show why migration has become such a significant area of study within world history. All of these studies include a balance of theory and narrative of global and local. They present efforts to identify broad patterns, yet also to emphasize the centrality of individual experience and perspective. Tiffany Trimmer analyzes both theory and a case study in attempt to link social history and world history in the analysis of migration. She combines the concepts of social capital, feedback, networks, and family risk diversification to show how the migration of a Jewish family from Russia to Boston reveals the mechanisms by which the migrants created and reinforced the migration system through which they moved. Anne Chao reviews some of the same sociological theories of migration and ties them to literary theory as she focuses on the outlook of Chinese migrants, including migrants to the U.S. and later movement of families throughout the Chinese diaspora. She traces the evolving debate among Chinese migrant writers seeking to make sense of their experience. Lia Paradis addresses a return migration: the repatriation to England of retired Anglo-Sudanese—English civil servants who had long worked in the colonial government of Sudan. She emphasizes the mysteries of reincorporation of these mature migrants into English society. Pascal Goeke analyzes the disciplinary basis of migration studies, drawing on geography, history, and sociology. Working with analyses of recent migration within Europe, he emphasizes that mere consultation of various disciplines is not guaranteed to increase the strength of theory or empirical work in the disciplines.

The third section, “Complexities across Boundaries of Topic and Space,” includes studies using a range of disciplines to link several topics as well as different regions. Such transdisciplinary studies on a large scale
are a hallmark of world-historical analysis. The authors, in addressing various disciplines and areas of discourse, analyze some of them formally and integrate others informally into their analysis. The type of nexus under investigation in these studies is the interplay of different areas of human experience. Christopher Harris identifies small farmers in Vermont as a group with a viable and even economically competitive style of life, who nonetheless were marginalized by the development of large-scale economic institutions. His analysis combines demography, environment, economics, and sociology to trace small farmers’ techniques of survival and reproduction as well as the forces that made them invisible; he argues that similar processes take place throughout the world at much the same time. Carolyn Biltoft combines language, politics, war, and ethics in portraying the development of Esperanto as a language intended to create a neutral ground for cross-community communication. She combines linguistic and political analysis to portray the wide interest in Esperanto as a device for creating unity across the fragmentation of the world in interwar times, but also the limits on a language that had no mass political base. George Dehner addresses the dichotomy and the unity of science and history as frameworks for analysis, in analyzing the response of medical bureaucracies to the threat of major influenza epidemic in 1976. At issue were the nature of epidemic disease, the technical skills of medical professionals, and questions of public policy. Yinghong Cheng traces the remarkable parallels in Cuba’s Revolutionary Offensive and China’s Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, as each society carried out large-scale experiments to create societies based on a “new man,” an idealistic servant of the common good. This ideal, espoused by social reformers back to the time of Rousseau, led to practical failure in these campaigns yet continues to attract widespread interest.

Each of these analyses presents fascinating materials, made more fascinating but more complicated by the authors’ reliance on several disciplines. The twelve chapters provide the benefits of varying analytical standpoints, but require that author and reader each be able to adjust to the distinctive emphases and terminology of the various disciplines as they are combined.

The fourth section of the book consists of a single chapter on the institutions and programs of world history. This concluding chapter, based on the plenary address of Patrick Manning at the March 2004 conference, reviews the evolution of world history in the past decade, and offers
projections of developments in the decade to come. The approach is at once optimistic and skeptical. The optimism centers on the remarkable development of global perspectives in history, and the expansion of world history as a field of teaching. The skepticism focuses on the scarcity of research funds for world history, and the reluctance of either funding agencies or established graduate programs in history to address the past in global terms. The reluctance of major institutions to support historical research at a global level, despite the widespread recent interest in historical interactions, is a striking phenomenon. World historical research, apparently, is quite different from research in other fields in history, and that it will have to be funded and carried out according to innovative patterns.

Achievements of these Studies

Historians are pleased to announce the discovery of unsuspected facts. Adam McKeown’s recent demonstration that Chinese long-distance migrants were as numerous as contemporary European migrants from 1840 to 1940 qualifies as a discovery. Similarly, the recent announcements of dates of volcanic episodes and their links to major climatic change also qualify as discoveries. Identifying these “facts,” however, involved far more than the collection of data. Underlying the discoveries was the work of identifying key questions, organizing a research design, and tracing historical processes. All these steps were necessary to provide the framework making clear which historical data were to be seen as important new “facts.” For world historians, every step in analysis involves breaking new ground. The processes of defining questions and research techniques and of linking research results are especially significant because we are inexperienced in analysis at this breadth. Thus, while the discovery of strong historical relationships is the ultimate result that historians seek, every significant step along the way to such discovery can be treated as an achievement of world historians.

Political history has been the mainstay of world history since the rise of the comparative study of civilizations. Despite the continuity of this tradition, innovations on global political studies are shown here to be possible and fruitful. Interactive analyses of frontiers, empires, race, and nationhood all work on a large geographic scale, and all cross the topical boundaries of politics and permeate adjoining topics. The mili-
tary dimension of politics is foregrounded in the studies of Yang, Neill, and Reklaitis; administration is central to the studies of Weiner and Yang; and the studies of Weiner, Yang, and Reklaitis address the political identity of leaders and general populations. Neill’s study shows the centrality of racial definitions to the functioning of British India, as Reklaitis’s study shows the centrality of definitions of nationhood in the twentieth century. Weiner, Yang, and Neill focus on the nature and practices of formal empire; Reklaitis emphasizes nationalistic struggles against both formal and informal empire.

Migration has become a leading theme in current world-historical analysis. The migration studies in the volume reconsider migrations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in broader perspective, linking different waves of migration to each other and considering migration from a range of disciplinary perspectives. This work leads toward treating a migration system as more than a stream of migrants from one place to another, to consider the feedback brought by returning migrants and the links among migratory streams. Trimmer’s study of migration systems identifies practical measures of social capital and uses them to show how migrants themselves helped to constitute the systems through which they moved. Chao traces the development of a chorus of voices out of the Chinese diaspora, articulating statements of identity and debates over contributions of those who stayed at home, migrants of first and second generation, and the societies in which migrants settled. Paradis analyzes a more specific case of return migration, a movement of great significance for the migrants, but for which the significance is hidden by the larger society in a fashion that is emblematic of the more general neglect of return migration. Goeke makes most explicit the potential misadventures of linking disciplines in analysis of migration, arguing that “transnational” approaches do the most to combine the disciplines effectively.

Interdisciplinary analysis, as several of these studies show, has become a hallmark of new work in world history. Explicit consideration of how to combine disciplinary perspectives helps achieve more precise empirical analysis and broader interpretations. The four studies in part 3 have focused in various ways on interdisciplinarity, each with regard to an empirical issue: they link disciplines to explain known links among phenomena, and to identify previously unsuspected links. Harris has drawn together a range of social sciences to document and make sense
of the remarkable survival of small farmers in Vermont, working from the hypothesis that their situation is parallel to that of small farmers in every other region of the world, seeking to sustain themselves in the face of the steady capitalization of commerce and transformation of agricultural goods. Biltoft addresses the links of politics and language, as the notion of a neutral, common language was developed to respond to the horrendous political and military conflicts of World War I. Dehner, simplifying the range of disciplines into science and history, describes the interplay of the two in the analysis of influenza viruses in 1976, and suggests lessons of the experience that may enable both history and science to benefit from the strengths of the other. Cheng traces the interplay of political, philosophical, economic, and educational motives leading the revolutionary governments of China and Cuba to launch campaigns to replace material incentives with moral incentives in the 1960s.

A further emphasis of the studies in this volume, pervasive though not explicit, is that most of them center on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, historical research in the aggregate tends to center on the last two centuries, and on the national experiences of the peoples of today. However, since the boundaries of world history are much broader, extending over all of human existence and beyond, the focus of these new world historians on the last two centuries requires some discussion. What picture do they give of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as compared with previous visions? Textbook versions of the world since 1800 tend to focus on industry, nationhood, world wars, and great-power conflicts: in general, they focus on dominance. These studies acknowledge those aspects of world history, but set them in the context of other factors, notably the limits on dominance. For instance, they emphasize migration, its links among world regions, and its influence on literature and culture generally. They nuance studies of empire with race and colonization, and portray reflections on the horrors of war as well as triumph of the victors. They emphasize the antagonistic struggles among nations and the political campaigns of communists through treating each of these as evolving trends of world history rather than as aberrations. They address agriculture as well as industry, and they remind us that the power of mankind is not yet sufficient to control disease. In short, while these studies emphasize the rapidity of change in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they also confirm the impor-
tance of continuities in global patterns, contesting the views of those
who would treat contemporary globalization as a break from the past so
profound that history becomes an irrelevant field of study.

At the same time, when the topic is world history, it rapidly becomes
apparent that the last two centuries do not provide a sufficient time frame
for our understanding of the past. World history brings this point to the
fore more unmistakably than does the history of nations, entities which
have existed only for the past two centuries. In this volume, Yang’s
study of Yunnan shows the continuities and long-term processes that
can be elucidated, and Weiner’s study of the Spanish empire outlines
a process of political change launched in the sixteenth century that has
had influence long since. The importance of world-historical studies of
early times is surely as great as that of recent times. More ambition and,
especially, additional resources for world-historical studies will enable
a larger number of such studies to be conducted.

Exciting work is appearing regularly in the field of world history.
We may hope for even more excitement as the authors of these chapters
continue the work they have started.

Notes

1 For recent surveys of the literature in world history, see Marnie Hughes-War-
rington, ed., Palgrave Advances in World History (London: Palgrave, 2005);
Patrick Manning, Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Ross E. Dunn, ed., The New World
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of World History in Twentieth-Century Scholarship (Washington, DC: Ameri-
can Historical Association, 1995).


3 Kenneth L. Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Mak-
ing of the Modern World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2002); Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).

4 Examples of these genres include, in Atlantic history, Bernard Bailyn, “The
Idea of Atlantic History,” Itinerario 20 (1996), 19–41; in European expan-
sion, David B. Abernethy, The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European


7 For a pathbreaking study of this genre, see Donald R. Wright, The World and a Very Small Place in Africa (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997).

8 The chapters not presented at the conference are those by Yang, Reklaitis, and Cheng.


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1571 was a particularly busy year for the Spanish Empire. In the corners of its vast territories, events were transpiring, processes were beginning and ending, decisions were being made, actions were being carried out, and ideas were being formulated—all of which would have profound implications for the future of the empire. This study focuses not on how the empire would develop in later years but on what was happening in that single year. My goal is to present the Spanish Empire of 1571 through a series of snapshots which together will help to answer fundamental questions that are seldom asked: What do empires do? How do they function? And what does it mean to live within one? It is tempting to answer that empires do very little, function fairly poorly, and that it often means very little to be a subject living within an empire. Based on my research, we will see that these statements are not quite correct.

If the empire is thought of as synonymous with the central state, then it can certainly appear as if it did very little. The distances and long travel times separating Seville and Madrid from much of the empire meant that the state was disconnected from the realities of life within its domains.¹ This disconnection can create the sense that the empire functioned very poorly, since what was said at the highest levels rarely translated to results on the lowest level. However, we must
be careful not to interpret this as evidence that living in the empire had little significance for people. This was not a modern nation with the ability to insinuate itself into all aspects of its inhabitants’ daily lives, but an early modern state that at best had only sporadic ability to achieve such an imposition. Empires, in fact, are not represented solely by the central state nor by any one entity; rather they are the sum of the ideas and actions that are contained within them. Activities within an empire do not have to emanate from an imperial center to have imperial consequences. Imperial states of the early modern period were reactive rather than policy-driven and were often shaped rather than shapers. Thus, while the Spanish Empire was certainly located in the council chambers of Madrid and Seville, it could also be found in a solitary galleon plying the Pacific between Acapulco and Manila, in a Morisco woman of Granada responding to the questions of her inquisitors from the Holy Office, and in the minds of the monarch’s many subjects.

The larger project of which this study presents a kernel will have much more to say about empire in general, but here I will simply offer a few examples to present a picture of an empire functioning. The Spanish Empire in 1571 found itself doing much of what empires have always done: putting down rebellions, creating a labor force, managing cultural difference, extracting surpluses, interacting with states beyond its borders, and establishing a more orderly empire. In particular, I will focus on three aspects of the empire in 1571—the legislation of difference, the flow of silver, and the role of the monarchy. Each of these transcended the activities of the central state, and each reveals the connections that linked regions inside the empire and beyond into a larger system, with consequences that sometimes served imperial needs and sometimes did not.

**Legislating Difference**

By “legislating difference” I refer to specific acts of legislation promulgated by the state with the goal of erasing or maintaining markers of difference that identified conquered or minority populations. As states expand and bring under their power people of diverse backgrounds, traditions, languages, and religions, a key issue is how to incorporate these new populations. Much has been written about the sixteenth-century debates over the status of Native Americans, but a more pressing issue for many in Spain was what to do about
another conquered population, the Moriscos (converted Muslims), and in particular those of Granada. Granada had only been conquered by Christian armies in 1492: despite the flight of many Muslim Granadans (particularly the elite) in the wake of the conquest and the immigration of many Castilians into the kingdom, the majority of the population continued to trace their descent to their Muslim ancestors. From the time of the conquest it had been the vision of monarchs, bureaucrats, and churchmen that the Muslim population would simply melt into the Christian population. Imperial leaders expected assimilation to erase the cultural, social, and physical markers distinguishing Muslims from their Christian neighbors.

It quickly became clear that such an assimilation was not going to occur as a natural process—or at least that this process would take far longer than desired. Increasingly, and mostly at the local level, the assimilatory project came to have legal backing. The first step came in 1502 when all Muslims throughout Castile were given the option of conversion or expulsion. At this point, the practice of Islam became illegal in Castile. The achievement of this step, which I call the baptismal assimilation of the conquered population, did little to alter the behavior of that population, which still marked them as different from the Old Christian population. The next step in the legislation of difference was what I call the period of cultural assimilation. Beginning in 1526, laws were promulgated to restrict Morisco secular practices that were considered by Old Christian observers to be too closely associated with the Islamic faith. These laws essentially said that becoming Christian would not be enough for Moriscos: they also had to become a particular type of Christians, Spanish Christians. At a time when it was in no way obvious what it meant to be Spanish, these restrictive laws defined those behaviors that were clearly not Spanish. Such activities as regular bathing, eating with one’s hands, sitting on the floor, cooking with olive oil, playing certain musical instruments, having too much facial hair, speaking Arabic, or wearing particular clothes all were considered by Old Christians as markers of the Moriscos’ continued adherence to Islam. In 1568 this intransigent attitude resulted in a major rebellion in Granada that would not be put down until 1571, at which time the defeated Moriscos were expelled from Granada.

The attempt to legislate away difference had failed to create an assimilated Morisco population but still points to the creative power of empire. The people expelled from Granada in 1571 were not the
type of Christians that Spanish authorities since Ferdinand and Isabela’s time had envisioned, but neither were they Muslims. The ambiguity of Morisco identity is well demonstrated by a Morisca named Maria de Molina who was brought before the Inquisition. When asked by her inquisitors to define the nature of God, she answered: “He is three persons: Mahoma, Allah, and Vizmillah [In the Name of God].” The answer was ambiguous. Maria seemed to understand the nature of the Trinity but identified its elements in Arabic. The answer itself could not quite be called heretical but the language used makes it very difficult to label it completely orthodox either. It is a fascinating statement that reflects a Granadan population that had become disconnected from the language, the faith, and the cultural practices of Islam while continuing to be culturally separated from Old Christian Spaniards. A leading Granadan Morisco known as “el Zaguer” more explicitly articulated the dilemma of Morisco identity: “Amongst the Christians we are treated as Moors and despised as Moors, whilst our own Moorish brethren treat us not as Moors but as renegades to Christians, and neither help nor trust us.”

A parallel process was occurring in America at the time. But where in Granada the Old Christians viewed any differences between Moriscos and themselves as evidence of heresy that needed to be legislated away, in America it was the maintenance of difference that had to be legislated. Viceroy Martin Enriquez of New Spain, in a 1571 letter to the king, noted the dangerous progress of indigenous assimilation, which saw many elite Mayans and Nahuas adopt the traits of Spanish nobility. In his letter Enriquez requested that the king order his officials to enforce the law against Indians riding on horseback because certain native elites “are already too much like Spaniards and feel themselves to be like Spanish lords.” Just as in Granada, attempts to legislate difference in America had unintended consequences. The perfect subject population would have been one that was Christianized but still maintained the visible markers identifying it as different from, and subordinate to, the Spanish ruling class. What appeared instead was a population that was at once more assimilated than the Spanish wanted and less doctrinally Christian. What made 1571 such an important year for the conquered populations of the Spanish Empire was recognition of the failure of both Moriscos and Indians to become ideal subjects, demonstrated
particularly by the Morisco rebellion of 1569. This failure was taken as evidence that these subjects would never meet the ideal. In Granada the Morisco expulsion was certainly punishment for their revolt but also acknowledgment by the state that Morisco assimilation was impossible to achieve, at least through the means then being employed. In America it was the church rather than the state that made the move: in 1571 the church categorized Indians as permanent neophytes. This classification exempted them from the Inquisition but also carried an implicit judgment that Indians were incapable of ever becoming true Christians. Symbolically at least, this is the moment in which the status of Indians was formalized as inherently less than that of the Spaniard. In both Granada and America, laws governing difference represented an attempt by the state to create an ideal subject population for particular locales. Instead of producing subject populations that lived up to these cultural ideals, however, such legislation precipitated unintended or insufficient cultural change among the conquered populations. By 1571 the failure of church and state had become clear in both Granada and America.

The examples of America and Granada give rise to a simple question about empire: what do empires do with conquered or minority populations? In Granada the state decided that a successful Granada was one in which the population was sufficiently Christianized and Castilianized; in America imperial policy dictated that indigenous populations be Christianized while maintaining the cultural markers that could serve as visual signs of their inferior status. Nicolas Thomas characterizes these choices by contrasting the “Renaissance discourse of conquest and conversion,” with “modern assimilationist and segregationist projects.” I would suggest that, instead, we think of policies of conquering states as falling somewhere along a continuum with assimilationism at one pole and, for lack of a better word, segregationism at the other. The Spanish, rather than simply being concerned with “conquest and conversion,” in fact had much more complex intentions involving the cultural as well as religious assimilation of the Moriscos and the religious but not cultural assimilation of indigenous subjects in the Americas. If (as so many have suggested) diversity is one of the key components of empire, then imperial tactics for dealing with difference should be key to
understanding how an empire functions. In writing about imperial responses to difference, however, the scholar should take into account not only pronouncements coming from the center, but also local imperial projects and indigenous responses.

“An Empire of Silver”

Spain is often portrayed as an incomparably powerful state during its Golden Age. What is often overlooked, however, is the degree to which the empire was the source of Spain’s power rather than the manifestation of its power. The presence of the empire—formed through a combination of inheritance, marriage, bribery, accident, and shrewd politics—masked such inherent weaknesses of the Spanish state as a small population, lack of resources, and an underdeveloped economy. These weaknesses preceded imperial formation and eventually hastened the relative decline of the empire’s fortunes. The topic of Spanish imperial decline is one that has received considerable attention in scholarly literature, but instead of continuing this discussion ad infinitum I would rather focus on the manner in which the Spanish Empire overcame its inherent limitations to achieve relative imperial stability over huge amounts of territory. Henry Kamen has been the latest scholar to call attention to the collaborative nature of the Spanish Empire. He notes that Spaniards were merely joint participants in an international imperial enterprise also made up of Genoese and Dutch, Chinese and Filipinos, Andeans, Mexicans, Portuguese, and Africans who together shared, if unequally, the benefits and burdens of the empire. As much as the Spanish state wanted to ensure that the profits of empire would flow unimpeded back to the center, the reality was that it was often individuals, even those from outside the empire, who benefited the most from the existence of the empire. This was nowhere clearer than in the production and distribution of silver.

An “Empire of Silver,” to use John Wills’ evocative phrase, is an apt description of Spain’s empire. Perhaps no empire, anywhere, has ever been as dependent on any one commodity. Silver allowed Spain to maintain its European empire, was the absolute center of economic life in the Americas, and made the Spanish colony in the Philippines important, if not especially profitable for the state itself. 1571 was an especially crucial year for silver, both because of innovations in its production and distribution and because it offers many examples of silver’s importance.
One of the biggest boons to silver production was the discovery of the mercury mines of Huancavelica in the viceroyalty of Peru in 1568. The mercury amalgamation process had been first used in German silver mines in mid-century but it was not until the tenure of Viceroy Francisco Toledo (1568–1583) that the amalgamation process was introduced to Potosí. The mercury mines of Huencavelica had only been discovered in 1568, but by 1571 Toledo was able to organize a labor force to extract and deliver mercury to Potosí and to Peru’s other silver mines. The discovery of one of the world’s most productive mercury mines so near to the world’s largest silver mine was a fortuitous event that drastically increased the Spanish production of silver. By 1585 the implementation of the amalgamation process in the mines had helped increase silver production sevenfold, to a level that would basically be maintained for the next seventy years. One contemporary noted: “Potosí lives to serve the imposing aspirations of Spain: it serves to chastise the Turk, humble the Moor, make Flanders tremble, and terrify England.” And indeed, Potosí did do all of this. In 1571 alone American silver helped finance victories against the Ottomans at the Battle of Lepanto, against the Moriscos in Granada, and against rebels in the Low Countries. But while the potential for silver helped sustain the European empire, in reality there was never enough to support all of Spain’s imperial enterprises. By 1571 the proceeds anticipated from the next four treasure fleets had already been spent and any new venture only diverted resources from other areas of need. Preparations for war against the Ottomans, for instance, meant that the state would not be able to provide the arms, supplies, and soldiers that Philip’s representative in the Low Countries, the Duke of Alba, had requested. Alba, when learning of this slight, wrote in frustration to Philip’s secretary Zayas: “I beat my head against the wall when I hear them talk about expenses here! It is not the Turks who are troubling Christendom but the heretics, and these are already within our gates.”

There was never enough silver to meet the incredible expenses of the empire: an estimate drawn up by the crown’s accountants in 1574 listed the annual income of the treasury as 6 million ducats with obligations coming to nearly 80 million ducats! Yet the potential of future silver shipments allowed the state to secure loans which enabled it to spend far beyond its means. So while critics are correct in noting that Spain was merely an entrepôt for American silver, it should also be noted
that it was the presence of mines such as Potosí that, indirectly if not directly, allowed Spain to raise the capital that it needed to maintain its empire.

Spain’s empire in Europe would have been impossible without the silver of America and by the same token the American Empire was important mainly because it helped sustain the European Empire. Spanish imperial studies that focus too narrowly on one side of the Atlantic or the other tend to overlook the interdependence of the two halves of the Empire. But if one spends any time with the writings of Martín Enríquez and Francisco de Toledo, the viceroys of New Spain and Peru in 1571, it becomes clear that their jobs largely consisted of ensuring that the flows of silver from Zacatecas and Potosí would continue unimpeded. This manifests itself not so much through direct instructions from Spain but from the writings of both men, which show them independently recognizing the centrality of that single commodity for the health of the entire colonial enterprise. So while they knew that their success or failure would be based on the amount of silver that made it to Spain, they also realized that the metal had an additional importance for colonial society.

James Lockhart has demonstrated how Spanish settlement in Peru and New Spain was largely distributed along two trunk lines leading from an Atlantic port to the silver deposits and with a capital city acting as a hub for the route. Additionally there were smaller lines that fed labor and goods into the trunk lines. Thus, beyond merely being a source of wealth in its own right, silver also established settlement patterns and created an economy based around the supply of the mines. This phenomenon was already well established in Peru by 1571—just a generation after Pedro de la Gasca had reestablished state control over the viceroyalty with the defeat of the Almagristas and their allies—and Viceroy Toledo certainly noticed. In a letter to the King and council he noted: “It seems that the strength of the mines consists and remains in the extensive market and commerce of all the things needed by the yndios.” In a letter written in October of 1571, Viceroy Enríquez echoed Toledo: “I have done all that is possible for the mines, I favored them with yndios and with skilled people to construct and repair them because it is necessary to sustain the mines for the universal good and for the conservation of the Spaniards in this land.” He added, “if the mines fall all of the commerce of this land ceases.” The mines did not
only serve the interests of Spaniards: according to Enriquez, “as Your Majesty knows, if we do not force the yndios they will work but very little, neither for themselves nor for others.” Both Enriquez and Toledo understood the larger importance of silver not just for the empire, but for all aspects of colonial economy and society.

Silver production was not only important to the empire in Spain and America but to the world economy in general. It was in 1571 that the city of Manila was incorporated, establishing “substantial, direct, and continuous trade between America and Asia for the first time in history.” This linkage meant that beginning in 1571 all the populated continents, with the exception of Australia, began to exchange silver in quantities large enough to impact all the trading partners. The importance of Manila is an example of the benefits of empire extending beyond its borders, and even accumulating disproportionately among people and places beyond the empire’s control. The Spanish Empire was necessary to the process of silver extraction and distribution that helped create a global economy. But while the Spanish showed themselves to be very capable when it came to providing silver, they were less successful in holding on to that silver. Thus, the founding of Manila proved to be a significant event for world history made possible by the Spanish Empire but providing relatively little benefit to the Spanish state.

The issue of silver in the Spanish Empire is a case in which an imperial activity had repercussions that spread much wider than the territory of the empire. This was one of the most impressive examples of the global consequences of imperial action, but the Spanish Empire was certainly not the only empire whose activities played out on such a wide-scale. Studies of individual empires that stop at their borders, therefore, risk overlooking the broader implications of empire.

“A Happy Year for the Monarchy”: The King and the Empire

I conclude by discussing the role of the monarchy, and specifically Philip II, in the empire. It is an easy thing for scholars looking at the extensive territorial holdings of the Spanish crown to see an empire. But what of those people who actually lived within these territories? How aware were they that they were a part of a much larger entity whose authority stretched from the Mediterranean to the Pacific? The answer is that they were only intermittently aware of this because the empire only sporadically infused itself into their lives. Merchants in Mexico
were certainly aware of their place within the empire: over the course of 1571 many complained bitterly at the restrictions placed upon their activities, the heavy taxes they were burdened with, and the distance that separated their treatment from that of their counterparts in Spain. As already noted, it was clear to the viceroyes of Mexico and Peru that their primary function was to help provide for the steady flows of silver that were all that stood between the empire and financial ruin. But to most living within the Spanish domains, even to the Indians who bore the brunt of the empire’s insatiable desire for silver, the empire was an abstract notion, something that happened somewhere else. Philip II did not rule over a well-integrated empire but governed instead what David Armitage calls a “multiple kingdom,” in which various kingdoms, maintaining various degrees of autonomy, were ruled by a single sovereign. In a technical sense it was not Spain that was the heart of the empire but Philip himself. He was the one entity that truly linked the disparate peoples of the empire together.

For all but the Netherlanders—who saw him as the source of their grievances—Philip served the role of mediator and final court of appeal; someone who was at the center of the empire and yet beyond reproach. One could suggest, request, or plead to the king, but complaints would usually be directed elsewhere. Letters from America were not addressed solely to the king but to the king and the Council of the Indies. This led to some interesting tricks of grammar. In a few cases I have seen an author switch between the third person singular and third person plural depending on the tone of his writing. In one example from October of 1571, the Bishop of Cuzco spent much of his letter describing conditions in his bishopric and addressing his reader using third person singular, indicating that he was writing to the king. However, when the topic moved to complaints about the quality of the churchmen sent from Spain, he switched the form of address to the third person plural, indicating that he was now directing himself toward the council. Excessive obsequiousness was another tactic used to soften the blow of criticism. Writing in April of 1571, the sycophantic Martín Enriquez tempered his complaints concerning the lack of priests to fill New Spain’s churches by adding: “Your Majesty would be served by providing for [the churches] very soon because I understand that service to God and service to your majesty are the same.”
But it was not enough for viceroys and other high officials to acknowledge the king as imperial center: this fact had also to be recognized by regular subjects. And, at particular times, it was. For imperial subjects Philip was a last court of appeal, a person who would set right that which had been fractured by his representatives on the ground. In one interesting letter an Andean woman wrote to Philip on behalf of her son, whose father had been a member of the Inca nobility. When Manco Inca, the boy’s great-uncle, rebelled against Spanish rule, the father had remained loyal and helped defeat the insurrection. For this act the woman requested a larger repartimiento or pension for her son, since currently it earned them only 400 pesos per year. The famous nueva crónica written in Peru by Guamán Poma, although appearing at a later time, was also written specifically to the king. What these examples have in common is that blame is placed squarely on local officials while the king is held responsible only for making things right in the future rather than for enacting what had happened in the past.

Even those who never felt it necessary to write the king could be made aware of his central role. Thus the birth of a male heir for Phillip II in December of 1571 set off celebrations on both sides of the Atlantic. Where the celebrations were not spontaneous, local officials did their best to encourage people. In a congratulatory letter to the king, Francisco de Toledo wrote: “The barbarians [barbaros] make great efforts to understand the grandeur of God, and they and the other [subjects] of Your Majesty will give all their praise to our Señor as they must, and make exhibitions of rejoicing that such grand news deserves.” If they had not yet celebrated the news, Toledo makes clear, they soon would. Unseen by most of his subjects, the King became the symbolic center of the empire—at the moment of celebration, in the appeals of the downtrodden, and in the letters of his officials—linking his subjects to a single point. In this sense the empire existed as much in the imaginations of its subjects as it did anywhere else.

Much work remains to be done on the role of the emperor in an empire. Historical epochs are named after sovereigns or dynastic houses. Thus my own study is within the period of Habsburg Spain; Elizabethan England is one of the most important periods of English history; and Chinese history has traditionally been divided into dynastic eras. Yet, besides giving names to widely accepted historical periodizations, it is not clear how important was the role of individual sovereigns in the
daily life of their states. I would suggest that even the most politically active sovereign was hard pressed to make much of a difference in territories far from the center. As Martín Enriquez reminded the King in a letter from September of 1571: “That which you order there, Your Majesty, I am not able to bring about here.” A study of the symbolic role of emperors is needed to augment the many political studies of such sovereigns.

In the above I have sketched the beginnings of a much larger study of the Spanish Empire. My intent is to write a history of this particular empire but at same time suggest ways that the study of empire in general can improve. Despite the fact that historians have studied empires at least since Han Dynasty China when Sima Qian (145–87 B.C.E.) wrote his *Records of the Grand Historian*, the subject remains under-conceptualized and beset by imprecision and assumptions. If historians are ever to do more than write histories that take place within empires, perhaps we need to engage the word “empire” in the same sort of critique that anthropologists have given to the concept of “culture.”

If empire is to be a descriptive term, then what does it describe? If it is an analytical term, how does it help us analyze polities such as the Mexica state of Central Mexico and the sixteenth-century Portuguese Empire, whose only common link seems to be the appellation of “empire” that historians have bestowed on both. If we are ever to create a more precise understanding of empires we need to stop describing them in terms of what they look like and begin asking what exactly they do. How they function? What does it mean for subjects to live within them? I do not claim to have answered these questions in the above, but will continue to explore them as my work progresses.

Notes

1 Madrid became the capital of Spain in 1561, but prior to this the political center of the Iberian peninsula was focused on the person of the monarch rather than a specific locale. It is widely believed that Madrid was chosen as capital because its central location on the peninsula meant relatively short travel times to anywhere in Spain, but Henry Kamen suggests that it was chosen not because of its easy access to the rest of the country but to the various palaces and retreats of Philip II. Henry Kamen, *Philip of Spain* (New Haven: Yale


6 The literature on the Moriscos of Granada is dominated by Spanish authors and generally does not exist in translation. A few scholars are writing or have written about the Morisco period of Granadan history in English. For a somewhat outdated (it was originally published in 1901) but still informative history see Charles Lea, *The Moriscos of Spain* (New York: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1968); for more recent work see David O. Coleman, “Creating Christian Granada: Religion and Community on the Old-World Frontier, 1492–1570” (PhD diss., University of Illinois, 1996); and C. Katherine Camp, “A Divided Republic: Moriscos and old Christians in Sixteenth Century Granada” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2001). There has not been much work that explicitly connects relations with conquered populations in Granada and America, but see Antonio Garrido Arranda, *Moriscos e Indios: Precedentes Históricos de la Evangelización en México* (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1980); and Patricia Seed, *American Pentimento* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).


10 Kamen, *Empire*, 286.

11 Kamen, *Philip of Spain*, 146.

12 Kamen, *Empire*, 188.


14 AGI, Lima 28B.

15 AGI, Mexico 19, N. 73.
An Andean from the region of Huamanga in southern Peru, Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala decided to write to Philip III seeking redress for some of the failures of colonial policy. The result was a 1200-page manuscript, entitled *El primer nueva crónica y buen gobierno*, that included 398 full-page drawings and is both an account of Peruvian history under Spanish rule from the perspective of a native Andean and an eloquent expression of the day-to-day indignities of life for the colonized under Spanish imperial rule. Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala, *Nueva crónica y buen gobierno* (Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacuchos, 1980).

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CHAPTER 3

Frontier, Chinese Incorporation, and Global Perspective:
The Case of Yunnan

Bin Yang

Yunnan, at present a province in Southwest China, neighbors Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Tibet; it is not far from Thailand and India. Literally meaning “(land) south of colorful clouds,” Yunnan is the home of twenty-five officially designated minority ethnic groups (shaoshuminzu), and has come to symbolize the ability of the Chinese government to unify its various ethnic minorities. It seems that Yunnan was the southernmost limit of the continuous expansion of Chinese empires. In the twentieth century, scholars such as C.P. FitzGerald showed a particular interest in Yunnan: he regarded it as “a special case, a kind of test to which the whole process of Chinese cultural and political expansion can be subjected.”

To understand the success of Chinese imperial incorporation, it seems natural to examine Chinese imperial institutions: over a two-thousand-year period the Chinese developed sophisticated institutions to handle frontier areas and ethnic groups. Nevertheless, an approach that emphasizes only the role of China mystifies the Chinese, though this is the fashion in which the histories of Chinese frontiers are written: the Chinese came, the Chinese conquered, the Chinese won, and the Chinese civilized. Such an approach symbolizes and results from Sinocentrism. Chinese incorporation of frontier peoples can by no means be seen as having been a simple
product of Chinese expansion. After all, the Chinese were just one player in the game. What was the role of local peoples? And what was the global context?

An alternative to the national literature on frontier studies is a global approach that attempts to examine the frontiers within their own changing worlds. My research scrutinizes the transformation of Yunnan from a foreign culture into part of China between the second century B.C.E. and the twentieth century C.E. Firstly, I put Yunnan back into its own world by demonstrating its diverse connections with China, Tibet, Southeast Asia, and India. Then I examine how global forces and Chinese colonialism combined to incorporate Yunnan into the southern side of China. In this manner I argue that the transformation of Yunnan must be understood in a global context. Through this case, I call for the introduction of a global perspective into frontier histories, and into local histories as well.

This project relies not only on a global perspective but also on a long-term scope. The long-term analysis is necessary, as the Chinese efforts at incorporation lasted over two thousand years. Many transformations took place, as the various processes brought both historical continuity and development. However, the essential change was that this non-Chinese area with diverse non-Chinese peoples became part of China.

A comparison of the political landscapes of southwestern Chinese frontiers in the ninth and twentieth centuries may throw some light on my approach. The Tibetan Empire in the ninth century was a rival of Tang China, a huge source of China’s borderland and internal troubles. Tibetan forces even took over Chang’an, Tang China’s capital. The Nanzhao kingdom, based in Yunnan, allied sometimes with the Tang and sometimes with Tibet, but in either case the Nanzhao army was able at times to defeat the Tang and Tibetan forces. Three times the Nanzhao army plundered Chengdu, the cultural and commercial center of southwestern Tang China. In addition, Nanzhao invaded Southeast Asian kingdoms, regimes, and city-states, building its own tributary system: Nanzhao attacked and took over Annam at a time when it was a military protectorate of Tang China.

The map of the twentieth century was dramatically different. Tibet was administratively part of China, though culturally problematic. Yunnan was seen, with little doubt, as part of China, both administratively and culturally. And Vietnam, now an independent and rising power,
challenged and contained China in the South China Sea. What forces lay behind these two contrasting cultural and political maps? A long-term and geographically broad approach is necessary to account for the change.

Understanding how Yunnan was transformed from a foreign culture into a frontier province of China over the course of two thousand years can yield significant findings for world history as a research field. Previous studies always looked at Yunnan from the side of China and remained restricted within the national boundary. A global perspective will present a distinctive picture of Yunnan, much different from what has been found in Chinese history. First, my research demonstrates Yunnan’s dynamic connections with China, Southeast Asia, Tibet, and India. What I have called the Southwest Silk Road - centered in Yunnan and connecting these regions - illustrates Yunnan’s global significance and adds a new dimension to Eurasian interactions and world history. Second, this research project examines how global interactions shaped the trajectory of Yunnan in the long term. Yunnan’s subjection to China, I argue, could not be accounted for within the confines of national history: global forces contributed as much as Chinese colonialism to the formation of present-day Yunnan. Further, the case of Yunnan may contribute to the theoretical construction of incorporation in World-System analysis. This research provides a case study of pre-capitalist incorporation: how the Chinese empire, a world empire, transformed an external area into a periphery.

A Capsule History of Yunnan

Before their contact with the Chinese empire, the various peoples in the land later called Yunnan had developed sophisticated societies. Based on Chinese texts, we can create a sketchy map of Yunnan in the third century B.C.E. According to Sima Qian, the grand historian of the Han state, there were many tribes, tribal alliances, or kingdoms, including Yelang, Dian, Mosha, Laojin, Mimo, Kunming, the Ailao people, Pu, Qiongdu, Ranpang, Baima, Gouting, Louwo, and Qielan. In a word, peoples living around Yunnan were diverse and there was not a single name either for the indigenes or for the area in which they lived. Certainly they had their own terms for their homeland, though gradually these words disappeared, overcome by Chinese counterparts.
From the early third century B.C.E., the Qin kingdom gradually expanded into the Yangzi valley. It first subjugated the Shu and Ba peoples, and then moved towards the Chu area. To counter-attack the Qin advance, Zhuang Qiao, a Chu general, led a long march into Yunnan, conquered the Dian kingdom, and established himself as the King of Dian. The collapse of the Qin state at the end of the third century B.C.E. left these peoples unattended until the expansion of the Western Han dynasty (207 B.C.E. – 9 C.E.).

In the beginning, the Western Han Empire paid attention primarily to its internal stability and economic recovery. However, during the rule of Emperor Wu (140 B.C.E.–87 B.C.E.), the Han expanded dramatically. Yelang was subjugated in 135 B.C.E. and incorporated into the new Jianwei prefecture. Then the Qiong and Zuo peoples “asked” for the same treatment as the Yelang, presumably under the threat of force from the Han. Han officials were assigned to oversee the Qiong and Zuo peoples. At the end of the second century B.C.E., another four prefectures (Yuexi, Shenli, Wenshan, and Wudu) were set up to the south and west of Sichuan. The Han now turned to central Yunnan: the Laojin and Mimo were destroyed by the Han army in 109 B.C.E., and the Dian kingdom, with no choice left, surrendered. The Yizhou prefecture was set up to administer the Dian kingdom, and a gold seal was awarded to the King of Dian, who was kept on to rule his people. Under the Yizhou prefecture a county called “Yunnan” was established. It was called Yunnan because it was located south of Yunling Mountain (Clouds Mountain). In a word, “Yunnan” was a word imposed on local peoples by Chinese authority.

The Eastern Han continued the campaign of southern expansion for a time. The first century C.E. saw the submission of the Ailao people and the formation of the Yongchang prefecture. But the collapse of the Eastern Han in the early third century left Yunnan independent from that time until the Mongol conquest in the mid-thirteenth century. During this period of longer than a millennium, the peoples of Yunnan nominally submitted to central Chinese states or to states centered on Sichuan. In practice, however, local rulers managed their own business and Chinese states were hardly able to intervene.

In the mid-seventh century, the Nanzhao Kingdom (literally “Southern Kingdom”), one of the many local regimes, gained the support of Tang China and Tibet, and for the first time unified most of
Yunnan. From then onward, Nanzhao, Tang China and Tibet had played a remarkable romance of international politics. Nanzhao, although relatively small, defeated both of its powerful neighbors, and expanded its power and influence into mainland Southeast Asia. In the early tenth century, the Dali kingdom replaced Nanzhao in Yunnan. The Dali kingdom repeatedly appealed to the Song court for tributary relations, attempting to build a peaceful relationship and regular trade. The Song, under unprecedented pressure from its northern frontiers, kept refusing the Dali requests. However, horses from Yunnan were crucial for Song China’s defense against the Mongols. The demand for warhorses from Yunnan forced the Song to build a kind of commercial partnership with Dali, as horse markets were established along Sichuan and Guangxi frontiers by the Song.

The rise of the Mongols in Central Asia dramatically changed power structures in the eastern Eurasian continent. After destroying the Jin kingdom, the Mongol cavalry turned its steeds toward the Song dynasty. Facing persistent resistance along the Yangzi River, the Mongols made a brave decision to take over Dali. In 1253 Kublai Khan led the Mongols to complete a march through the Tibetan plateau and conquered Yunnan, thereby placing the Song under siege. Yunnan became the springboard for the Mongols’ southward and eastward move into Southeast Asia and China. A quarter century later, the Mongols unified China.

Reviewing the military campaigns against Yunnan over one thousand years, one sees that it was ironically the Mongols, the non-Chinese “barbarians,” who succeeded in bringing Yunnan into China proper. From that time onward Chinese states, whatever their changes, did not lose control of Yunnan. Military and administrative incorporation started by the Mongol Yuan Empire opened the road to Chinese biological, economic, and cultural penetrations. The Ming and Qing empires moved more than three million Han Chinese into Yunnan, which set the demographical structure for modern Yunnan. By the late Ming, Han Chinese had become the largest ethnic group in Yunnan and continued to introduce their institutions.

The Yuan dynasty, while introducing central administrative hierarchy into Yunnan, acknowledged the power of local chieftains. As a compromise, local chieftains were incorporated into the central system of officialdom. As a result, the so-called Tusi (Local Chieftain) System was established. The following period witnessed tensions and
contentions between central authority and local regimes. Central states managed to reduce local power and break down local power systems and institutions, though facing fierce resistance. Transforming local chieftains into agents of central administration (*Gaitu guiliu*) began as soon as the *Tusi* System was created. This process of reducing the power of local chiefs continued until the end of the Qing Empire, and was resumed under Republican China. Some local chiefs retained power, mainly in southwestern frontier areas, until the arrival of the Communists in the 1950s.

As the heir to imperial China, the People’s Republic of China continued to penetrate Yunnan. A large program was launched from the 1950s to the 1980s, classifying local ethnic groups into twenty-five nationally designated ethnicities (*minzu*). Minority autonomous regions (at prefecture, county, and town levels) were established, as a counterpart and heir to the local chieftain system. By incorporating ethnic minorities into the Chinese political system and the large Chinese national family (*zhonghuaminzu dajiating*), the Chinese state finally achieved what imperial China had attempted to do.

Today both central and local governments take Yunnan as a model of ethnic harmony and frontier stability, in sharp contrast to Tibet and Xinjiang, the other two ethnic frontier regions. While the latter two have drawn a lot of international attention, the case of Yunnan deserves our efforts to understand both the intricate Chinese imperial institutions of incorporation and the broader historical contexts.

**A Global Perspective on a Local Region**

Yunnan, as a center of cross-regional trade, had cultivated close relationships with neighboring areas of East Asia and Southeast Asia. Ironically, neither Chinese studies nor Southeast Asian studies have paid appropriate attention to Yunnan. As a result, neither Yunnan’s significance in Eurasian communications nor its importance in Eurasian power struggles has been realized. William McNeill, in *The Rise of the West*, while noticing the northern expansion of the lower Mekong-based kingdom, ignored Nanzhao, the great Southeast Asian empire, and its southern influence. In *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia* similarly neglected Nanzhao when discussing early kingdoms in Southeast Asia. In *The Cambridge History of China*, when Tang China is examined, the
Nanzhao kingdom is largely overlooked: for the period of the Song and Yuan (907-1368), studies of the four northern non-Chinese regimes (the Khitan Liao, the Tangut Xixia, the Juren Jin, and the Mongolian Yuan) constitute a volume, while the Dali kingdom (937–1253), a southern non-Chinese kingdom, is neglected. More interestingly, Chinese history endorsed by the Chinese state, while claiming that Yunnan has been part of China since the Qin-Han era, leaves no place for Nanzhao or Dali in the standard Chinese Historical Chronology (*Zhongguo Lishi Nianbiao*).

The absence of Nanzhao both in Chinese and Southeast Asian studies indeed exemplifies the awkwardness of the frontier in area studies. While area studies have contributed to our understanding of the diverse cultures and peoples of the world, and have provided a basis for the emergence of world history, they have created and enhanced imagined boundaries. History was born much earlier than the nation and state, and demarcated boundaries seldom existed in early times. To understand the past of our world, we cannot just roll the national wheel back into pre-national times. We have to completely erase the boundaries both in reality and in our minds. In this manner, the employment of a global perspective in frontier history characterizes my research.

By a global perspective, I mean a cross-regional/national/cultural approach or cross-border perspective. I emphasize connections and interactions across imagined regional boundaries; I utilize World-System analysis and a cross-regional approach, both of which are classified as global. The difference between them is that World-System analysis regards the research area as a kind of World-System because of its frequent and systematic connections, while a cross-regional approach may not treat these areas as a unity but still emphasizes the significance of their interactions.

My focus on the so-called Southwestern Silk Road demonstrates the importance of Yunnan in commercial and cultural exchanges. Yunnan has never been as isolated by mountains, rivers, harsh climates, or ethnic barriers as commonly thought. This road network began to function as early as the second century B.C.E. Diverse goods, such as silk, cotton, salt, tea, horses, jade, ivory, lumber, gold, silver, copper, tin, lead, and local products were circulated, as well as religions such as Buddhism, Taoism, and Islam. Stretching from the southern coast of Indochina to as far north as the northern Tibet Plateau, this road met the Sea Silk
Road and the Silk Road, so that Tibet, China, Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia were linked together. Thereby, the three silk roads, from north to south, from the Central Asian grasslands to the sea, criss-crossed the Eurasian super-continent and constituted a temporal and spatial communication web.

My research attempts to fit Yunnan into a global context. Culturally, racially, economically, and politically, Yunnan should be seen as “Southeastern Asian,” at least until the Mongol conquest in the mid-thirteenth century. My study reveals that neither Yunnan’s political subjugation nor its economic incorporation into China was made solely by Chinese states. It was the Mongols who, by bringing Yunnan into China proper, completed what the previous great Chinese empires, the Han and Tang, had failed to achieve. In short, a legacy of international power struggles shaped modern southwest Chinese boundaries.

Similarly, Chinese economic incorporation of Yunnan was also shaped and facilitated by global forces. The replacement of Yunnan’s cowry money with Chinese copper coins in the Ming-Qing transition should be attributed, to a great extent, to the expansion of trans-Atlantic slave trade. The cowry money system emerged in Yunnan in the ninth century and lasted until the mid-seventeenth century. Both the Yuan dynasty and the Ming dynasty attempted to replace cowry money with paper money or copper cash, but with little success. However, the rise of slave trade in the Atlantic attracted a large amount of cowries from the Indian Ocean and dramatically increased the price of cowries. As a result, cowries no longer flowed into Yunnan. Put simply, the western outflow of cowries in the Indian Ocean facilitated the southern expansion of the Chinese monetary system into Yunnan during the mid-seventeenth century.

Likewise, Japan’s control over copper exports to China in the early eighteenth century forced the Qing state to explore the copper mining industry in Yunnan, a risky project to undertake in a frontier province. During the whole eighteenth century, Yunnan served as the major provider of copper for the imperial minting furnaces, which produced millions of coins for the giant world economy. In some years nearly 7,000 tons of copper were shipped from the mountains in Yunnan to Beijing through the Yangzi River and the Grand Canal. Tens of thousands of miners worked the ores. In this manner, Yunnan’s economic reorientation, just like its military submission, served to reveal the vivid global influence
on its local trajectory. Therefore, the formation of modern Yunnan could not be accounted for only within the category of China. Rather, global forces shaped the transformation of Yunnan over a long period.

A Case of Pre-Capitalist Incorporation

Since Immanuel Wallerstein’s first book on the Modern World-System in 1974, his constructive approach to human history has been widely acknowledged, hotly debated, much mediated and applied by many scholars of diverse backgrounds. The process of the incorporation of external areas into the modern World-System has won a lot of attention, as this process accompanied the formation and development of the core-periphery structure. Consequently, some scholars have begun to examine the process of incorporation both in modern and ancient times. Thomas Hall, in his study of the American Southwest frontier, demonstrates that incorporation by the modern World-System greatly changed the frontier society, though this process did not leave much influence on the system itself.\(^8\) Thus Hall has established a bridge between the frontier and the World-System: that is, how Wallerstein’s modern World-System incorporated and marginalized an external area.\(^9\) This is a way to write world history: the incorporation of frontiers into the World-System. David Wilkinson’s notion of Central Civilization develops a similar idea although with different terms. His Central Civilization originated in 1500 B.C.E., but gradually absorbed (incorporated) neighboring civilizations (and frontiers?) and began to become global after 1500 C.E.\(^10\)

The study of Yunnan’s transformation is precisely such a process of transformation from an external area into a periphery, exemplifying a pre-capitalist incorporation of a world empire. China originated in the Wei River valley, and gradually incorporated the neighboring areas and peoples. From a small tribe near the Yellow River to the huge empires such the Han and the Tang, Chinese history was to a great extent the history of incorporation. While the dimensions of China have continually changed themselves, the experience of incorporation has successfully created institutions to transform others through the process of “sinicization.” My study of Yunnan is aimed to reveal this mechanism, and to present a case of the pre-capitalist incorporation of a World-System.
Yunnan as a Frontier: A Comparative and Global Assessment

Western scholars, pioneered by Owen Lattimore, have contributed much to Chinese frontier studies. During the last three decades, many studies have examined Chinese frontier areas including Manchuria, Xinjiang, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Taiwan. Books, dissertations, and papers on the southwestern frontiers, while contributing much to our understanding as case studies, mainly focus on the period after Yunnan was conquered, and do little to reveal the role of Yunnan in cross-regional interactions or the transformation of Yunnan as a macro-region. Most of these works confine Yunnan within the imagined national boundaries of China. As the price of this approach, global context and foreign influence on the frontier were taken as non-existent.

Furthermore, while those studies help understand the formation and transformation of Chinese frontiers, they generally ignore the significance of Chinese frontiers in a comparative context. Could Chinese frontiers be compared with European counterparts, the Great Frontier in North America, or the tropical frontier in South America? Were there any common features? And what is the comparative and global implication of Chinese frontiers and incorporation? Indeed, scholars of Chinese frontiers have already begun to apply paradigms created in American frontier studies to Chinese cases. Here I would like to review how the Great Frontier studies pushed me to think over the case of Yunnan.

The term “frontier” is a key word in the American lexicon, since it symbolizes the vigor and elasticity of American culture, virtue and people. To many Americans, the frontier not only reveals the essence of the American past, but also determines their future. That is why frontier studies have remained a focus of scholarship even though over a hundred years have passed since F. J. Turner’s 1893 address. In recent years, the World-System approach and the middle-ground paradigm have been introduced into this field. These approaches have provided us with a more complicated and intricate landscape of frontier societies, as mutual borrowing and cultural adaptations are presented as taking place all the time. It is exaggerated to embrace F. J. Turner’s statement that the Great Frontier had built Americanness, but he was right to emphasize the significance of the frontier to Americanization. As the Great Frontier contributed much to American identity, what about the importance of the two-thousand-year frontier experience to the Chinese? Specifically
in this research, how did this process in Yunnan contribute to Chinese identity or Chinese culture? A tentative comparison of Yunnan and the Great Frontier may shed some light on these questions.

First of all, the Chinese did not decimate the indigenes, although violent military campaigns took place. The large number of the indigenes hence distinguishes the Yunnan frontier, a major factor challenging Chinese states and the incorporation project. When the Ming army conquered Yunnan in 1383, the Emperor had to station nearly 100,000 soldiers to ensure that the new frontier remained under control. And more soldiers joined in later campaigns. As a result, by the end of the sixteenth century, the Ming state had stationed about 280,000 soldiers in Yunnan.\(^\text{15}\) While the total population of Han immigrants and descendants at the end of the Ming reached about three million, so that the Han people became the largest ethnic group, the native population was not outnumbered by Han Chinese until the nineteenth century.\(^\text{16}\)

Second, bio-ecological environment, unlike that in the Great Frontier, proved to be a barrier to the Chinese and a haven for the indigenes. Malaria and other tropical and subtropical diseases increased the difficulty of Chinese penetration. Chinese imperial records report that diseases helped the Nanzhao army defeat a Tang force of 200,000 soldiers. Chinese sojourners wrote poems to complain of the unfavorable nature of Yunnan. Such a problem troubled the Chinese until the modern medical system was introduced in the mid-twentieth century.

Moreover, the Yunnan frontier lasted much longer than the American process, mainly due to the above two reasons. Taking the Western Han conquest into account, the process had gone on for over two thousand years. Or at least it lasted seven to eight centuries if we start from the Mongol period. Such a long-term process of frontier experience may be unique in the world.

Finally, the indigenes in Yunnan had long-term interactions not only with the Chinese, but also with other peoples such as Tibetans and peoples in Southeast Asia. These experiences made them able to develop and utilize many connections, institutions, and sources for their resistance against Chinese colonialism. All these factors, however, did not stop the Chinese colonial efforts nor succeed in driving the Chinese away.

The large population of the indigenes posed a crucial project to Chinese states and to scholars like us. How to rule them? How to define them? How did these peoples identify themselves? Did they see
themselves as Chinese? If so, when and why? What forces lay behind
this change in identification? And if the decimated Native Americans
seemed too weak to challenge the American government, then why did
the populous indigenes in Yunnan not to seek independence from China
in the colonial or post-colonial period, as did some Tibetans or those
in Xinjiang? The key to these questions is that the long-term frontier
experience in Yunnan did indeed create a new local identity, that is,
a Yunnanese identity, an unprecedented thing. The emergence and
acceptance of this local identity implied the acknowledgement of being
Chinese subjects, and it provided a basis for the future acceptance of
Chinese national identity.

My research will reveal that during the late sixteenth century, a
kind of new local identity, the Yunnanese (Yunnan ren), was created,
as a result of long-term interactions between native peoples and
Chinese immigrants. Such a result was caused by the sinicization
(huahua) of the indigenous population, on the one hand, and the
indigenization (tuzhuhua) of Chinese immigrants on the other hand.
Social elites (firstly, Yunnan Confucian students, mainly descendants
of Chinese immigrants) identified themselves as Yunnanese, though
mass identification as Yunnanese took place much later. Underlying
such a change in identity was the general transformation of Yunnan
society, including demography, administration, economy, and culture.
The identity of the Yunnanese, a provincial-level identity, not only
demonstrated the success of Chinese incorporation, but also added a
new dimension to Chinese identity, or to Chineseness. It was multi-
cultural sixteenth-century Yunnan that inspired Yang Shen, one of the
best scholars in the Ming period, to comment, “The Chinese are a truly
cosmopolitan people, the heirs of all mankind, of the entire world. The
Han are just one of the ethnic groups in the empire, and we include
many different types of people. In Yunnan alone there are over twenty
other non-Han native peoples. So long as they accept the emperor’s
rule, they are Chinese.”

Finally, I raise a global question arising from Chinese incorporation
of Yunnan. The Ming Empire, the Russian Empire, and European
empires began their migrations into Yunnan, Siberia, and the Americas, respectively, almost at the same time - mainly in the long sixteenth century. Were these colonizations parts of a single global project? Was there any global force was behind these simultaneous movements? Or were they not relevant at all? How could these advances into frontier areas help our understanding of the so-called “modern” empires such as England and “traditional” empires such as the Ming and the Qing?

Conclusion

The transformation of Yunnan accompanied the development of Chinese empire territorially, culturally, and ethnically. Indeed, Yunnan entered China just as China entered its late imperial or modern era. As a frontier area connecting several cultures and peoples, Yunnan and its history are difficult to fit into any national or regional approach that, more or less, serves to build a national legend. The fate of Yunnan was held neither in the hand of the indigenous nor in the hand of the Chinese: global interactions, to a great extent, created present-day Yunnan. Such a complex picture sharply contrasts with what has been found in histories of China where Yunnan is assumed to be part of China since the very beginning and where the Chinese have brought civilization into Yunnan. This local history must be rewritten with a global perspective.

Notes

2 Some of them indeed moved from Central Asia, and some indigenous peoples in Yunnan might have moved to mainland Southeast Asia.
6 History Research Institute, Social Science Academy, China, Zhongguo Lishi Nianbiao (Chinese History Chronology) (Beijing: Shehuike xue Chubanshe, 2002). By contrast, all the Liao, Xixia, Jin and Mongol kingdoms are listed.


8 Thomas Hall, Social Change in the Southwest, 1350-1880 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989).


15 Lu Ren, Jiaoliu yu Ronghe: Mingdai Yunnan de Yimin (Interactions and Amalgamations: The Ming Immigration in Yunnan) (Kunming: Yunnan Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2001), 39–44.


Giersch, Charles Patterson. “Qing China’s Reluctant Subject: Indigenous Communities and Empire along the Yunnan Frontier.” PhD diss., Yale University, 1998.


“Sir, we can fight well, but we do not understand military arrangements.” “Bobs Bahadur,” Masculinity and Racial Policy in Britain’s Army of India

Jeremy Neill

One of the most peculiar and complex examples of cross-cultural interaction in world history is the British Raj, where a relative handful of soldiers and administrators governed millions of people who shared a very different society from that of their rulers. How was this managed? Stalin once referred to it as an absurdity, but there must be some rational explanation. This study focuses on one way in which this absurdity was made comprehensible, through the lens of Indian Army frontier action and recruitment policy. Essentially, it was a quest for sameness, a level where the British and their subjects could interact in a way comprehensible and rational to both sides. The British tools were race, religion, and masculinity. Masculinity was vital in this construction, as the shared qualities of manhood that the British saw in what came to be known as the “martial races” became a means of control essential to the maintenance of British rule. While there were early notions of martial qualities inherent in certain groups in the East India Company days, these qualities were emphasized more after the Mutiny of 1857. Essentially utilitarian at the outset, dividing castes and races by loyalty, the post-Mutiny Army of India was increasingly built on lines that emphasized the supposed martial qualities of select groups that could be scientifically measured.
Before the outbreak of the Second Afghan War (1878–1880), the British had taken a new interest in the peoples of the North-West Frontier, as both a problem and an opportunity. Their aggressive raiding of the lower-lying farm territories of the Punjab was a constant problem, yet many men came across the frontier looking to enlist, a tradition that went back to the days of the Mughal invasion of India and continued as the armies of the princedoms hired them as mercenaries. Many had moved north after the final defeat of Tippu Sultan at the beginning of the century, seeking work in central India, and the post-Mutiny assessments saw these freebooters looking for any excuse to fight as one of the primary sources of trouble. What better way to control them within India than to bring them into the organization of the army, since this had proved to be a solution that worked in the Scottish Highlands a century earlier? The problem thereafter was what to do about those on the other side of the frontier, and the solution was the Second Afghan War.

This war was in many ways a mistake. The First Afghan War had been a complete disaster, with the infamous retreat from Kabul, but the second would be more successful, if not necessarily strategically, then at least for the prestige of the British Army. Lord Roberts of Kandahar would earn his title here, and would earn the fame that got him referred to as “Bobs Bahadur” in Kipling’s soldier stories. It also became a focal point of the popular culture image of the North-West frontier of India, with its rugged mountains, exotic people, and heroic tales of ambush and siege that were suited to the image of the empire as a place of adventure. In spite of the fact that the war did not put an end to the problems of the North-West frontier in any sense, it did place it in the public eye to an extent not seen before - and made service on the frontier an earnest desire of most young officers going to India.

Lord Roberts of Kandahar, hero of the Second Afghan War and later one of the most influential Commanders-in-Chief of the Indian Army, most heavily emphasized this concept of “martial” races. In the view of Roberts and many like him, the British rulers of India, and British officers in the Indian Army, were there to provide paternal guidance to the Indian people, who had admirable qualities but lacked the capacity for self-government. Roberts’ memoirs cite one example of how he developed his particular attitude during the Mutiny:
After the fight was over, one of the Native officers, bemoaning the loss of the British officers, asked me who would be sent to replace them. He added: *‘Sahib, ham log larai men bahut tez hain magar jang ka bandobast nahin jante’* (‘Sir, we can fight well, but we do not understand military arrangements’). What the old soldier intended to convey to me was his sense of the inability of himself and his comrades to do without the leadership and general management of the British officers.²

While the bond between British officer and Indian men was in many cases genuine, it is also true that the system which denied command positions to sepoys made sure that no Native Officer could “understand military arrangements,” since all major decisions were made by British officers.

Maintaining the racial superiority of the British was key to maintaining order. Roberts attributed a weakening of this prestige as the main factor in allowing the Mutiny to occur. In his opinion:

> An army of Asiatics, such as we maintain in India, is a faithful servant, but a treacherous master; powerfully influenced by social and religious prejudices with which we are imperfectly acquainted, it requires the most careful handling; above all, it must never be allowed to lose faith in the prestige or supremacy of the governing race.⁴

Leadership was key in maintaining this prestige, and Roberts judged those viceroys he served under by that lens. He would develop a strong relationship with the Viceroy Lord Lytton during the Afghan War, and preferred the politician who shared his aggressive outlook, particularly on the frontier.

Roberts was placed in command of one of the columns that invaded Afghanistan in 1879 (Second Afghan War), and soon showed his skill in command at the battle of Peiwar Kotal. The campaign also posed some interesting problems that Roberts would deal with in the future, particularly the problematic loyalty of Muslim sepoys recruited from the frontier. In his annual reports for the campaign, composed in February of 1879 after the initial battles of the campaign, Roberts assessed his regiments, and held out his highest praise for the Gurkhas, “I give the palm to the Goorkhas, they simply do not know what fear is.” While “[t]he behavior of some Pathans in
the 29th N.I. was unfortunate, and I much regretted having to sentence one man to death... but prompt action was necessary, or the infection would have spread. Moollahs abound in Kurram and Khost and the people are very fanatical...”6 The importance of this action is that it demonstrates a switch from essential qualities of loyalty to a racial construct. The frontier Pathan was considered a natural fighter, and his problematic loyalty was secondary to his martial quality essential for the Indian Army.

Roberts’ reputation was made by his march to the relief of Kandahar, what became known as the Kabul-to-Kandahar march, something greatly followed by the popular press. Roberts actually considered the initial capture and defense of Kabul the greater victory, but the march captured the public imagination as a daring maneuver after the bloody defeat at Maiwand. Roberts developed the strong belief that the defeat at Maiwand was due to the majority of the Native Infantry troops being from the Bombay presidency, and was disgusted by what he saw as the poor morale and leadership of the force besieged at Kandahar. This led to the major lesson Roberts learned from the Second Afghan War: British officers needed to be men with “force of character” to ensure the reliability of those fighting races that made up the Army. Roberts drew two further conclusions from the war: that war with Russia remained inevitable and the “forward policy” needed to be maintained by a more aggressive government at home, and that many of his Indian troops were not reliable. The “martial races” of Sikhs, Gurkhas, and Dogras needed to be the backbone of the Army – a policy he would begin to effect when he became Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army in 1884. His early experiences in the Mutiny likely aided in forming these ideas, but the Second Afghan War confirmed them. The loyalty of the troops would be maintained by the moral courage of the British officers who led them and the fundamental bond this created between men. In his report to the Adjutant-general in September of 1880, he made his opinion of the southern sepoys clear, stating:

It is impossible to conclude without recording my opinion that, in physique and fighting power, the Bombay sepoy is unfit for service in Afghanistan. The people in the neighborhood speak of them with open contempt, and many, I understand, predicted that on the departure of the Bengal troops, in April last, troubles would arrive [a reference to Maiwand and the subsequent siege of Kandahar]7
Categorizing the tribes of the frontier region, as well as looking more closely at the races within India that could be useful for their martial qualities in facing off against Russian troops, became a renewed priority after the Second Afghan War, and ethnographic studies became incorporated into policy making, particularly in the military with Lord Roberts as Commander-in-Chief. This policy was tied in to scientific interest in the question of race that came with Darwin, as well as the growing field of philology that sought to put order to the world by the study of language. These two philosophies came together in the field of Aryan studies. Originating with Indo-European language roots, the Aryan school believed that the common roots of Europeans originated in central Asia, and that the ancient invaders of India were part of the same group that settled Europe, meaning the Anglo-Saxon and the martial races that conquered Dravidian India shared a common ancestry.

This idea was used after 1850 for two purposes, both to justify the British occupation of India as a reunion of branches of the Aryan race and to denounce it as oppressing fellow racial brethren. In either case, the big losers in the racial game were the darker Dravidian peoples of southern India. Phrenologists attempted to link language types with cranial structure in order to create a coherent idea of race in scientific terms, as race had always been a fluid term for groups. In practical terms, this meant greatly reduced military recruitment in Southern India, as non-Aryan peoples who had lived under conquest could not by definition be martial. Ironically, this meant that the very people who Clive and his successors had led as sepoys in the conquest of India for the EIC were no longer considered fit to be soldiers. There was also a growing belief that people from warmer climates were ‘enervated’ and lacked manly vigor (an idea that has proven remarkably persistent).\(^8\)

Roberts’ actions when he became Commander-in-Chief in India reflected two beliefs. One: that the southern sepoy was essentially worthless for anything but internal policing and could never be pitted against European troops, particularly the swarms of Cossacks that Roberts imagined pouring through the Khyber. Secondly, change in recruitment should not be openly stated for political reasons, as it would lead to unrest, particularly among the Bengalis.\(^9\) The martial-race theory presented a conundrum. How could a race be martial if it never got a chance to prove itself? In that sense, the attitude towards the southern races was a self-fulfilling prophecy. Roberts
had to struggle with others in the Army who stood by the quality of the regiments they commanded and wanted the soldiers recruited in the south of India to have a ‘sporting chance’ in war. In a memo Roberts also dismissed doubts that exclusive recruitment from the north would produce adequate numbers of troops, “... so long as the Government are wise enough to treat the Native soldiers liberally, we need have no anxiety as to their willingness to go on service; certainly not such men as Sikhs, Goorkhas and the majority of Pathans, who love fighting and the excitement of war.”

An analysis of the composition of the Indian Army shows trends in recruiting from various groups after the Mutiny. A close survey of the Bengal army at the close of the Mutiny as requested by the Peel commission returned the following statistics:

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<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Regular troops</th>
<th>Irregular troops</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Christians</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td>572</td>
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<td>Muslims</td>
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<td>5,684</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>10,452</td>
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<td>Brahmins</td>
<td>6,549</td>
<td>1,882</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>8,526</td>
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<td>Rajputs</td>
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<td>3,460</td>
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<td>10,362</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4,002</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>8,818</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sikhs</td>
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<td>4,337</td>
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<td>Huzara Tribes</td>
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<td>Predatory Tribes</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The immediately striking numbers are the numerous irregular Sikhs and especially Punjabis who joined up to fight against the Mutineers, considering how few had been in the regular army before the Mutiny. An examination of the Army in 1880 shows how much the recruitment of the regular Army reflected the loyalty of the groups that had eagerly joined the British in suppressing the rebels:

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<th>15,422</th>
<th>8,867</th>
<th>6,418</th>
<th>12,990</th>
<th>11,771</th>
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<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>23,187</td>
<td>52,022</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>77,133</td>
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</table>

More than half of Bengal’s soldiers now came from outside Bengal, and Punjabis were now a predominant minority in the Presidential Army. In religious terms, Sikhs were now wildly disproportionate, almost equaling Muslims and combined with Muslims equaling Hindus in numbers. Other Presidencies show similarly skewed numbers. Also, the preference for soldiers from the more northerly princely kingdoms with their descendants of Mahratta and Muslim mercenaries looking for service is notable. By way of comparison, the Madras Army was half the size of the Bengal Army, which reflected the security of the south as well as the possible impression that there was a lack of recruits to be found there to make the army any larger.

Prior to the Second Afghan war, studies of race tended to be cursory, focusing on larger patterns of racial stock, but in the 1880s studies began to become more focused in terms of the study of racial characteristics. In India, the British tended to use the term “race” rather fluidly to suit divisions they perceived among the peoples there, but new studies put a more scientific stamp on these divisions by creating hereditary racial explanations for these divisions, particularly caste and the “martial races.”

Prewar studies of the frontier fall into this pattern, focusing mostly on the military potential of the tribes in the region. Most fascinating are...
the physical descriptions and the accounts of character that were used in surveys of the frontier region, as they initially contain little quantitative data, but are instead based on aesthetic views of the male body. For example, in H. W. Bellew’s survey of the people of Afghanistan:

Physically they [the Ghilji] are a remarkably fine race, and in stature, courage and strength of body are second to none in Afghanistan; but they are a very barbarous people, the pastoral clans especially, and in their wars especially savage and vindictive.¹⁴

Or those of more positive character:

As a race the Tajiks of the plains are a handsome people, of a tall stature, and robust frames. They are of a peaceable disposition [sic], industrious, and frugal in their habits, and fond of social gatherings and amusements.¹⁵

One thing that is striking about these descriptions is how male-centered they are. While seclusion of Muslim women is one reason for this, there is little attempt to even inquire about women, and the entire tribe is characterized by the way the British observer sees its men. There were exceptions, but usually women were only discussed in their relationships with men.

The principal study of the races of the Punjab frontier area, including the Afghan border, was Denzil Ibbetson’s *Punjab Castes*, published in 1883. Ibbetson’s report, undertaken in part at the request of the government but published commercially as well, was the first attempt to scrutinize the tribes of the frontier in detail. What emerges is a study of “character” that combines admiration and disdain, reflecting the adventurous Victorian scholar’s mix of envy of the natural life and disgust at the “barbaric” behavior associated with it. His main focus is on the two major groups on the frontier, the Pathan and the Baluchi. He finds the Baluchi honorable and courageous, with physical qualities matching his character in his “manly bearing.” It had become a predominant Victorian belief in the Anglophone world that a person’s physique reflected his character, which helped feed the new emphasis on sport and exercise, so that the soldier’s enthusiasm for sport became an important
social marker for martial character in war.

So if the Baluchis had all of these characteristics of courage and a manly bearing, why did they not enlist in the Army? This was a problem that perplexed the British, although on the bright side the Baluchis seldom caused trouble for local authorities the way the Pathans did. Ibbetson claimed that the Baluchis saw cleanliness as a mark of effeminacy. The cleanliness that was a standard part of the drill of the sepoy in the Indian Army therefore would not be conducive to the Baluchi in Ibbetson’s model. There were of course other reasons for the lack of Baluchi recruits that had more to do with resentment of the British and the traditional enemies of the Baluchis that the British took into the army, particularly the Sikh and the Pathan. Ibbetson takes this more complicated social and political structure, of which he was at least somewhat aware, and boils it down to a gendered structure of the Baluchis regarding clean uniforms as effeminate.

In contrast, the Pathan signed up for the Army in large numbers, though Ibbetson expresses his reservations at the same time as he gives the reason for British acceptance of Pathan sepoys:

For centuries he has been, on our frontier at least, subject to no man. He leads a wild, free active life in the rugged fastness of the mountains; there is an air of masculine independence about him which is refreshing in a country like India. He is a bigot of the most fanatical type, exceedingly proud, and extraordinarily superstitious. He is of stalwart make, and his features are of a markedly Semitic type.16

So in spite of his ignorance and religious prejudice, the Pathan still seems to be better in the eyes of Ibbetson than most of the inhabitants of India. The refreshing air of masculine independence that Ibbetson ascribes to the Pathan strongly implies that this is not a characteristic that men in India possess in general. The characterization of the Pathan as Semitic marked an important differentiation from the Dravidian peoples of the plains, and was an important aspect of the philosophical studies of the frontier.

Of the most problematic race on the frontier, the Afridi, Ibbetson quotes with approval from an earlier Gazetteer of the North West Frontier that the Afridi are the most difficult to deal with:
Yet he is reputed brave, and that by men who have seen him fighting; and he is on the whole the finest of the Pathan races of our border. His physique is exceptionally fine, and he is really braver, more open and more treacherous than other Pathans. This much is certain, that he has the power of prejudicing Englishmen in his favor; and few are brought into contact with him that do not at least begin with enthusiastic admiration for his manliness. He is tall, spare, wiry and athletic; hardy and active, but impatient of heat.17

So here Ibbetson at least recognizes the gendered context of the dealings between the British and the Afridi, and that the “enthusiastic admiration for his manliness” does “prejudice Englishmen in his favor.” The same statement could be made across the frontier, as Ibbetson’s own descriptions can attest, though one wonders how someone can be more open and more treacherous at the same time without at least a qualifying “seemingly” in there somewhere.

Ibbetson then devotes most of his study to pinpointing the different tribal divisions among the Pathans. He first notes the separation between highland and lowland Pathans:

Such is the Pathan in his home among the fastnesses of the frontier ranges. But the Pathans of our rule have been much softened by our rule and by the agricultural life of the plains, so that they look down upon the Pathans of the hills, and their proverbs have it – “A hill man is no man,” and again, “Don’t class burrs as grass or a hill man as a human being.” The nearer to the frontier the more closely the Pathan assimilates to the original type.18

The inversion here is quite notable, as the British regard the hill people as more manly, yet the settled farmers of the plains contest that characterization. Ibbetson sees the Pathans on the British side of the frontier as “softer” yet the Pathans see themselves as more civilized than their hill neighbors, and therefore manlier, much the same way the British see themselves. What this dialogue suggests is that gender and concepts
of manliness were an important part of the relationship between the British administrators and military men and the Pathans they dealt with, as both considered manliness as an important virtue and strongly asserted their masculine identities as an integral part of the colonial relationship.

In trying to decipher the complexities of the tribal groups on the frontier, the British fell back on familiar historical parallels, particularly the apparent distinctions between the highland and lowland peoples. The easiest example was that of Scotland, with its well-known history of violent clan struggle and resistance to English hegemony. In a popular print survey of the frontier published in London, the author made this comparison explicitly. This sort of analysis draws most particularly on a cultural trend in England that romanticized the Scottish highlands. It also marks the attempt to find historical explanations for the distribution of races in the distant past:

There is no country that offers a better analogy to the present condition of Afghanistan than that of Scotland in the Middle ages, if we can imagine the highland and lowland sections of the population inextricably intermingled as regards their local positions, in adjacent parishes, or counties, as it were, instead of inhabiting perfectly distinct tracts of country, though equally distinct from one another in all their social relations. The Pathans would, then, represent the Highlanders or the more ancient inhabitants of the country; while the lowlanders, or the mixed races, composed of the remains of successive invading elements of the south, would be represented by the various tribes of a distinct extraction from that of the Pathans, who are found intermingled amongst them, but still, after years of contact with them, perfectly distinct in appearance, character and customs.¹⁹

This discourse also marks the attempt to find historical explanations for the distribution of races in the distant past. The theory of Aryan races invading Europe and India would eventually be adapted to explain the differing appearances of tribes in the frontier regions, as well as caste difference in the more settled parts of India.

Lord Roberts was so wedded to the idea of martial races that he suggested the possibility of recruiting what he considered martial Africans, specifically mentioning the Zulus, into the Bombay army.²⁰ The
concept of martial races led to a cataloguing not only of the frontier tribes, but of all of the troops that made up the sepoys of the Indian Army. A number of studies came out in the late 1890s, suggesting an increasing British preoccupation with the subject. There were a number of political reasons for this focus as well, as there were several sharp campaigns on the Afghan frontier, and the Russian threat loomed larger up until the Russo-Japanese War. On top of the external threats were increasing signs of discontent in India itself, which meant loyal troops were at a premium. Captain A. H. Bingley’s *Notes on the Warlike Races of India* is a good example of this effort. P. D. Bonarjee’s *A Handbook of the Fighting Races of India*, published in 1899, continues this trend as well, and their studies show a great similarity in rhetoric.

The dichotomy of Indian races that the British were imposing – with the brave and warlike peoples away from civilization and the degraded civilized people who have sunk from their previous martial character – obviously poses a problem for an empire that was supposed to be bringing civilization to those without it. This intellectual conflict colored much of the discussion of India in Britain and among the British in India up to and after World War I. The solution to this intellectual problem was the British love of sport, which regenerated the race. One irony of the British fondness for Native soldiers who enjoyed sport was that the British were rarely allowed to compete with them, particularly in individual physical contests, as losing would damage the prestige of the officers who commanded them and damage the fierce reputation of British troops. The stated reason was that it would be unfair to pit strong English public school men against their less well-fed and exercised Indian comrades. This had to be slightly ludicrous when the average height of a Sikh sepoy was almost six feet and many were turned away for lack of space, while the British Army had trouble finding men that met the minimum physical requirements. These restrictions on sporting competition only started to be loosened before World War I, and of course Indian soldiers took great pride in beating the English at their own games.²¹

One race that was excluded from physical requirements was the Gurkhas. Their loyalty was almost entirely unquestioned and their utility as soldiers had been demonstrated repeatedly. The “hereditary education as a sportsman” that the Gurkha was supposed to possess linked him with those English who saw sport, and particularly hunting, as neces-
sary training for war. This attitude in part explains the remarkable affection that the English had for their Gurkha troops, a relationship that continues even today. Lord Roberts held a similar view of the Gurkha, based on his experience commanding Gurkha troops during the Second Afghan War. It should be noted that the British at this point knew very little about the Gurkha as a people, as foreigners were largely banned from Nepal, and recruiters met prospective soldiers at hill stations on the border.

Lord Roberts had issues with the Pathans, regarding them as good fighting men but doubting their loyalty. Roberts’ attitude here is an example of the way in which the British negotiated and justified their recruitment policy among the Pathans. Personal loyalty to the British officer who bonds with the soldier will trump any other feeling. Retroactively, this explained the Mutiny, as Roberts and others attributed much of the problem to poor leadership, contrasting those officers who lost their regiments and jobs, frequently their lives, to decisive leaders who maintained the loyalty of their men, and the experience of later campaigns on the frontier seemed to bear this principle out.

It was not merely admirers of military races and the army who worried about civilizing influences. Some went so far as to say that the British mission of bringing civilization to India would degrade the manly qualities of the inhabitants that the British so admired. As one writer put it:

> It is one of the sad but inevitable results of the progress of civilization that these simple, law-abiding jungle races who, in their straightforward independence and manliness are in striking contrast to the degraded stuff of the Plains, must exchange the free life of the hillside for the restraints of an ordered existence.

This refrain becomes almost constant, degrading the agricultural, settled people who suffer British administration with little or no complaint, and praising the independent manliness of the people of less settled mountains and hills who live a more difficult existence and prove more resistant to British administration.

When Roberts retired, he noted that one of his primary accomplishments was getting more of the fighting races enlisted in the army, and
the weaker races weeded out. While Roberts felt he was working against
the grain during his tenure, after he left office in 1891, his views on the
martial races had become widely accepted. Roberts claimed his main
goal was to ensure the efficiency of the Indian army against a European
foe, most likely Russia:

The first step to be taken to this end was, it seemed to me,
to substitute men of the more warlike and hardy races for
the Hindustani sepoys of Bengal, the Tamils and Telagus
of Madras, and the so-called Mahrattas of Bombay. . . . In
the British Army the superiority of one regiment over an-
other is mainly a matter of training; the same courage and
military instinct are inherent in English, Scotch, and Irish
alike, but no comparison can be made between the martial
value of a regiment recruited amongst the Gurkhas of Nepal
or the warlike races of northern India, and of one recruit-
ed from the effeminate peoples of the south . . . we were
able to do a great deal towards increasing the efficiency of
the Native Army and improving the status and prospects of
the Native soldier. Several companies and regiments com-
posed of doubtful material were disbanded, and men of
well-known fighting castes entertained instead. Class regi-
ments were formed, as being more congenial to the men
and the more conductive to esprit de corps; recruiting was
made the business of carefully selected officers who un-
derstood the Native character, and whose duty it was to
become acquainted with the various tribes inhabiting the
districts from which their own regiments were drawn; and
special arrangements were made with the Nepalese gov-
ernment by which a sufficient number of the best class of
men could be obtained for our thirteen Gurkha regiments.25

Roberts’ view of the character of the Native Soldiers would become
the accepted dogma of the British Army in India before the First World
War, and shaped much of the political administration as well. But the
contradictions of British policy were becoming more evident, and
helped feed the resistance to British rule that eventually ended the Raj.
The problems of British administration and control in India reflected
the larger problems of the Age of Imperialism. In managing this encounter between very different peoples that Empire required, cultural similarities provided one means of creating a dialogue. As this example shows, the cultural formation of masculinity in Victorian society, with its emphasis on honor, sport, and physical courage, found a shared ideal in the sepoys who made up the Army of India. For reasons of their own, whether a martial tradition enforced by religious practice as in the case of the Sikhs, or a mercenary motive among relatively poor hill peoples like the Pathans, military service and the rituals associated with it were a key part of forging a workable Imperial relationship. A shared concept of manliness meant that gender became a vital part of the creation and maintenance of the Imperial structure of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Notes

1 The Mutiny began in May 1857, when Indian troops in Meerut, near Delhi, attacked their officers and British troops of the British East India Company. The rebellion continued for over a year before British forces repressed it. In the aftermath, the British crown took power in India from the East India Company.
3 The British used the term “Native” for the soldiers of the Indian Army; thus non-commissioned officers were “Native Officers,” regiments were “Native Infantry,” and so forth. Although the British referred to it as the Army of India, calling the soldiers Indian would imply a unity and common identity among the recruits that the British wished to avoid.
4 Roberts, Forty-One Years, 243.
5 From the Pushtu term for mountain pass, kotal.
7 Robson, Roberts in India, 222.
9 Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: The ‘Manly Englishman’ and the ‘Effeminate Bengali’ in the Late Nineteenth Century (New York: St.

10 Sinha, Colonial Masculinity, 266.


12 Archives of Great Britain, L/Mil/14/220–221, Recruitment Records and Caste Returns, 1880.

13 “‘Race’ as applied to India usually meant merely ethnic, regional, religious, tribal or caste division; thus there were numerous ‘races’ in India and to some extent their characteristics were not thought to be innate. Since India was not considered a relatively homogenous nation like those of Europe, the term ‘Indian race’ comparable to ‘British race,’ did not develop clearly in this period. But the Aryan theory, by blurring divisions, imposed a unity on all the speakers of Indo-European languages in India and considered them the predominant group there.” Leopold, “British Applications,” 580.

14 H. W. Bellew, The Races of Afghanistan: being a brief Account of the Principal Nations Inhabiting that Country (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and Co., 1880), 103. Bellew was a doctor attached to many of the Afghan expeditions, and Lord Roberts came to rely on him heavily, particularly in Kabul in the Second Afghan War.

15 Ibid., 111.


17 Ibid., 90.

18 Ibid.


20 Robson, Roberts in India.


22 A lengthy treatment of the service of Gurkhas with the British Army in India and elsewhere can be found in Byron Farwell, The Gurkhas (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990).

23 Many colonels committed suicide, not believing that their men could be disloyal, while others were killed by their troops. This persistent theme of loyalty and the bond between the British officer and Indian soldier is echoed throughout the literature of the Raj, and Paul Scott made it a theme of The Raj Quartet as he was writing in the 1960s and 1970s.


25 Roberts, Forty-One Years, 531–533.
Archives
Archives of Great Britain. L/Mil/14/220–221, Recruitment Records and Caste Returns, 1880.

Published Words


Bingley, Captain A. H. *Notes on the Warlike Races of India*. London, 1897.


CHAPTER 5

Communities of Hate:
Antagonistic Nationalism in the Twentieth Century

George Reklaitis

A nation is a society united by delusions about its ancestry and a common hatred for its neighbors.¹
William Ralph Inge

Nationalism in the twentieth century existed as a peculiar variety, much different from that of previous centuries. The terms “ethnic cleansing” and “ethnic genocide” are products of the bitter and deadly conflicts that erupted during this period between rival groups intent on attaining national recognition or preserving it in the face of perceived enemies. Only recently have the broader phenomena of ethnic cleansing and ethnic genocide been given treatment as not only singular events, but as larger, global trends. A distinction has been made between the policy of “cleansing” populations of ethnic minorities, usually accomplished through population transfer, and that of “genocide,” the intentional killing of the minority group or groups. Moreover, the growing frequency of such incidents in the twentieth century has drawn the attention of numerous scholars.² What emerges as the common link to each instance of ethnic cleansing or genocide is nationalism. In the twentieth century, the nation-state was the unifying political force for ethnic bodies, and the construction of a common enemy was the means of bolstering national strength. A new world historical phenomenon of antagonistic rather than inclusive nationalism was born.
The Lithuanian national experience during the triple occupation of 1939-1953 – the successive occupations by Soviet, German, and Soviet forces – is a defining moment in the larger history of twentieth-century nationalism. Lithuanian resistance to the Soviet occupations before and after World War II, and participation in the ethnic genocide of the Lithuanian Jewish population before and during the German occupation from 1941 to 1944, represent a crucial transformation of global nationalism that would characterize the twentieth century and the national movements that would develop during this period. The Lithuanian experience is indicative of the naissance of these new communities of hate.

Hans Kohn characterizes the one-hundred-and-fifty-year period encompassing and following the French Revolution as the “Age of Nationalism.” Kohn identifies nationalist movements embodied in the revolution itself and manifest in the unification of Italy and Germany in the nineteenth century. These movements, as Kohn and Eric Hobsbawm argue, were spawned from a national awakening, which spurred peoples of similar linguistic and cultural backgrounds to “imagine” the common circumstances which led to the creation of unified national bodies. In his book *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson extends this discussion of nationhood. He explores the processes that created these “communities,” such as the territorialization of religious faiths, the interaction between capitalism and print, and the development of vernacular languages-of-state. Anderson’s book reveals that long before these communities were consolidated under a singular body of government or appeared on a map, their nationality was “imagined” by the people who shared common faiths and languages and were bound together by an “imagined” interaction.

Such characterizations of nationalism, along with numerous others, present nationalism as an “act of consciousness” through which individuals could construct a political unit that legitimized their membership within an imagined group and provided a vehicle by which they could become viable members of a global community of nations. These representations are valuable for their insight regarding the factors that shaped early nations. These studies, however, do not capably explain the new form of nationalism that erupted in the twentieth century, during and following World War I. The nationalist movements that sprung up from the disintegration of the large, pre-war multi-ethnic empires were based largely on resentment and animosity. These movements
were antagonistic. As the new successor states sought to gain political legitimacy and territorial sovereignty, bloodshed was often the result. With the outbreak of the Second World War, many of these smaller nations, particularly those in Eastern Europe, found themselves at the mercy of the German and Soviet states. It is here that twentieth-century nationalism was forged, as the German and Soviet occupations of these regions served to intensify Eastern European nationalism. Nationalist movements looked to preserve their nations at all cost. Nationalism became not a phenomenon of self-awareness, imagined commonalities, and political action, but of hatred, resistance, and in many cases ethnic genocide. The Second World War served as a crucible for twentieth-century nationalism, and the Eastern European nationalist movements during the triple occupation were precursors to the nationalist movements that would follow. Faced with the threat of national annihilation, nationalist groups could no longer rely on politics and diplomacy to preserve their nation: now they relied on conflict. Nationalism no longer focused on imagining “us,” but rather on hatred against “them.”

The narrative of twentieth-century nationalism begins in the era surrounding World War I. The many newly independent nations such as Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Iraq, all sought to strengthen their national boundaries. Moreover, dozens more ethnic groups such as the Vietnamese, Chinese, Indians, Tunisians, and others from British West Africa shared in this burgeoning national experience and looked for national recognition. The majority of these groups had no national experience to build on and no long-standing cultural antecedents from which to draw. Moreover, these new political groups began bitter contests among each other for political recognition, territory, and ethnographic unity. While being part of a larger political entity, these groups had cohabitated in relative peace, but with the end of external political restrictions, nationalist aspirations became a principal motivation for fierce political rivalry and in many cases ethnic conflict.

In January 1921, Greece launched an invasion of Turkey in an attempt to claim the territory of Anatolia. In Ireland, following the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922, Irish nationalists continued to fight British authorities over six counties in the north that remained part of the United Kingdom. Likewise, Poland launched an attack in
Lithuania in September 1920 and claimed the contested city of Vilnius. At the same time, ethnic cleansing became an element in national creation. The Turkish massacre of Armenians in 1915 and the expulsion of the Greeks by the Turks in 1921-1922 were key elements of the conflicts of this period. These examples are but a few of many that exemplified the conflicts and rivalries that were the product of new nations struggling to create national unity and establish national territory in an ever-growing and increasingly crowded national landscape.

If the First World War broadened the scope of national movements, the Second World War in Eastern Europe would prove to be the crucible of twentieth-century nationalism. The intense pressure on nationalist groups, resulting from the fight for national preservation in the Eastern European nations during a period of German and Soviet occupation, would reinforce nationalist resolve and nationalist hatred, and spark fierce resistance movements and periods of ethnic conflict. Resistance and ethnic cleansing now became the principle vehicles of antagonistic nationalism.

The Lithuanian national experience under the triple occupation of World War II and immediately after is representative of Eastern European nationalism during this period. Moreover, Lithuanian national resistance and collaboration would serve as a precursor for post-war nationalist movements in which nations with brief yet intense national experiences would seek to preserve their national sovereignty and identity at any cost.

Lithuanian nationalism had its foundation in an unprecedented cultural flowering exhibited during a relaxation by the Tsarist government at the turn of the twentieth century. The end of the First World War saw Lithuania emerge from under Tsarist and German control as one of the several new European successor states. Lithuania’s geographic position alone, however, placed it in immediate range of the machinations of the greater powers that surrounded it, namely Soviet Russia, former Tsarist forces, Germany, and Poland. This situation only increased Lithuanian national solidarity.⁹

Coupled with this siege mentality, as they fought off the encroachments of their neighbors, for the first time Lithuanians undertook the administration of their nation. The physical nation-building tasks themselves reinforced this new nationalism. Simultaneously, the Lithuanian Jewish community grew as a largely independent, slight-
ly superior, and very unique group, which managed to resist assimilation into first Russian and then Lithuanian culture, but was welcomed by the fledgling Lithuanian national administration as a vital cog in the Lithuanian economy. Thus emerged a generation of independent Lithuanians, responsible for forging a new Lithuanian national identity. They would be hard pressed to relinquish this independence.\textsuperscript{10}

During the increasingly volatile environment that pervaded Europe during the 1930s, Lithuania consistently sought to ward off the advances of its neighbors. On several occasions this course of action necessitated the sacrifice of territory by allowing Polish control of Vilnius, and ceding Memel to Nazi Germany.\textsuperscript{11} In 1939, Lithuania allowed the establishment of several Red Army garrisons on its soil in exchange for assurances that the Soviets would not infringe on its sovereignty. Such assurances proved meaningless, however, as the Soviets used the occasion of the German attack on France in June 1940 to take full control of Lithuania. Again the Lithuanians attempted to take a passive approach by offering no physical resistance to the initial occupation in the hopes that the Soviet presence was only a temporary protectorate. The Soviets, however, had other intentions, and immediately began the forceful Sovietization of Lithuania through their own program of ethnic cleansing, including the deportation of a sizeable portion of the population.\textsuperscript{12} In response to these oppressive measures, a Lithuanian resistance movement began to organize in October of 1940. Early resistance was largely limited to anti-Soviet propaganda, but as word of a pending German invasion spread, the newly formed resistance movement began plans for an armed revolt.

The weeks of June 1941 saw a crescendo of activity in Lithuania. On the Soviet Union’s western border, Nazi Germany was preparing to launch the largest military invasion in history. In Lithuania, the nationalist resistance movement finalized its preparations for the armed revolt and anxiously awaited the commencement of the German attack. The Soviets, ignoring the impending threats both within their new borders and without, continued their pacification of Lithuania, initiating mass deportations.\textsuperscript{13} On June 22, 1941 the German army invaded the Soviet Union, and the Lithuanian nationalists launched a nationwide revolt against the Soviets. The revolt represented nationalist fervor at its peak. After suffering through the Soviet occupation and the deportations, the armed rebels launched an explosion of Lithuanian anger
towards both the Soviets and the Lithuanian Jews. The Lithuanian Jews, who had drawn the resentment of many Lithuanians for their continued economic superiority in the face of growing Lithuanian prosperity, also found themselves targeted as collaborators with the Soviet regime. The German invasion then provided the Lithuanian nationalists an opportunity to act on their strong nationalistic feelings both in an attempt to regain control of their nation, and as a means of taking out their aggressions on those groups who had conceivably wronged them. The Lithuanians also looked to the Germans as allies against the Soviets and, remembering the brief German occupation during World War I, hoped that this second coming would also lead to Lithuanian independence. For these reasons, the German occupation was widely anticipated as beneficial for the Lithuanian nation, in stark contrast to the Soviet presence.\textsuperscript{14}

Lithuanian hopes of regaining autonomy were short lived. However, the Germans were willing to allow certain amounts of self-administration, and while some Lithuanians perceived to be anti-Fascist were deported, the majority of Lithuanians were allowed to keep their jobs and land. For their part, Lithuanians took every opportunity to curry the favor of Germany in the hopes of maintaining even the slightest levels of autonomy and with the perpetual hope that if the Lithuanian nation could but survive until war’s end, it would once again achieve independence. Thus, many Lithuanians would collaborate in the round-up and extermination of the Jewish population. Some Lithuanians attacked the Jews without prompting by the Germans or anyone else during the national revolt.\textsuperscript{15} Many acted out of hatred and anger toward the Jews for anti-Semitic reasons and for those mentioned above. Most Lithuanians, however, collaborated not necessarily out of malice but simply as a means of satisfying the Germans and retaining some autonomy. Many of the nationalists who collaborated in the treatment of the Jews saw this as another sacrifice required to maintain the Lithuanian state. For their part, the Germans were happy to use Lithuania and even allowed Lithuanian self-administration, but Germany’s long-term plans did not involve allowing Lithuanian independence.\textsuperscript{16}

Lithuanian collaboration in the treatment of Lithuanian Jews existed in several forms. Prior to the advent of the mass extermination facilities employing gas chambers such as Auschwitz and Buchenwald, many of the executions of Jews in the first few years of German occupation of Eastern Europe involved roving shooting squads. The Germans organized several such battalions in the Baltic States, including Lithuania, which were used
as mobile killing units throughout Eastern Europe. At home, Lithuanians rounded up Jews to be placed in ghettos, served as guards at these ghettos, escorted Jewish forced-labor brigades to and from work, and served as executioners. While it is difficult to gauge the exact number of Lithuanian collaborators, it is recognized that the number was in the high thousands.\textsuperscript{17}

In this way, Germany received much help and faced very little resistance in Lithuania. During the war Lithuanian resistance cells existed, but their actions were minimal as resistance leaders maintained a wait-and-see attitude. Lithuanians resisted some German labor policies and attempts by the German army to conscript Lithuanians to fight on the Eastern front. Armed resistance, however, was avoided, as the Lithuanian resistance movement saw any armed attacks on German forces as only aiding the Soviets. Rather, Lithuanians hoped that, by collaborating, they could preserve their nation until the Western allies defeated the Germans and restored Lithuanian independence.

In the summer of 1944, Lithuanians’ worst fears were realized, as the Soviets returned to Lithuania. This time, Lithuanian resistance would display no passivity. While many had seen the German occupation as a temporary problem, the Soviet occupation was perceived as permanent. Therefore, Lithuanian resistance was absolute. Though the Western allies had failed to liberate them, Lithuanians believed that a third world war, pitting the United States and Great Britain against the Soviet Union, would enable Lithuania to reclaim her independence. Under this assumption, the Lithuanian armed resistance movement was determined to hold off Soviet attempts to assimilate their state into the Soviet empire until the Western allies could come to their rescue.\textsuperscript{18}

Initial armed resistance was organized into small Special Defense Teams of about thirty-five persons per county. Early Soviet policies, such as the forced conscription of young Lithuanian men into the Red Army, the collectivization of Lithuanian farmland, and the resumption of deportations, only served to increase resistance numbers. By 1945, approximately 30,000 partisans were operating in Lithuania. For the Soviets, their early pacification attempts did more harm than good, as the military units composed of Red Army troops and locally recruited Destruction Battalions were easily outwitted and outmaneuvered by the elusive partisan forces. Moreover, these military units often robbed and abused Lithuanians, thereby undermining Soviet authority in the eyes of the people.
Through the period from 1944 to 1947, the Lithuanian partisans, operating in small groups and hiding on the farms of supporters or in secret forest bunkers, managed to thwart the pacification efforts of the Soviet NKVD and MGB using ambushes and guerrilla tactics. By 1947, MGB authorities realized the need to change their operations. In light of the failures to eliminate the nationalist resistance, and in light of the growing Cold War and the possibility of Western involvement in Eastern Europe, the MGB looked toward less overt methods by which to undermine Lithuanian resistance. Through the use of intelligence agents and informants’ networks, the MGB slowly infiltrated the resistance movement. Furthermore, by using deception and disorganization tactics, the Soviets were able to confuse and sow distrust within the resistance ranks and between the partisans and their local supporters. In this way the Soviets attacked the very fabric of Lithuanian society, disrupting the social cohesion that had made a successful resistance movement possible. Moreover, by establishing false partisan organizations, the Soviets were able to entrap many Western agents sent in to aid the resistance movement.¹⁹

For the Soviets, then, pacification of Lithuania came full circle by the early 1950s. Pacification efforts such as collectivization, interrupted by the war and then held off by the Lithuanian partisans, were finally resumed. By 1953, Lithuanian nationalism was by no means dead, but the Soviet security forces had successfully eliminated its physical manifestation. For Lithuanians, starting in the early 1900s their nationalism had been channeled towards one purpose, the establishment of an independent Lithuanian state. Following 1939, all efforts were focused on regaining that sovereignty by any means necessary. Lithuanians sacrificed much in this quest: themselves and others.

The story of Lithuanian nationalist resistance is representative of all anti-Soviet resistance that occurred after the Second World War. Armed resistance took place in five Soviet western border states, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, and the Ukraine. In each of these borderlands the Soviet Union faced nationalist opposition to its occupation and pacification policies. Such opposition occurred largely in the most common form of nationalist resistance to foreign aggression, guerrilla warfare. More generally, Lithuania is a microcosm of Eastern Europe in the first half of the twentieth
century. Such a repre-sentation includes the development of new na-
tionalism in the early 1900s, Lithuania as a European successor state
following World War I, the Lithuanian experience under German oc-
cupation and in the Holocaust, and, naturally, the Lithuanian parti-
san struggle against Soviet NKVD/MGB forces after World War II.

Lithuanian history of this period does not mirror that of each state,
but is certainly indicative of the overall Eastern European experience
during this time. The essential commonality present is that of twenti-
eth-century nationalism. Each of the five Soviet western borderlands
developed new national identities based on a shared culture and ethnic-
ity. As Ernest Gellner wrote, “cultures define and make nations,” and
this was certainly the case in Eastern Europe, where cultures, long sup-
pressed by Tsarist Russia, were allowed to grow and flourish at the turn
of the century.\textsuperscript{20} In addition to possessing distinct cultures, each state
grew as an ethnic community in which, to paraphrase Anthony Smith,
the members of each national group shared a sense of common origins,
distinctive history, distinctive characteristics, and a sense of common
solidarity.\textsuperscript{21} All of this occurred in the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury during a period in which any body of people with a shared language
and ethnicity was given consideration as a national body.\textsuperscript{22}

In this way, by studying the Lithuanian experience, we learn about
the experiences of the entire group. Moreover, by studying Lithuanian
nationalism and its development throughout the first fifty years of the
century, we learn about the many factors that shaped the history of
Eastern Europe in this period.

Kohn wrote, “Nationalism demands the nation-state, the creation
of the nation-state strengthens nationalism.”\textsuperscript{23} Such a statement,
while accurate, is incomplete in reference to Eastern European na-
tionalism during World War II and the nationalist movements of the
post-war period. What happens to nationalism when the demand for
the nation-state is met and then threatened or even rescinded? The
answer, as the Lithuanian resistance movement during the triple oc-
cupation demonstrates, is that nationalism is now intensified. More-
over, nationalism, as redefined by the triple occupation, now relied
less on common ancestry, common language, and common culture,
and more on the common enemy. Lithuanian nationalism during the
double occupation was manifested in the preservation of the nation
against enemies both internal and external. Lithuanian partisans sacri-
ficed their lives in an effort to prevent the Sovietization of their country. At the same time, Lithuanian nationalists participated in the extermination of the Lithuanian Jewish population in an effort to avenge themselves and cleanse their nation of perceived internal enemies.

In much the same way Ukrainian and Polish nationalists ruthlessly slaughtered one another in an effort to homogenize their populations and eliminate any enemies within. Following the war, the post-war resistance movements regarded Soviet occupation forces and local collaborators as one and the same: national enemies.

This nationalist phenomenon continued beyond Eastern Europe as nationalists throughout the world spurred their movements not by a call for the celebration of “us,” but for the negation of “them.” This antagonistic, resentful nationalism born in the ashes of World War I, and forged by the pressures of World War II, now became the common method for creating nationalist movements.

“A nation is a society united by delusions about its ancestry and a common hatred for its neighbors,” wrote Inge. It is this statement that best represents the idea of the new nationalism of the twentieth century. Many nationalist movements arising out of colonial empires, fragmented poly-ethnic states, or from under Cold War-imposed political systems sought to create immediate national consciousness not by relying on established cultural or linguistic traditions, but by relying on real or imagined enemies of the nation. Nationalist movements that came into existence after World War I but had been unable to achieve national recognition now joined the global trend of using resistance to foreign imposition and the cleansing of internal ethnic bodies as avenues for attaining immediate national autonomy.

The Vietnamese, led by nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh, declared their independence from France in 1945, and waged a long and protracted struggle against French colonial forces and American intervention. In Kenya, the Mau Mau movement led a long campaign of terror and guerrilla warfare against British rule, a crusade which eventually led to Kenyan independence in 1963. Likewise on the African continent, Algerians fought an eight-year guerrilla campaign against the French, culminating in victory and the establishment of an Algerian nation. In these instances, nationalist movements sprung up where no national traditions had previously existed, but the drive to remove foreign elements spurred the growth of national consciousness.
This new nationalism also presented itself in established nations under threat from without. Two striking examples are those of Israel and Egypt, which redefined their nationalism in reaction to incursions by opponents: Israel during the military struggle with Arabs in 1948, and Egypt during the French, British, and Israeli-led intervention during the Suez Crisis of 1956. 28

And once again, much as in the early stages of the twentieth-century nationalism following World War I and the defining period of World War II, ethnic cleansing was a clear element in many of the post-war national movements. In this manner, nationalist groups based their creation of the nation not simply on shared traditions, but on the creation of an ethnically homogenous unit. In 1994, Rwandan Hutus, in an effort to strengthen their control of the former Belgian colony, began a campaign of violence against the Tutsi minority leading to the deaths of over 800,000 Tutsi in a period of 100 days. 29 Following the fragmentation of Yugoslavia, ethnic violence erupted as Serbian nationalists attempted to homogenize their territorial domain, perpetrating rape and murder in an effort to cleanse their territory of Croatians and other non-Serbian minorities. 30

Animosity and conflict between nations are long-standing elements of the history of nations. Nations and nationalism based on animosity and conflict, however, are phenomena only seen in the twentieth century. Lithuanian nationalism found its origins in the flowering of long suppressed cultural traditions at the start of the nineteenth century. In this way Anderson’s definition fits: a Lithuanian community was “imagined” where none had existed. Yet the Lithuanian national experience that would follow independence demonstrates a radical reconstruction of Lithuanian nation and nationalism. Under the triple occupation Lithuanians encountered a nationalism based on hate. This trend would permeate much of Eastern Europe at this time, and resound in many of the nationalist movements that would follow.

The legacy of Lithuanian nationalism during the triple occupation is evident today, as Lithuanian national memory is based largely, if not wholly, on the sufferings of the Lithuanian people during the triple occupation. Lithuanian nationalism was so shaped by this period that it created a nation of heroes, not only those who died in the struggle of national preservation, but those who survived to witness an independent Lithuania. The Soviet era is and will continue to remain a firm pres-
ence in Lithuania’s collective national consciousness. This can be witnessed through numerous Soviet-era monuments still preserved as constant reminders, and the fervent effort to mine the Soviet archives in an attempt to document the Lithuanian resistance and the Soviet occupation. Yet, while remembering hatred for all things Soviet is a crucial element of modern Lithuanian nationalism, forgetting moments of national genocide is equally vital.

In describing the survival of Lithuanian culture throughout the Soviet occupation, Anatol Lieven pointed to the fact that in order to avoid Soviet subversion, Lithuanian intellectuals were hesitant to critique forms of traditional and dissident culture such as poetry, art, and literature. This same analysis can be applied to the Lithuanian reaction to the Holocaust. During the many years of occupation Lithuanians looked to avoid Soviet subversion of their heritage and the memory of the partisans. In this way the Lithuanian nationalism that sustained Lithuanians throughout the occupation did so by avoiding an objective criticism of Lithuanian history. This is demonstrated by historian Petras Stankeras’ treatment of the Lithuanian Holocaust in his work on the Lithuanian police force during the war. Stankeras argues that all Europeans collaborated in some respect and that what little collaboration Lithuanians were responsible for was seized upon and exaggerated for propaganda purposes by the Soviets. Only those memories that served to sustain the Lithuanian national tradition in the face of Soviet occupation were acknowledged. Following independence this ultra-nationalist mentality, one that had served Lithuanians so well in their quest for freedom, continued to act as blinders in regards to the less than appealing elements of Lithuanian nationalist history.

In the same way, we see reactions and denials by perpetrators of ethnic violence in similar situations. In response to historical evidence of the Armenian massacre, Turkish historian Turkkaya Ataov wrote:

Many of [the Armenians] died of illnesses and epidemics as they were moved. And this was a time of war. But there were no orders to kill them and no reliable document has ever proved that.
Similarly, when confronted with the tragedies in their country, Rwandan officials stated:

The national unity government has never had a policy of systematic extermination of any part of the Rwandan people. . . . No investigation has ever confirmed the gratuitous accusations of massacres, whether in the form of exterminations or systematic vengeance.35

And even in the face of international pressure, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic refused to address his government’s complicity in ethnic genocide.

I should be given credit for peace in Bosnia, not war. The responsibility for the war in Bosnia is with the forces who broke up Yugoslavia and their agents, not the Serbs, or Serb people in Bosnia.36

The hurdle to writing a history of Eastern Europe during the period of World War II is that the memory of the events is, as Jeffrey Burds puts it, “constructed ethnically – which is to say, each ethnic group has recorded their own versions of the tragic devastation of that era.”37 The same can be said for the broader history of nationalism and ethnic conflict in the twentieth century. National bodies formed through segregation, exclusion, and destruction must then be preserved through a nationalist rendering of the facts and the history. Perceived national enemies must not only be physically cleansed, but their memory “white-washed” as well.38

In the twentieth century the nation was the “critical locus of identity for a great many people.”39 Moreover, the nation increasingly became less of a political entity and more of an ethnic community. Such a community based its strength and survival on a homogeneity which sought to define and categorize differences rather than commonalities. Those seen as different were viewed as potential enemies or polluters of the pure ethnic body. Antagonistic nationalism became an accepted and even celebrated form of national development when manifested in forms of resistance to outside pressures. However, numerous examples throughout the later twentieth century
demonstrated what resulted when nationalist hatred turned inwards. In both cases, the Lithuanian national experience during the triple occupation is a clear example of the world historical phenomenon of communities of hate.

Notes

1 William Ralph Inge, Lay Thoughts of a Dean (London: Putnam, 1926), 7.
7 The concept of a nationalism of hate is presented by Brian Porter. Porter studied the nineteenth-century Polish nationalist movement led by the intellectual right.
In order to strengthen their own control of the Polish government and enhancing Poland’s international status, nationalists looked to create a homogenous political system which soon carried over to cultural affairs as well. While Porter’s study focuses principally on mid- to late-nineteenth-century Poland, this concept of a nationalism of hate is readily applicable to the twentieth century – even more so because we see nations acting on this new form of nationalism against their neighbors. Brian Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth Century Poland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).


15 One particularly shocking incident of an unprovoked Lithuanian attack on local Jews occurred in the city of Kaunas, at Lietukis garage on June 25, 1941. An eyewitness recounted:

Suddenly, a group of partisans decided to have some fun and a massacre began. With spades, sticks, rifle butts, crowbars, and other tools from
the garage they started assaulting the Jews. There must have been at least fifty or more Jews, all of them severely wounded, lying on the pavement crying and moaning. The partisans then grabbed many Jews by their hair and dragged them across the lot to the amusement of the bystanders. When the Jews collapsed, they turned the hoses on them and revived them. Once revived they again beat them until they died.


18 Lithuanian partisan Juozas Luksa echoed this hope: “We solemnly believed that freedom and the rights of men were the sacred things they had been declared to be in the Atlantic Charter. We therefore did not even consider the possibility that the Allies might not continue to carry on the fight until that freedom and those rights had been restored.” Juozas Daumantas, Fighters for Freedom: Lithuanian Partisans Versus the USSR, 1945–1947 (New York: Manyland Books, 1975.)

19 See Reklaitis, “A Common Hatred.”


22 In 1918, with the collapse of the Tsarist regime that had held power over all these bodies, a number of these states, namely Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, achieved independence. While Belarus and the Ukraine did not achieve statehood, a profound sense of nationalism had been formed as demonstrated by the work of John Armstrong and Jan Gross. This nationalism whether manifested in statehood or not, would drive these collected bodies of people to take similar courses of action during the Soviet occupation of 1940–1941, the German occupation of 1941–1944, and the second Soviet occupation beginning in 1944. See John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); and Jan T. Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Union’s Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).


24 The motives of revenge and elimination can be witnessed from a number of Lithuanian partisan manifestos issued at the time of the Soviet withdrawal
from Lithuania. One example from the Lithuanian Activist Front reads as follows:

Local Communists and all other traitors in Lithuania must be detained at once. . . . The Jews must be informed immediately that their fate has been decided upon. . . . At the decisive moment, seize their property, so that nothing will be lost. The crucial day of reckoning has come for the Jews at last. Lithuania must be liberated not only from the yoke of Bolshevism but also from the long-protracted burden of the Jewish yoke!


33 Such a mentality is evidenced by popular reaction to the case of suspected Lithuanian war criminal Alexandras Lileikis. In September, 1998, public responses from Lithuanians were published in the Western press showing that support for Lileikis was widespread in Lithuania. One Lithuanian stated:

> Lileikis’s organization operated under a mandate solely to arrest members of the Polish and Communist underground. Their greatest involvement in the oppression of Jews was that they returned the fugitives from the ghettos back to the Germans, and who clearly afterwards were shot.

Stanislava Jevsejeva, a Vilnius florist, was quoted as saying, “I believe it is absolutely wrong that he is on trial now because, in many countries, the governments change. There are different types of governments and somebody has to work there. So, what’s his wrongdoing here?” “I think it is unjust, but it is very difficult to know now what is what,” said Mykolas Simkunas, another Vilnius resident. “There is evidence that he is guilty, and there is the opposite evidence that he is not guilty. And a lot of time has passed. So, it is more of a theater today than a real trial. . . .” David Filipov, “Lithuanian Hearing Held on Alleged War Criminal,” *Boston Globe*, 5 March 1998, A2.


35 The Independent, U.K., 1 March 1996.


37 Jeffrey Burds, “Ethnicity, Memory, and Violence: Reflections on Special Problems in Soviet and East European Archives,” in William Rosenberg and Francis Blouin, eds., *Archives and Social Memory: Institutions, Practices, and*

38 Naimark, Fires of Hatred, 41.
39 Weitz, A Century of Genocide, 44.

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Published Works


Research Center, 1999.


Unpublished Works


What happens when over 100 million people migrate within the span of 100 years? In the years between 1840 and 1940 at least that many Europeans and South and East Asians crossed an ocean to take advantage of the steadily expanding economies of the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Ocean basins.1 How does such extensive population redistribution preserve or change large-scale connections amongst parts of the globe? How does it affect families, individuals and local communities? In conceptualizing answers to such questions, we face the challenges of selecting a manageable piece of the world-historical process to analyze and articulating an analytical framework that allows us to “keep an eye on the individual experience as well as the overall pattern.”2 Recent sociological critiques of migration theory and historical critiques of world-system theory call for closer attention to the patterns of human interaction that facilitate long-distance connections over time and across space.3 Yet the main problem is locating the arenas in which these interactions take shape. Where, precisely, does world historical change actually occur?4

To address this question, I advance a model of the transoceanic migrant family. This “meso-level” model of migrant-family decision-making reveals the interaction between large-scale trends shaping available migration options and local contingencies: the interaction determines which individuals within a family are selected to migrate at a given
time. In the transoceanic migration process, migrant families and other meso-level institutions—shipping and railroad companies, emigrant aid societies, labor recruitment firms, to name a few examples—played a distinctive role in world history, bridging considerable distances through the communications amongst their members. The families provide a tangible, traceable framework for assessing world historical change.

This chapter proceeds in three phases to illustrate the utility of this model in reconstructing the process and experience of past migrations. I begin by introducing the remarkable personal narrative of Mashke Antin (later Mary Antin), a Russian Jewish emigrant who relocated to Boston in 1894 via a prepaid steamship ticket sent by her previously-emigrating father. Second, I outline the multi-level migration system of the mid-nineteenth to early-twentieth centuries. This sketch sets the context for the communications between the American and Russian halves of the Antin family and more generally highlights the “feedback effects” of the migration system, linking its many parts at global, regional and local levels. The third section merges the conceptual and empirical to reconstruct the transoceanic decision-making processes that shaped the Antin family’s two-phase relocation to Boston. Overall, this emphasis on the decision-making strategies of migrant families, as they coped with being stretched across space, helps to connect social-historical and world-historical perspectives on the migration process. Leslie Page Moch refers to this analytical connection as addressing “both the broader economy and the personal context of migration.”

A Migrant Narrative as Source Material for World History

The primary source material for this reconstruction of a transoceanic migrant family comes from Mashke Antin, who traveled from Polotzk (a shetl in the Russian Pale of Settlement) to Boston via the German port of Hamburg in 1894. Her father had emigrated via the same route in 1891, creating a three-year period of letter writing between the family’s “home base” in Polotzk and their newly-established footing in across the Atlantic. Once reunited in Boston, neither Antin nor any other members of her family ever returned to Polotzk. Yet she clearly felt that her family—and the four million other Eastern Europeans who came to United States along with them in years between 1881 and 1914—somehow served as a bridge between the places they left and the places they migrated to. “We [immigrants] are the strands of the cable that connects the Old World to the New,” wrote Antin.
With the 1912 publication of her second book, *The Promised Land*, “Mary” Antin gained something of a celebrity status as an advocate for U.S. immigration and assimilation. Antin learned English alongside other recent arrivals in the Boston Public Schools, married into another ethnicity and religion (her husband was a German immigrant, and a gentile) and moved to New York City where she became an active participant in ongoing public debates on the prospects for the assimilation of European immigrants into American culture. From this vantage point, Mary Antin (the assimilated immigrant) could clearly see the large-scale outcomes of the transoceanic migration system she had participated in.

But as thirteen-year-old Mashke Antin (the emigrant in transit), her descriptions of encounters with border guards, health inspectors, emigrant aid society officials and fellow emigrants help us to understand the complex range of social interactions required to facilitate her family’s migration to North America. Her account reminds us that migration requires the complicity of a vast assortment of former migrants, non-migrants, and potential future migrants, as well as people who are currently in transit. It also alerts us to the multitude of places where we can also seek insight into the process of long-distance migration. Migration should be seen as a multi-phase journey where individuals navigate a series of social contexts, over which they may have varying degrees of control. We must consider not just the points of departure and arrival, but also the regional border crossings, quarantine facilities, third-class steerage holds, emigrant aid society offices, and other arenas of social exchange that facilitate the movement of people between the starting and stopping points of their journeys.

Antin’s often-overlooked first book, *From Plotzk [sic] to Boston*, composed in-transit as a series of letters to a non-migrating uncle and published in 1899, presents a detailed description of the preparations for the family’s journey and their actual experiences in transit. It includes lengthy discussions of a failed attempt to cross the Russian-German border, the discovery of a trans-border emigrant aid society, and a makeshift Passover seder held in the Hamburg-Amerika Line’s quarantine facilities. The reappearance of these passages (almost verbatim) in *The Promised Land* suggests that for Antin, the space she traversed between the “Old” and “New” worlds was not without its significance.

In addition to preserving the details of her life in transit, *The Promised
Land also includes seven chapters on her home community of Polotzk. Although the editor of a collection of her letters dismisses this section of the book as having “precious little in positive memories,” Antin provides a wealth of detail on the local factors causing her family to leave Polotzk. Before Polotzk became the place that Antin and her family left behind, it was the place where her father’s business ventures failed, Jewish residents feared anti-Semitic pogroms, neighbors gossiped about the postman’s delivery of letters from already emigrated neighbors, and children “played at emigrating.”

Polotzk was the place that Antin’s father left in 1891, but for the rest of the family it remained “home base” for another three years. It was the place to which Mashke’s father directed his letters from Boston and the prepaid steamship ticket he sent his wife and children in 1894. Consequently, it became one half of the comparison Pinchus Antin would eventually have to make when considering how to reunite his family. Relocate them to Boston or return to them in Polotzk? It is precisely this moment in the Antin family’s life—its attempts to continue functioning while separated by half a continent and an entire ocean—that I want to contextualize and investigate in the following sections.

The Multi-Level Migration System and its Feedback Effects

The general concept of a system—where interconnected parts facilitate and sustain a process that individual pieces could not accomplish independently—seems most appropriate for world history’s stated priorities of investigating long-distance processes and linkages between the global and the local. Starting with the premise of Wallerstein’s World-System of core-periphery interconnections, sociologists and historians have developed a language of “migration systems.” Linkages such as colonial relationships and tensions between less- and more-industrialized regions are seen to shape the contours of the system, helping to determine which parts of the world will be connected by population transfers. Dirk Hoerder recently updated the established definition of migration systems to emphasize “cluster[s] of moves between a region of origin and a receiving region that continues over a period of time and is distinct from non-clustered multi-directional migrations.”

But such a definition focuses neither on what people actually
do to facilitate their movement across space nor on how to test the effectiveness of historical migration systems. Leslie Moch, by focusing on the systemic aspect of the idea of a migration system, rather than its functional outcome of moving people from one point to another, offers a conceptual alternative. She writes that, “migration itself is ... a socially constructed, self-perpetuating system that includes home and destination—a responsive system that expands, contracts and changes according to circumstance.”15 I draw on two elements of her definition—the role of social interaction and the response of the system to circumstances, global and local.

Following Moch’s emphasis on responsiveness, any definition of a migration system should also emphasize the “flows and counterflows” that hold the system together.16 To that end, I argue for more careful attention to the “feedback effects” generated within a migration system.17 Broadly conceptualized as the ability of events in one part of a system to shape subsequent developments in other parts, or be felt in them, this interplay among the places, transportation systems, and flows of people, capital and information serves as the motor of a migration system. To locate these arenas of system activity where the interaction of migrants, non-migrants, former migrants and future migrants might occur, we must ask where, when, and under what circumstances the larger world intervenes in migration flows.18 By tracing the causes, effects, counter-effects and responses among these components, we can improve our understanding of the ways a migration system develops, sustains itself, and perhaps declines or redirects its energies.

To illustrate the role and relevance of feedback effects, I provide a brief sketch of the transoceanic migration system that the Antin family participated in. The model includes three levels—global, regional and local. In each section, I first emphasize the factors shaping system function, then give a few examples of detected feedback effects. For the purposes of this model, I define a migration system as a connected set of geographical and social settings that facilitates the circulation of people, information, capital and material goods.19 The act of voluntary migration itself—individuals, families and communities relocating temporarily or permanently to take advantage of better prospects elsewhere—creates and sustains links among the elements of the system.

**Global Level.** At the global level, the model necessarily focuses
on the long-distance “connectors” that held the system together. The connectors included the expanding steamship and railroad lines, the demand for workers to meet a range of labor needs (agricultural, mining, construction, factory work) dispersed across the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Ocean basins, changing land use patterns and the expansion into “frontier” areas, and effective communication and capital-transfer systems, such as the telegraph. Although the “push” and “pull” factors of migration are often explained individually in terms of myriad local circumstances, they can and should be seen as evidence of a systemic redistribution of population, capital, and means of production. At this level, declining rural prospects in Ireland, Southern Italy, India and the Qing Empire belong to a larger trend of emigration, just as the sugar plantations of Hawaii and Natal, opium farms and tin mines of the Singapore Straits Settlements, and mobile labor camps of the U.S. Transcontinental Railroad belong to the larger trend of short-term contract labor.

Feedback effects clearly emerged by the 1890s—the midpoint of this century of overseas migration—at once making the system more efficient and resulting in new patterns of institutional and migrant behavior. Trans-Atlantic steamship companies engaged in price wars to lure prospective European migrants away from their competitors. The lower cost of passage and the “closing” of North and South American frontiers expanded the number of European and Southeast Asian migrants who took advantage of return passage. “Sojourner” increasingly became a label that applied not only to Southeastern Chinese migrants, but to Croatians, Austro-Hungarians, Italians, and even to English and Swedes as well.20

**Regional Level.** From any particular vantage point within this system, how did the range of options open to a potential transoceanic migrant develop and change over time? Answering this question requires us to think about how the emerging connections amongst transportation options, channels of communication, employment opportunities, and migrant flows. Three limiting trends are relevant for investigation at this level: the increasing rigidity of certain migration routes as regional railroad and steamship companies shut out competitors, the conscious self-association of certain port cities as emigrant or immigrant destinations,21 and the evolution of “gate-keeping” immigration quotas, health examination criteria and
entrance examinations in response to the increase volume of migration traffic.22

To trace the role of regional-level feedback influencing the subset of transoceanic migrants to which Mashke Antin and her family belonged—Eastern Europeans who crossed the Atlantic via Hamburg between 1881 and 1914—I will present two examples. First, I describe the growing power and transoceanic reach of German steamship companies in order to set the context for their role in funnelling Eastern European emigrants towards the German ports of Hamburg and Bremen. Second, I summarize changes in immigration and health inspection policies in the wake of an 1892 outbreak of cholera in Hamburg, which altered both perceptions and actual experiences of the emigration process.

In 1871, the German steamship company Hamburg-Amerika Line (popularly known as HAPAG)23 had one trans-Atlantic port of call, New York City. Its service grew to include Montreal, Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore.24 This expansion not only firmly linked HAPAG’s own business prospects to these popular emigrant destinations, but now gave it a reason to promote these ports to its potential customers. By offering incentives to travel to America via German ports, HAPAG and its rival, the Bremen-based Lloyd line, were able to significantly decrease the number of Russian passengers who planned to travel via English shipping lines.25 Between 1891 and 1911, HAPAG used the profits from the lucrative eastern European emigrant transport market to expand its services to include ports of call in East Asia, Chile, Peru, Mexico, San Francisco, Brazil, Argentina, Genoa, West Africa and the Red Sea.26 Regionally, it boasted ticket agents in fifty-one cities spread across eighteen European countries or territories, all intended to funnel prospective emigrants towards established HAPAG routes.27

HAPAG’s growth both fed off of and created new possibilities for the expanding volume of Eastern European emigrants. The business opportunity that these migrants presented also created certain liabilities and required that the company meet certain expectations to continue operating. In the wake of an 1892 cholera outbreak in Germany, HAPAG had to vastly improve the health inspection process of emigrants and the quarantine and lodging facilities.28 To maintain its reputation with customers as it increased the cost and frequency of health inspections, HAPAG attempted to cater to a diversity of emigrants from Central and Eastern Europe. Its “Emigrant’s Halls” facility maintained a separate
kosher dining facility for Jewish passengers, three types of religious facilities (a synagogue, Catholic, and “Christian” churches), and printed its signs in five languages.29

A second instance of regional feedback came with the expansion of health inspection services for prospective HAPAG customers in the mid-1890s. Cholera was endemic across portions of the Russian Empire (including the Pale of Settlement), but in August 1892, an outbreak of the disease killed over 8,000 in Hamburg. Cholera was perceived to be entering Germany via the steadily expanding emigrant traffic, and the Germans began periodically closing their Eastern borders.30 Individuals traversing Germany to enter an increasingly global labor market were thought to be creating an undesirable biological exchange, which the newly-consolidating German nation state sought to control.

The gate-keeping response involved a two-pronged weeding out of potentially diseased emigrants. First, beginning in 1887, medical examinations and steam cleaning of emigrants and their baggage (with the cost paid by the traveler) were conducted at a series of inspection points along the rail routes between the border and the ports of Hamburg and Bremen. These inspections were intended to protect the Second Reich from another disastrous epidemic, but they also had a more subtle intention—to prevent HAPAG and other shipping companies from having to bear the cost of transporting returning emigrants who were refused entry into the U.S. (and Canada, Brazil or Argentina) because of their “physical, moral or financial status.”31

This link to the screening practices and criteria of Ellis Island for trans-Atlantic emigrants (and after 1910, Angel Island for trans-Pacific ones) highlights connections across the trans-oceanic migration system.32 It illustrates how a larger-scale trend of inspection and certification is co-opted and incorporated into the response to a local outbreak of cholera perceived to be linked to a trans-regional threat of contagion. Yet it also suggests parallels to the broader trend of immigrant exclusions, for example forbidding Southeast Asian immigrants access to citizenship or land ownership in South Africa, Australia and the United States.33

Local Level. For world histories of migration, the local community is an especially important site of investigation. It is the site of negotiations and decision making that determines which members will migrate, and it is where the separated components of the transoceanic migrant family live their daily lives. In the Antin family’s case, two intersecting
local constraints—limited economic opportunities and a fresh wave of Russian state-sponsored anti-Semitism—combined to direct the timing and sequence of their multi-phase migration, and their lack of return. The assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 and his replacement by his less-liberally minded son unleashed a new wave of deportations, pogroms and legal restrictions. The year 1890–1891 was particularly difficult, according to Mashke Antin. As streams of recently deported Jews from St. Petersburg and Moscow made their way south and west to the Pale of Settlement, she chronicled the effect that this latest round of forced migrations had on cities within the Pale:

It was a little before Passover that the cry of the hunt thrilled the Jewish world with familiar fear. The open cities [of the Pale] were becoming thus suddenly crowded, every man’s chance of making a living was diminished in proportion to the number of additional competitors. Hardship, acute distress, ruin for many: thus spread the disaster, ring beyond ring, from the stone thrown by a despotic official into the ever-full river of Jewish persecution.

Antin’s language is dramatic, but the emphasis on this “ripple effect” set off by anti-Semitic persecution is quite relevant. Although Russian Jews left major cities because of the enforcement of anti-Semitic proclamations that expelled them, their arrival in other parts of the Pale exacerbated existing economic difficulties, creating a new class of emigrants (including Antin’s father Pinchus) who would need to go farther away to find secure employment. As importantly, assumptions that the ripples of economic and ethnically-motivated disadvantages would continue negatively influenced Pinchus Antin’s appraisal of Polotzk in relation to his new location of Boston. As I argue below, these factors played a major role in his decision to relocate the rest of the family to Boston, rather than return to Boston to reunite with them.

This blend of economic and security motivations for emigration is important for two reasons. First, it highlights the fact that present-day categorizations imposed by migration researchers—“labor migrant,” “refugee”—are not mutually exclusive. Second, it helps us to think about the interaction of global (industrializing international labor market), regional (expansion of rail and steamship lines), and local
(anti-Semitism and economic competition) factors which may shape the direction and volume of migrants.

The “Meso-Level” Migrant Family: Theory and Illustration

In contrast to notions of individual migrants being “pushed” or “pulled” by macro-level forces, meso-level constructs allow us to imagine a migrant family stretched across time and space, but nonetheless actively assigning individual members particular migratory activities to mediate and decide how to respond to the forces “pushing” or “pulling” them. In particular, the family decision-making unit which stretches itself out across long distances may have more than one method of reuniting itself. Three overlapping concepts address this issue in interdisciplinary perspective. Basch, Schiller and Blanc use the concept of “base-building” to describe the ways in which migrant families consider a mix of circumstances in the home communities and the places they migrate to in deciding how long to remain away from home and if they will permanently return. Similarly, Donna Gabaccia refers to an “international family economy” in which migrant families made decisions. She argues that the decision of whether to keep a family’s “home base” in the home community or to re-establish it in a popular immigrant destination involves an appraisal of living costs and potential wages in both areas. Third, the notion of a “migrant-family contractual agreement” among parents, children, siblings and other relatives derives from the literature on the “new economics of labor migration.” It recasts the decision to migrate as a reallocation of family labor resources made at the household level, aimed a risk diversification. Each of these comparative assessments of multiple points within a migration system emphasizes the ways in which migrant-family decision makers both shape and are shaped by long-distance and long-term circumstances.

In order to investigate how transoceanic migrant families functioned while separated, three key questions must be answered:

1) How was the decision made on who should migrate and where to go?

2) How were labor and economic responsibilities adjusted in the absence of the migrants?

3) How did family members reconnect?

In the remainder of this section, I attempt to answer these questions
from the evidence provided in Antin’s *From Plotzk to Boston* and *The Promised Land*.

After a series of failed business ventures and a few years of traveling around the Pale of Settlement in search of employment, Mashke Antin’s father, Pinchus, borrowed money from friends and relatives for a railroad ticket to Germany. “Driven by a necessity for bettering family circumstances,” he traveled to Hamburg, where an emigrant aid society gave him a steamer ticket for Boston; Pinchus Antin crossed the Atlantic in 1891.\(^40\) In 1912, hindsight (and perhaps her career as an immigration promoter) led Antin to contextualize her father’s departure as part of a much larger migration stream. She wrote that “his history” was intertwined “with the history of thousands who come to America, pockets empty, hands untrained to the use of tools, minds cramped by centuries of repression in their native land.”\(^41\)

But in 1891, her understanding of the changing contours of long-distance migration within Eastern Europe was less certain. She claimed that she was used to her father leaving home in search of employment and, initially, “‘America’ did not mean much more to me than ‘Kherson,’ or ‘Odessa,’ or any other names of distant places.”\(^42\) However, it was the “references to ships, societies, and other unfamiliar things” that did eventually lead Mashke to think this separation from her father was “[an] enterprise . . . different from the previous ones.”\(^43\) As the hints of new methods of transportation and new social institutions imply, Pinchus Antin’s departure ultimately was “different from the previous ones.” It was driven by the regional factors of anti-Semitism and economic competition, yet it also capitalized on HAPAG’s steadily improving ability to link Eastern Europe to transoceanic labor markets.

The year 1890–1891, for which Maske Antin recorded the effects of deported Jewish city dwellers returning to the Pale, was also a time of serious discussion between her mother, father, and her mother’s extended family. She commented that “many family councils were held before it was agreed that the plan [for her father to migrate] must be carried out.”\(^44\) Her comment that, “it was impossible for the whole family to go at once,” and the fact that her father had to borrow the money for his rail ticket and received subsidized passage to Boston, implicitly suggest the financial constraints of relocating a family of six.\(^45\)

But gender-constructed identity and practice also likely shaped the order of the Antin family’s migration strategy.\(^46\) As Mashke noted,
she was accustomed to her father leaving the family behind in search of work—a role that her patriarchically-structured family and shetl of Polotzk would have expected Pinchus to fulfill. In a letter written shortly before departing Hamburg, her father sounded optimistic. But it would be three years before he sent his wife and four children a prepaid steamship ticket for HAPAG’s SS Polynesia. In this “lag time” between the departure of one of the family’s main financial supporters and its reunification, how did the remaining members compensate for the loss?

Initially, Hannah’s older and more prosperous brothers provided her with a monthly allowance, but as Mashke was keenly aware, “they all had large families with marriageable daughters [to arrange dowries for] and sons to be bought out of military service.” The remaining Antins, in an effort to adjust to their “reduced domestic economy,” pursued a two-pronged strategy: adjust family labor roles and cut household expenses. To provide for her children, Hannah started a door-to-door peddling business. Initially, eldest daughter Fetchke took over the household chores, including care of her three younger siblings. Mashke joined her mother in making deliveries of tea as their customer base expanded. As their “fallen family state” continued to decline, the Antins rented two of their three rooms to boarders. After an embarrassing scandal in which their property was nearly confiscated by the Russian authorities because of their boarders’ unpaid debts, they moved to a one-room apartment. Mashke was sent to live with one of her maternal uncles and set to work earning extra money by giving lessons in lace making.

In the third year of their father’s absence, both Mashke and Fetchke were apprenticed into local trades, as a dressmaker and milliner respectively. The decision to have the elder Antin daughters learn a trade seems to have been based on an attempt to combine their father’s perceptions of the New England labor market with the constraints of local gendered and ethnic discrimination in Polotzk. “In America there is no disgrace to work at a trade,” Pinchus had written home to his family. At first glance this comment may seem to be just another immigrant celebrating the economic opportunities of his adopted home. But the concepts of “base building” and “international family economies” urge us to think more carefully about his message. Given that only his son was currently allowed to attend school in Polotzk, putting the idle time of his daughters to good use while they waited to emigrate was a doubly practical decision. In both the current Antin family base of Polotzk and the future one of Boston, his
daughters could help improve the family’s economic circumstances.51

This dual focus on education and possible economic contributions by his children was again cited by Pinchus when he finally purchased the steamship tickets that would reunite his family. Having arranged to buy part of a concession stand (at what is now Revere Beach in East Boston), he borrowed against the future business’s revenues to bring over his family. Learning English in the Boston Public School system during the week, his multi-lingual children would help him and his wife run the recently acquired family business on weekends and during the summer.

To view this situation through the lens of the migrant-family contractual arrangement, it seems that a large portion of family decision-making power had migrated to Boston along with the male head of household. In one sense this is an accurate assessment—Pinchus Antin elected to stay in the city (Boston) that the Hamburg emigrant aid society had initially given him the ticket to. He had sent his wife and children a prepaid steamship ticket for that same city. He had chosen the business venture to incorporate his family into.

But, as Mashke Antin and her family found out, there was an entire world of frontier border crossings, cholera-fearing health inspectors, emigrant aid societies, quarantine facilities and seasickness between Polotzk, Hamburg, and Boston. Reflecting on the several weeks her journey had taken, she summarized her experiences:

> Imagine yourself parting with all you love; believing it to be a parting for life; breaking up your home, selling the things that years have made dear to you; starting on a journey without the least experience in traveling, in the face of many inconveniences on account of the want of sufficient money; being met with disappointment where it was not to be expected; with rough treatment everywhere, til you are forced to go and make for yourself friends among strangers; being obliged to sell some of your most necessary things to pay bills you did not willingly incur; being mistrusted and searched, then half starved, and lodged in common with a multitude of strangers; suffering the miseries of seasickness, the disturbances and alarms of a stormy sea for sixteen days. . . . How do you feel?52

More than just a poignant chronicle of the difficulties of late-
nineteenth-century transoceanic emigration, Mashke’s description serves as a list of some of the many situations that her father could not control or assist the family in navigating from faraway Boston. Although he controlled the decision to send for his family and set their destination, the nature of such “chain” migrations resulted in a dispersal of decision-making power.

Mashke’s mother (already a capable decision maker who ran a small business in her husband’s absence) repeatedly found herself in situations where she had to make on-the-spot, in-transit decisions. Whether selling items out of her luggage to pay for health inspections and steam-cleaning of luggage, or seeking out the local representative of an emigrant aid society to circumvent the German second-class ticket entry requirement, Hannah Antin faced situations that arose from the complex intersection of global, regional and local contours of the migration system she and her children traversed.53

**Contours of the Transoceanic Migration System**

When discussing the wave of “emigration fever” that swept Polotzk in 1891, Mashke Antin wrote that, “the different currents that dictated the wave cannot here be enumerated.”54 Neither do I propose to enumerate the totality of factors that interlinked the tiny shetl of Polotzk with the port of Hamburg and the distant shores of North and South America. But by focusing on the feedback effects generated by the interaction of some of these currents, I think one conveys the ebb and flow of the overall system. Eastern European emigration, fueled by anti-Semitism and economic necessity, supported the expansion of HAPAG, thus easing the transport of both phases of the Antin family migration. But it also led to the increased health inspections and financial costs that put bureaucratic hurdles in the path of Mashke Antin and her family.

The predominant transoceanic migration patterns at the turn of the twentieth century have come to be known as “chain” migration and “return” migration.55 Both patterns required family members to endure geographical separations, adjust labor roles and consumption patterns, and develop ways of making decisions across long distances with significant time delays. In practice, “chain-migrating” Irish and Russian Jews did in fact share a world-historical phenomenon with “return-migrating” Italians, Japanese and southeastern Chinese,
although the two categories are more frequently contrasted than compared. In both types of migration, the human family is stretched across space and must decide if, and when, to reunite. The outcomes of the strategies may differ—reunite via the subsequent emigration of additional family members or the return of previous emigrants—but the transoceanic migrant family exists in each. Consequently, these family migration strategies allow us to conceptualize a model of a basic human social institution that is more than a bounded, localized entity. At once anchored to a home community, in movement, and resettling amongst millions of co-migrants, the long-distance migrant family allows us to examine the development and maintenance of socio-economic linkages that span considerable distances.

In this study I have examined how a migrant family, separated by time and space, fits into and interacts with a multi-layered historical migration system. By setting groups of individual migrants within the context of a migration-system framework, we can balance world history’s focus on long-distance and long-term processes with social history’s interest in documenting agency.56 In relation to existing interdisciplinary migration literature, this analysis also provides three important reminders. First, by thinking about the ways in which migrants become promoters of additional migration (inducing non-migrants to migrate), we develop a better understanding of the multiple phases of an individual’s migrant “life cycle.” Second, although the notion of the “transnational” migrant family and community has been based on empirical evidence from the late-twentieth century, the efforts of earlier generations of transoceanic families to remain connected add a relevant experience.57 Finally, the long-distance migrant-family household proves a useful framework for moving towards a social history of global migration trends. Study of household decisions—whether migrant members should return to the home base or whether other members should relocate—firmly sets the basic social unit of the family within the larger processes of expanding transportation, communication, labor, and capital linkages that are more commonly studied by world historians.

Notes


8 For Antin’s background and her career as immigration promoter, see Evelyn Salz, ed., “Introduction,” in *The Selected Letters of Mary Antin* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), xiii-xxiv.


10 Antin, *FPTB*.


12 *FPTB*, “Prefatory,” 11.


16 In the existing literature, the concept of “migration system” has been defined both specifically in terms of volume of migrants and more generally. Compare, for example, Ernst Georg Ravenstein, “The Laws of Migration,” *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 48 (1885): 167–235, and the second installment published under the same title in *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 52 (1889): 241–305, with Kritz, *International Migration System*, 4. I think this
concept should not just be limited to volume and direction of migrants, but should be open to all inputs into a migration system—people, information, capital and material goods.

17 Faist uses this term specifically in the context of Massey’s concept of cumulatively-caused chain migration. In contrast, I would argue for a broader definition of the term that also allowed for negative consequences within the system, such as increased gate-keeping function which could impede or prevent additional emigration. Faist, “The Crucial Meso-Level,” 194, 212–214; Massey, “Theories of International Migration.”


19 Three particularly helpful discussions of system-wide or global-level migration dynamics are Moch, Moving Europeans, 7; McKeown, Chinese Migrant Networks, 4; and Carolyn Cartier, “Cosmopolitics and the Maritime World City,” The Geographical Review 89 (1999): 284.


23 Clapp, Port of Hamburg, 82.

24 Ibid, 88.


26 Clapp, Port of Hamburg, 77–95.


29 For a list of all facilities in the Emigrant’s Halls, see NARA, RG 32-SB, Album #2, 22. See also photos 4B, 5B, 6A-B, 7B, and 8A for views of churches, Jewish Dining Room, and signage in camp.

30 Wüstenbecker puts the number at around 8600; Nugent uses the figure of 10,000. Wüstenbecker also discusses the contrast between the perception that Eastern European emigrants were the cause of the outbreak and alternative, more plausible sources of the epidemic. Wüstenbecker, “Hamburg,” 227; Nugent, Crossings, 86.

31 Wüstenbecker, “Hamburg,” 227–233; Clapp, Port of Hamburg, 67. For Mashke Antin’s first-hand account of the health inspections, see TPL, 170. On medical facilities and the unclean/clean distinctions in the Emigrant Halls see NARA, RG 32–SB, Album #2, 22.

32 This linkage fits with the goal of “pushing . . . analysis simultaneously outward toward global and inward toward local phenomena.” Benton, “Institutional World History,” 285.


35 TPL, 140.


38 Gabaccia, Italy’s Many Diasporas, 90–94.


TPL, 181–182.

Ibid., 141.

Ibid., 141–142.

FPTB, 12.

Ibid.


TPL, 143.

Ibid., 144.


On the need to apprentice Mashke and her sister Fetchke, see TPL, 148–149. On their inability to attend school in Polotzk, see TPL, 51.

TPL, 148–149.

FPTB, 80.

Ibid., 27–35. see

Ibid., “Prefatory,” 11.


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CHAPTER 7

Moving In, Moving Up, and Moving Around: Literary Perspectives on the History of Chinese-American Immigration

Anne Chao

The complexity of the migratory experience of the Chinese overseas defies categorization by means of any particular diasporic paradigm or a single theory of international migration.¹ Within the Chinese-American migratory movement, the plurality of actors and diversity of trajectories require multiple diasporic and migratory perspectives in order to understand the total phenomenon. How can we evaluate the myriad permutations of Chinese egress and ingress across territorial boundaries, which have ranged from the massive migration of traders and laborers in the mid-nineteenth century to the shuttling of intellectuals between Beijing and the U.S. on today’s jumbo jets?

One valuable perspective on the “culture of migration,” to borrow a phrase from Douglas Massey et al., is to look at the evolution of diasporic literature as it seeks to link the migrants, their old home and their new host countries.² Whether in the form of autobiography or fiction, diasporic literature provides a window into the immigrants’ experiences of settling into a new society, of assimilation and, increasingly, of journeying back and forth between their new and old home countries. Inspired by Patrick Manning’s view on the importance of literature in world-historical context, I will argue that fiction, as well as travel diaries and other historical documents, together can help us trace “individual consciousness of global and local change [and] provide substantial
evidence on the changing perceptions . . . of the world from the point of view of individuals.”³

The term “diaspora,” originally used by the Greeks to depict an act of “dispersion,” “to sow or scatter,” and more generally associated with the Jewish exile and its historical, religious and socio-economic conditions, has been applied in recent years to ethnic mass migrations of every type in the world. Nicholas Van Hear’s definition of diaspora offers the most broad-ranging interpretation of the concept. Drawing from Khachig Tololyan, Robin Cohen, and others, Van Hear identifies diasporic peoples as those who disperse from a center to two or more other lands, whose stays abroad are prolonged but not always permanent, who travel back and forth between their destinations, and who engage in one form or another of social, economic, political or cultural exchange among themselves and with others of the diaspora.⁴

According to Laurence Ma, the term diaspora in the late twentieth century has also acquired connotations of supermobility, flexible identities, multiculturalism and transnational flows of capital. He suggests using paradigms focusing on socio-economic, political, and cultural networks to understand transmigration, diaspora, and the latter’s role in the globalization of production and the increasing spatial mobility of modern times.⁵

Migration Theories

As one way of understanding what Van Hear describes as the migratory processes of “moving out, coming in, going back, moving on, and staying put,” I would like to focus on the literary and cultural component of the overseas Chinese experience.⁶ I believe that valuable insight into the complex relationship between Chinese Americans, their land of origin, and other environments, can be gained by following literary trends not only in America but also on the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. But before arguing for the inclusion of literary and cultural material into the interpretative equation, I would like to summarize briefly some other analytical tools that shed useful light on the migratory experience.

A quick survey of the prevalent theories of migration suggests an analytical approach that favors economic factors overwhelmingly. Much has been done on the core-periphery relations of production through World-System analysis, while supplies of labor and capital are
studied via neoclassical economic theory and dual labor market theory. The new economics of migration theory introduces human agency in the decision-making process of the individual and his family. Network theory emphasizes interpersonal ties and looks at shared surname associations, schools, and clubs linking the migrants in an ever-expanding circle of diasporic people. Enclave theory, by contrast, sees Chinatown as a safe haven which performs a protective function for newly arrived immigrants.

Probably the most useful of these integrative approaches is the theory of cumulative causation, which broadly identifies six conditions that affect patterns of migration: the distribution of income, the distribution of land, the organization of agriculture, culture, the regional distribution of human capital, and the social meaning of work.7

Missing from these otherwise valuable theories and typologies is a way of deciphering what immigrants actually think, how they conceptualize their existence, and how they interact with their home country and other environments. Chinese-American literature helps to fill this gap. In migrant movements up the socio-economic ladder and back and forth across host and home boundaries, issues of Chinese assimilation, globalization, and transnationalism are interwoven into and vividly expressed in the written text.

In more than a century of development, Chinese-American literature has moved from apologetic writing through a period of descriptive realism to self-confident, albeit varied and often sharply divergent, assertions of “Chinese” identity. Benefiting from the globalizing spread of information technology in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, compatriots on the mainland and Taiwan have joined Chinese Americans in literary discussion and debates.

**Migration in Literature**

Chinese-American literature, here defined loosely as a body of writing authored by those who came to the United States either as first-generation immigrants from a “Chinese” environment, or as descendants of this generation, offers a unique perspective on the subjective values that operate at the ground level of the immigrant experience.8 Traditionally considered “foreign writing” by American mainstream literary critics, and yet not generally viewed as Chinese literature by experts in that field, it represents a unique window into the constantly
evolving worldview of these diasporic people.

From the earliest autobiography by Lee Yan Fou in 1887, titled *When I was a Boy in China*, to *Waiting*, the National Book Award winner by Ha Jin in 1999, Chinese-American literature has gradually come of age. Chinese-American subjectivity encompasses, among other things, a plea for tolerance, an angry reaction against intransigent racial discrimination, an assertion of a distinctive identity, and at this point a postmodernist fluidity that is beginning to merge with the “mainstream” of American literature. Within this literary movement, a major debate has developed along gendered lines, and divisions have arisen among American-born Chinese, or ABC, and so-called first-generation immigrant writers. The latter, consisting of those who were born abroad, write in Chinese for a readership that bridges the Pacific divide.

This body of literature cannot be separated from the history of Chinese migration, which, according to Adam McKeown, consists of two main stages. The first took place between 1842 and 1949 and the second between 1963 and 1997. The first wave of Chinese immigrants worked mainly as laborers in their host countries. The second wave, consisting mainly of educated professionals and affluent businessmen, includes Chinese from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia, who settled down primarily in North America, Australia, and New Zealand. This latter group consists mainly of well-educated professionals and affluent businessmen.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the opening of China have created an unprecedented surge of global migration. According to Douglas Massey, these events have forced the traditional immigrant-receiving democracies in the West to impose barriers to counter the pro-emigration policies of countries such as China. At the same time, improving political, social, and economic conditions in mainland China and on Taiwan have encouraged transnational Chinese migrants to return home—some permanently, others as reverse “sojourners,” maintaining homes in both the United States and China or Taiwan. On the mainland, this latest group of returned Chinese is called *haigui*, or those who return from across the sea. They follow in the footsteps of the returnees of an earlier era, intellectuals such as Hu Shi, Jiang Menglin, Tao Xingzhi, and Chen Duxiu of the May Fourth period. These “reverse migratory” movements effect a transformation of the cultural and intellectual forces of the home
country, a phenomenon of particular significance in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Paralleling the historical stages of Chinese-American migration, the literary subjectivity of the Chinese American has undergone several transformations. In 1887 Lee Yan Fou, in response to the discriminatory influence of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, wrote *When I was a Boy in China*. Lee attempted to introduce Chinese culture to the American reader by describing the details of his youth. The condescending and apologetic tone he adopted toward his own culture reflects the enormous pressure and anxiety for acceptance on the part of an alien. Around the same time, Sir Chengtung Liang Cheng, a graduate of Philips Academy and holder of an honorary degree from Yale who was knighted by the British government, also used literature to correct misperceptions about China and Chinese civilization. These efforts continued into the twentieth century with the publication of Lin Yutang’s *My Country and My People* in 1937, of Adet and Anor Lin’s *Our Family* in 1939, and Anna Chenault’s *A Thousand Springs* in 1962. Acutely aware of the low social position of most Chinese Americans, these authors deliberately passed over the grimness of the Chinatown denizens’ daily existence and emphasized the positive aspects of Chinese culture.

The first published work by an American-born Chinese was Pardee Lowe’s *Father and Glorious Descendant* in 1943. The most successful work by an American Chinese in the 1940s was Jade Snow Wong’s *Fifth Chinese Daughter*. These two works benefited from the public sympathy for China that developed during and after World War II. Nevertheless both authors, like other Chinese-American writers of their time, felt compelled to distance themselves from their Chinese origins.

The decade of the 1960s marked a watershed for Chinese-American writing. The civil rights movement, the anti-war effort, the emergence of ethnic and gender consciousness, and a more lenient immigration policy opened the civic discourse to a plurality of subjectivities. Louis Chu’s *Eat a Bowl of Tea* heralds a new phase of literary realism. Written in 1961, it portrays the harshness of the existence of the Chinatown inhabitants and the problems of interracial marriage. Meanwhile, as a leading voice of the “angry young Chinese men” of the 1960s, Frank Chin shattered racial stereotyping with a new definition of Chinese-American masculinity. Chin charged that “America’s dishonesty—its
racist white supremacy passed off as love and acceptance—has kept seven generations of Asian-American voices off the air, off the streets, and praised us for being Asiatically no-show.”

Disparaging early Chinese-American writing as propagating “early yellow white supremacy,” Chin also railed against the feminizing stereotype of the Chinese American male, and blamed Chinese-American women writers such as Maxine Hong Kingston and Amy Tan for reinforcing the “effeminate” image of Chinese males.

In the 1970s, Kingston’s *The Woman Warrior* and *China Men* had won both critical and popular acclaim, garnering National Book Critics Circle Awards in 1976 and 1980 respectively. Kingston sought to carve out a separate Chinese-American identity, neither denying her Chinese roots nor disregarding her American minority status. A decade later Amy Tan’s *The Joy Luck Club* became widely accepted by mainstream America with its universal theme of mother-daughter relationship. However, as indicated above, her negative portrayal of Chinese men brought accusations of Chinese-American male-bashing by Frank Chin and others, and her protagonist’s return to China suggested to some critics a “neoconservative rhetoric of ‘tribalism’” and an overemphasis on “the Asian American literary desire to return to Asia.”

The subjectivity of the first generation of Chinese immigrants from the People’s Republic to America was shaped by the “wounded literature” (*shanghen wenxue*) of the 1980s in China, itself a response to the “scars” of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Works such as *Life and Death in Shanghai* (1986) by Nien Cheng, *Wild Swans* (1991) by Jung Chang, and *Red Azalea* (1994) by Anchee Min portrayed the horrors of the Cultural Revolution so vividly that they tended to dominate Western perception of China and the Chinese. Ha Jin’s *Waiting* (1999), winner of the National Book Award for that year, was this type of writing. The Chinese-American reaction to this genre of “wounded literature” was mainly one of condemnation and of distancing themselves from the China portrayed in these books.

*Some of Us: Chinese Women Growing Up in the Mao Era* (2001), written by a group of women intellectuals currently residing in the U. S., is an attempt to offer an alternative perspective on growing up during the Cultural Revolution. These authors describe a carefree childhood, innocent of the implications of class struggle. They even claim that for those who were “sent down” from the city to the countryside,
the friendship and respect of the peasants mitigated the harshness of their experience. Their effort to put a positive spin on life in China uncannily echoes the efforts of the earliest immigrants such as Lee Yan Fou and Lin Yutang.

Within the genre of Chinese-American literature, the end of the twentieth century has indeed witnessed an unprecedented multivocality. David Leiwei Li argues that the aim of the emerging Asian-American discourse is to “reclaim the United States as the unambiguous geocultural site of Asian American self-definition.” Similarly, Lisa Lowe calls for “heterogeneity, hybridity, and multiplicity” in characterizing Asian-American culture. The increasing exchange of ideas among Chinese communities around the world, focusing primarily on the written texts, has resulted in a phenomenon which I term the Greater Chinese postmodernist flow. Authors who choose to write in Chinese broach subjects that are elided by their compatriots who write in English. Their choice of language marks a conscious effort to maintain an aesthetic of authenticity with their Chinese heritage, in the process of explaining America to their audience. Freed from the constraint of attracting mainstream American readers, writers such as Chen Ruoxi and Cao Youfang discuss issues of interracial love involving white women and Chinese men, and relations with other minorities, among others. Chen’s personal life exemplifies the fluidity of transnational identity, since she was born in Taiwan, studied in the United States, moved to the mainland, and then returned permanently to the United States. She focuses her writing on the inner conflicts of the diasporic Chinese who find themselves at the crossroads of the triangle of America, China and Taiwan. In Taiwan Chen Ruoxi is considered a member of the Modern Literature group, Western-influenced Chinese writers who use psychological explanation and a neutral authorial voice to critique the totalitarian state.

**Postmodernism Goes to China**

The late-twentieth-century backlash against the hegemony of modernism in all of its manifestations first came about in the West. Eric Liu’s *The Accidental Asian: Notes of a Native Speaker* (1998) was hailed by Henry Louis Gates, Jr. as comparable to Richard Wright’s *Black Boy*, and by *Time* Magazine as a “uniquely American memoir.” Liu’s ambivalence about his Asian identity reflects the sense of crisis and
The indeterminacy of the postmodern sensibility. The subversive potential of postmodernism was quickly appropriated by cultural radicals in China and Taiwan in an effort to destabilize the status quo. The shift to postmodernism in literature on both sides of the Taiwan Strait occurred about the same time under different political, social and intellectual circumstances, but shared the same intention to subvert the dominant hegemonic discourse within each society. On the mainland the translation of John Barth’s essay, “The Literature of Replenishment: Postmodernist Fiction,” in 1980 marked the introduction of postmodernist thought. Editors of avant-garde journals, many of whom studied in the West, introduced translations of Frederic Jameson, Jean-Francois Lyotard and others in rapid succession in the 1980s. The resultant debates generated a period of “cultural fever” or “beautiful chaos.” In 1983 Beijing University’s Institute of Foreign Philosophy launched a debate on the philosophies of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Ricoeur and Rorty, the repercussions of which can still be felt today. Some intellectuals have argued that the most important outcome of this “Cultural Discussion” was the harnessing of modernism in a counter-hegemonic discourse designed to subvert the reigning political ideology. The literary ramifications of the debate in the 1980s have been the subsidence of social realism and the emergence not only of the wounded literature school (shanghen wenxue pai), but also of Misty Poetry (menglong shi), the modernist school (xiandai pai), the root-seeking school (xungen pai), the avant-garde school (xianfeng pai), and various experimental schools (shiyanpai). In short, the plurality of literary discourses severed the bond between the aesthetic and the political and moral purposes of language—an unprecedented phenomenon in recent Chinese history.

In the 1990s, poststructuralism and postcolonialism entered into the intellectual debates as scholars engaged with their counterparts in the West. They appropriated Foucault’s theory of power and knowledge and Derrida’s theory of deconstruction in an effort to dismantle the totalitarian ideology. A welter of post-isms was created in the process, and terminologies such as post-Maoism, post-revolutionism, post-Fordism, and post-Fifth Generationism, in their emphasis on a unique Chineseness, were ironically co-opted by the state in its crackdown on
dissidents.\textsuperscript{42} During his lectures at Beijing University in the early 1980s, Frederic Jameson maintained that postmodernism, as a cultural phenomenon, can only come about when capital has entered the last stage of production.\textsuperscript{43} This marriage of culture to political economy spurred a debate among mainland intellectuals on the viability of calling the genre of irreverent literature of the 1980s and 1990s “postmodern.” Jing Wang argues that because China has not developed into a fully capitalist society, the writings of these experimentalists can only be viewed as variations of modernism.\textsuperscript{44} Xiaobin Yang, however, believes that because China has become part of the world economy, globalization and transnational capitalism have introduced cultural transformations that fit Jameson’s criteria of postmodernism.\textsuperscript{45} In a third opinion befitting the irony of the subject matter, Xiaobing Tang concludes that postmodernism in China occupies a marginal position in intellectual discourse, because its arsenal of “detachment, distrust, and irony” has been overrun by the popular culture of ever-growing market capitalism.\textsuperscript{46}

In Taiwan, Frederic Jameson’s works and the notions of poststructuralism and postmodernism were introduced in the late 1980s by William Tay, Jameson’s student and professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.\textsuperscript{47} The period was one in which discussions arose among Chinese communities in Taiwan, Hong Kong and the mainland.\textsuperscript{48} When martial law was lifted in Taiwan in 1987, the ensuing freedom of expression resulted in an indigenous formulation of postmodernism. According to Sebastian Liao, the liberalizing effect of political reform loosened social and cultural control, leading to a “carnivalesque cultural atmosphere” that led in turn to the rise of postmodernism in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{49} Drawing upon the Anglo-American inspired modernist school of the 1960s\textsuperscript{50} and the nativist movement\textsuperscript{51} that ended around 1979, the intellectuals of the 1990s reverted to a “cultural nostalgia”\textsuperscript{52} that privileged folk traditions and native subject matter. Political fiction, resistance literature, and feminist works began to appear, and stylistic formulations such as double endings and the juxtaposition of the factual and the fictional emerged in popular literature.\textsuperscript{53} On Taiwan, as it is on the mainland, it appears that the culture of mass consumption threatens to relegate such processes to the obscurity of academia.

One reason that intellectuals on Taiwan appropriated postmodernism
was to counter both the nationalist and the Taiwanese political discourses. For a time the radical group Isle Margin became the main force of critical postmodernism in Taiwan in the 1990s. It championed feminist, gay and lesbian issues, and challenged the dominant “power complex of patriarchy-heterosexuality-nationalism-statism-capitalism.” The postmodernist project in Taiwan also aims to deemphasize the island’s economic dependence on mainland China and, in the process, to move away from a Han-Chinese orientation toward a multicultural and transnational one. Genealogies of Chinese immigrants and of the Taiwanese aborigines of Malayo-Polynesian roots are being identified, and more research is being done on the colonial legacies left behind by Dutch, Japanese and earlier immigrants.

Zhang Dachun’s novel, *My Kid Sister*, provides an especially striking example of postmodern indeterminacy of meaning. In the protagonist’s response to his kid sister’s query as to why he writes, he responds: “During the past several years, just what have I actually ‘created’? All I do is take those little details of life that are lacking and add a little of something else; I take D event that occurred during A time at B place to C person, and rewrite it in E time at F place to G person. Then I add a bit of H or remove a tad of K—did forget I and J? Oh, I’m saving them so critics and readers will have space to exercise their imagination.”

**Conclusion**

By focusing on the cultural component of the Chinese-American migratory experience, with its ever more complex movement between China and the West, I have tried to show a concrete link between globalization and subjective representation. What David Der-wei Wang terms the “radicalization of traditional realist discourse,” in the privileging of elements of fantasy and the uncanny by both mainland and Taiwanese writers, has wrought a distinctive Chinese postmodernism from the global migration of ideas. In the century and a half of criss-crossing the globe, Chinese immigrants have attained an ever-increasing literary sophistication. Whether it is Ge Fei’s *Diren* (the enemy) on the mainland, or Zhang Dachun’s *My Kid Sister* in Taiwan, or Ha Jin’s *Waiting* in the United States, Chinese and Chinese-American authors are increasingly participants in a global “imagined community” of postmodern exchanges. Of foremost importance, issues of assimilation and identity formation have been elevated onto the global stage. As
Chinese, Chinese-American and American intellectuals interact in various cultural and geographical environments in the next ten years, there will be continuous shifting of basic assumptions about, and debates over, the question of cultural distinctiveness—a process conditioned by local, national, and transnational factors, and aided by the increasing spatial and informational mobility of the twenty-first century.

Notes

1 I borrow Wang Gungwu’s use of the term “Chinese overseas” to define all those Chinese who live outside of Greater China, i.e. China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, for lack of a better terminology to describe the people. See Wang Gungwu, “Greater China and the Chinese Overseas,” China Quarterly (Special Issue: Greater China), no. 136 (1993): 927.

2 Douglas Massey, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor, “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal,” Population and Development Review 19 (1993): 452. The “culture of migration” is one of the six variables in this discussion of the theory of cumulative causation, in that each act of migration alters the social context within which subsequent migration decisions are made, usually contributing to further migration.


5 Laurence J. C. Ma and Carolyn Cartier, eds., The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility and Identity (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 4–11.

6 Van Hear, New Diasporas, 40.

7 Massey, “Theories of International Migration,” 431–466; Douglas Massey et al, “An Evaluation of International Migration Theory: The North American Case,” Population and Development Review 20 (1994): 740–741; and Ma and Cartier, Chinese Diaspora, 3–11. In an effort to clarify Chinese migration, Wang Gungwu stresses the need to examine each overseas community individually within its specific political and historical context and divides Chinese overseas migrants into four groups. They are huashang, or traders of the Southeast Asian cities such as Batavia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; huagong, or coolies and peasants working on the railways and in the mines of the North America and Australia; huaqiao, or sojourners; and

8 By “Chinese” environment I refer to “cultural China,” which encompasses not only China proper, but the greater areas of East and Southeast Asia where the Chinese live and are able to identify themselves as originally from China. See also Tu Wei-ming’s conceptualization of “Cultural China,” which consists of three symbolic spheres: the predominantly Chinese societies of mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore; the Chinese diasporic communities around the world, and the intellectuals and entrepreneurs who study and work with China abroad. Tu Wei-ming, ed., *The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 13.


10 These writers explore issues of assimilation from the Chinese perspective, often critical of American values, and generally lamenting the loss of the Chinese heritage among the younger generations.


12 Ma and Cartier, *Chinese Diaspora*, 19.

13 Ibid.


15 Yin, *Chinese American Literature*, 2, 54.


18 Ibid., 61.

19 Yin, *Chinese American Literature*, 229.


24 Li, Imagining the Nation, 26.

25 Lowe, Immigrant Acts, 44.


28 Yin, Chinese American Literature, 162–165.

29 Kao, Short Stories of Chen Ruoxi, 7.


36 Wang, Jing. High Culture Fever, 88.

37 Ibid., 47.

38 Ibid., 143.

39 Wang Ning, “Chinese Postmodernity,” 28; and Jing Wang, High Culture Fever, 45.


Professor T. A. Hsia is largely credited for introducing Kafka, Joyce, Woolf, and Faulkner to Taiwan University’s young writers and thereby initiating the creation of Modernist literature in Taiwan. See Chang, *Modernism*, 4–5.

The nativist literary movement is an attempt to get back to the roots of the Taiwanese culture and tradition through literature, in the form of the genre of xiangtu wenxue.


52 Ibid.


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Georg Simmel, in describing the characteristics of the Stranger, begins by marking as a stranger the trader who has come into one society from another in order to sell goods. He asserts that every society has one, “unless there are people who wander out into foreign lands to buy these necessities, in which case they are themselves ‘strange’ merchants in this other region. . . .” It is interesting that Simmel only ascribes the trader this quality of strangeness while “out in foreign lands” and in relation to the society that is out there. Once the trader returns to his own society (Simmel’s stranger is gendered male), his strangeness will, presumably, be washed away in the warm bath of commonality. By assuming the unidirectional strangeness of the trader, Simmel presupposes that the citizens of his homogeneous society share an innate commonality that survives any and all divergences in the ostensibly parallel course of personal and national identity narratives.

Why has this intersection between experience and identity, so well examined in other fields, remained unexplored in the case of the colonial actors of imperial societies? The political focus of world history, particularly in colonial and post-colonial studies, has been concentrated on the previously underrepresented, silenced, subaltern populations upon whom colonialism and displacement have been imposed. The preoccupation, across the disciplines, with the disruptive nature of the imperial project began as the desire to expose the myriad locations of
conflict and negotiation between colonizer and colonized.\textsuperscript{4} When the identity formation of colonizers became the subject of examination, it was usually limited to the colonial arena.\textsuperscript{5} The subsequent focus on movement and migration has perforce continued the (valid) presumption that the burden of disruption has overwhelmingly been on the once colonized.\textsuperscript{6} Recently, the “outward” journey of the colonizers has been followed by the “inward” journey of the colonized (including the material products of their exploitation), exploring the impact of colonialism on the metropole and on metropolitan culture.\textsuperscript{7} This was undertaken not least in an attempt to challenge the privileging center/periphery model that spatial characterizations of the imperial circuit encourage. Only very recently have historians, anthropologists and sociologists paid attention to the return journey of colonizers, acknowledging the possibility that these people who embodied the metropole while in the colony, might now, as part of their imperial baggage, possess a subjectivity not wholly commensurate with the metropolitan society to which they have returned.\textsuperscript{8} In the absence of such an analysis, not only of the British but also of any other nation’s colonizers, the colonial return is rendered unproblematic and the colonial setting as impermanent in its impact on the colonizer as the foreign land is on the trader. By focusing on one returning population, I will explore the strategies and negotiations they undertook in order to reconcile their supposedly immutable British identities with the challenges of their return.

Unlike many other colonies, all British members of the Sudan Government were barred from settling in the Sudan once they retired. Every Anglo-Sudanese knew that they would be leaving the Sudan at the end of their service—mandatory at the age of fifty—which usually lasted around twenty-five years, but was much shorter for those whose careers were cut short by independence. The certainty of departure encouraged the development of elaborate “final leave” rituals within the Anglo-Sudanese community in the Sudan. But curiously, there was a complete absence of any comparable rituals of return once back in Britain. Asserting their Anglo-Sudanese identity was more difficult, at least initially, for those who were forced to leave. As they were asked to leave, their ability to think of the British community in the Sudan as home, in any sense, was severely undermined; we are never asked to leave home—if we are, then it wasn’t home.\textsuperscript{9} This rejection could only be denied by also denying the departure. Nevertheless, throughout the
Condominium, many Anglo-Sudanese also acknowledged how much their world view had been altered by their time in the Sudan. And in the first moments of returning, anxious about the disruption that so many life changes brought on anyway, some may also have feared that these changes were potentially insurmountable. In response, they facilitated their reintegration into British society by eliding the boundaries between colony and metropole for their metropolitan audience. This strategy was only possible and successful up to a point, however. Inconsistencies and contradictions in their social practices, once they returned, speak to their anxieties about returning and the tension between whom they were and the contemporary British national culture to which they ostensibly belonged.

For the Anglo-Sudanese, the desire to reintegrate into British society precluded them from marking the return passage in front of a British metropolitan audience. I would argue that their silence is located within a wider silence that was (and is) indicative of the reluctance to explore the contingent nature of the collective social and cultural identity of former imperial powers, even as similar projects are repeatedly undertaken in order to elucidate occasions of cultural and identity disruption for colonized peoples wrought by the imperial project. Historians are always questioning the cultural assumptions imbedded in our own work in the hopes of becoming more sensitive to the strategies (including silence) employed by historical subjects to naturalize their own cultural practices. So we need to question why this particular silence continues to pass virtually unnoticed. To say that the colonizers themselves have been acted upon is not to diminish the inherently inequitable power dynamic of the imperial encounter; but it could, I hope, reduce the potency of a central tenet of all imperial philosophies, that there is an existential condition, in this case Britishness, that could be carried like a portmanteau, stamped with destinations but with its contents unaltered.

“I can make roots . . .”

Anglo-Sudanese preparations for the return began months before it actually occurred. The returnees fell into two groups: those who returned at the end of a normal length of duty in the Sudan, and those who were forced to leave the Sudan in the early 1950s, before their time was up, due to the processes of Sudanization—whereby all positions in
government that could “affect the freedom of the Sudanese at the time of Self-Determination” had to be held by Sudanese. As the retirement age for Sudan officials was so young, however, both groups shared the experience of “retiring” while still being young enough that they were expected to pursue a second career. For the second group this meant a career out of necessity, whereas for the first group it had more to do with the expectation that a man in his late forties or early fifties was too young to be idle.

In an era when most men stayed with the same employer for their entire career and, by fifty, were reaping the benefits of a slow but steady advancement, the Anglo-Sudanese at that age began all over again. The positions that they took up were generally rather senior ones, certainly. Nevertheless, for the man who stayed put, the social and economic benefits of professional continuity cannot be underestimated. A middle-class, public-school-educated man who had remained in Britain for the same years of his life created a place for himself—perhaps becoming a pillar of the community. He participated in local organizations and made connections through work and his community activities that extended into a social and cultural life beyond. And wives had similar experiences. Anglo-Sudanese women did not enjoy the same continuity that came from years of social interaction in Britain. While in the Sudan, they made an effort to mimic the style of life that these women had watched their mothers maintain back home. Of course, these women had Sudanese servants who cleaned the house and prepared meals, unlike some of their mothers at home, and this was a domestic arrangement that many couldn’t afford when they returned, particularly in the different British economic environment of the 1940s and 1950s. The men were similarly often engaged in what appears to be an unconscious recreation of the British suburban life of their parents. On the other hand, they were always expected to be on call. There was no separation of work and home: no 5:19 train to Woking. And for both the men and the women, the experiences of life on trek (when weeks at a time were spent in the outlying territories) cultivated improvisational skills that, perhaps, equipped them for such a profound change in lifestyle once they returned. When interviewed years later, Mary Rowley, a midwife who went on to marry an SPS (Sudan Political Service) official, stated repeatedly, “As I always said, ‘I can make roots . . . I can live in a tent. I shall be very happy.’” She certainly attributed
that ability to her time in the Sudan.\textsuperscript{17}

This adaptability was a skill that was to be tested by the return. Before British officials left the Sudan, they auctioned off most of the household goods that they had acquired while there. They didn’t usually ship back their furniture because one of the most ubiquitous pests in the Sudan is the white ant, which will eat any wood or natural fiber that it encounters. Most pieces of furniture that remained stationary—beds, dining tables, etc.—had their feet placed in cans of white spirits in order to keep the ants away. All other furniture would slowly be consumed over time and have to be replaced. As a result, it was seldom worth the expense of shipping. Women arrived to set up their first home with the silver and linens and the other accoutrements usually given as wedding gifts to middle-class couples during this period, and this was usually when the men first thought of themselves as having an adult home, as well.\textsuperscript{18} When the couple returned to Britain many years later the inventory lists were strikingly similar to the new bride’s. \textsuperscript{19} When W. A. Porter left Tokar, Kassala Province, in 1951, he and his wife had to ship or sell belongings that they had accumulated since he first arrived in 1927, including the wedding presents that his wife brought with her in 1930. The auction netted seven hundred and eighty seven pounds, and the goods they were shipping back to England were insured at a value of four hundred pounds, one hundred of which were the surviving wedding presents—one quarter the value of the whole.\textsuperscript{20} After over twenty years of marriage, this household was about to begin again with only four hundred pounds worth of furnishings.

The auction was as much a social event as anything else and also seemed to be, in a way, part of the tribute to the officer. Storrar writes about a weekend auction in much the same tone as he would write about a tea party.\textsuperscript{21} If those remaining in the Sudan could help with a purchase, it was a way to lend support to the departing family, and also a way to compliment the couple on their taste. Diana Arthur was pleased to inform her mother after their auction in 1954, that “there was great demand for all our things.”\textsuperscript{22} Although the Arthurs do not mention it, auctions became much more politically fraught later in the Condominium when the officials were selling their belongings to up-and-coming Sudanese officials, rather than the newly arrived or newly married British ones. The auction was an institution and a rite of passage; although never codified, its function and form were
absolutely understood and passed down through the Anglo-Sudanese generations. Its ritualistic and symbolic aspects were underpinned by its functionality. The fact that this helped to define the community, to welcome new members to it, while giving others a supportive farewell as they left it, turned practicality into ceremony.

Community support was also reinforced by a series of farewell parties. Depending on where an official was stationed and who he was, there could be an endless number of official and semi-official ones, and then as many private, purely social ones as a person’s popularity determined. The centerpiece was a testimonial dinner which sometimes included the wives of officials and sometimes included the Sudanese members of the department. This depended most often on where the official was stationed. (In other words, the greater the number of people within the returnees’ Sudan community, the more compartmentalized the various farewell events would be.) In their personal letters, many give detailed accounts, including seating plans carefully noting everybody in attendance. The social or sports club also had a banquet, and if an official’s work brought him into steady contact with the non-British, non-Sudanese community in the Three Towns (Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman), and a few others where there were substantial Greek and Syrian merchant communities, there might also be farewell events hosted by them.

Then there was at least one Sudanese farewell party, usually held as a tea party in the afternoon, which made the absence of alcohol less remarkable. These parties produced the most elaborate tributes for the retiring official, and ones that he very often held on to for the rest of his life. Numerous officials have remarked on the politesse of the Sudanese—how it was both a sign of their great civilization and also one of the most frustrating things in trying to govern them—that they would forgo truthfulness in favor of graciousness. Interestingly, at the time of departure and after, the Anglo-Sudanese consistently failed to extend that observation about Sudanese cultural practices into the context of their own personal contact with Sudanese colleagues and friends. Particularly after independence, Sudanese popular opinion retroactively became extremely important in the creation and preservation of a particular corporate identity. These written tributes were carefully preserved, and quite prominently placed in their memoirs and scrap books.

And finally, there was an obligatory, community-wide farewell at
the train station, or dockside. Many memoirs end with a similar coda: a bittersweet departure with a huge multi-ethnic cast of well-wishers at the docks, or the train station, or the airport. There are also numerous photos of these kinds of farewells, and the preservation of the apparently “spontaneous” act of a community farewell in dozens of photographs makes it clear that this ritual had taken on a significant meaning that extended beyond the value of the individuals as friends, to their value as symbolic representations of belonging to a community.

“Generally repatriating ourselves . . .”

Embarking on their “final leave,” after weeks of preparation, these men, women, and children returned “home.” Although they had been home on ninety-day leaves every year, for many of the men their arrival in Great Britain marked the start of living in the country for the first time as mature adults. There were family and friends with whom they had faithfully kept in touch and with whom they could now live in easy proximity, sharing milestones and tedium in equal measure, but there is no mention anywhere of a welcome home party. If they took place, they are unremarked upon. And yet, although many of the officials’ diaries continue uninterrupted and their private papers also include the recording of important events after their return to Britain, even coverage of unfortunate, embarrassing, and unflattering events, there does not seem to be any evidence of a celebration in honor of their return. Sir Donald Hawley, Chief Registrar of the Judiciary at the time of his retirement in 1955, makes no mention of his return in his papers. And yet he kept an entire file of mostly unfavorable news coverage of a 1976 event, when a report on immigration that Hawley had written for the government was misleadingly cited by Enoch Powell to support his extreme right-wing stand on immigration.

It seems likely, in most cases, that the people were missed while they were gone. Diana Arthur, the wife of district commissioner Allan Arthur, felt it necessary to establish boundaries with her over-eager parents and in-laws before one of their leaves: “We shall certainly be with each of you for at least a month. So please parents don’t squabble over us.” And yet, at the time of their permanent departure, she feels it necessary to remind her parents “that the children and I have only got another 3 weeks in the Sudan,” and that she is “rather thrilled with the idea that we may be house-hunting this summer, I should love to get settled in a
house of our own,” without any mention of looking forward to a reunion
with family and friends.\textsuperscript{33} She jumps over three intervening months that
happen to be those in which the actual departure and arrival will take
place, and talks about buying a new home as a marker of adulthood, “a
house of our own,” rather than as part of resettling in Britain. This may
be another reason why that period was elided in the memoirs and letters
of returnees. Years later, in her accompanying notes for her letters,
Lesley Lewis, the wife of entomologist David Lewis, summed up the
entire return period by saying, “then back to London to flat-hunting,
finishing off my Bar final, learning to cook and generally repatriating
ourselves to an unfamiliar post-war London.”\textsuperscript{34} Her “repatriation” is
acknowledged but tempered by the assertion that it is specifically “post-
war London,” that was unfamiliar, even after ten years of coming to it
on leave. And when asked directly about it, neither Mary Rowley nor
Lorna Kingdon had any recollection of any party for her family or being
at any party held for any of their returning friends.\textsuperscript{35}

Upon first arrival, wives were concerned with establishing a new
home and arranging appropriate schooling for children, or, if the
children were older and at boarding school, there was the issue of
continuing them there or removing them to a local day school.\textsuperscript{36} Women
often searched for a new home, and even selected one, prior to their
husbands’ return. Of course, as relocation would be dependent on where
the husband ended up working, wives had to wait until their husbands
had found a new job before they could begin establishing a new home.
At a time when many women were unused to handling a check book, I
think it is worth pointing out that everyday activities became occasions
where returnees could not hide their different circumstances from
their metropolitan audience; instead it became a potential moment
of exposure, where their different experiences could not be hidden.
Women, rather than men, were dealing with estate agents and school
heads; and the logistics of shipping, storage, unpacking and furnishing
fell to them, as did the need to set up accounts with merchants and
arrange for utilities.\textsuperscript{37}

Despite the certainty of relocation, there was no established way by
which new homes were bought or furnished in Britain. The Sudan Agent
never arranged a contract with a particular company for the storage of
goods once a family returned to Britain, but before they were able to
find a home. Returnees had to arrange that for themselves. Winifred
Johnson, whose husband worked for the Sudan Cotton Syndicate, wrote as her departure was nearing, that a friend “very kindly gave us a list of people to enquire of if we go to Pembroke in search of a house.”

Companies such as Thomas Cook offered a range of services for those home on leave, such as house and car rentals, but these were never advertised as also being necessary requirements for returnees. Nor were house sales included in the Thomas Cook gazettes. And practical concerns like where someone might stay while searching for a house or a job concerns were left un-addressed by the Sudan Government and Sudan Agency. Of course, people stayed with family or friends when they first returned. But many returnees needed to be in London in order to look for work, and most returnees’ families were not located in or near London. Older colonial retirees from other services often settled in the South due to the weather, but for the Anglo-Sudanese, who retired at a much younger age, the primary motivation was opportunities for employment.

“He deserves a better fate”

A tension exists in the men’s letters and diaries between their desire for a smooth transition and concern about the ongoing needs of their families, and their fear that there was little to which they were ultimately suited after so many years in the Sudan. This concern can be seen in many of the speeches made at farewell parties in the Sudan, where post-Sudan career choices were often lampooned. After more than twenty years in the service, Brian Storrar was regaled with a poem in which his possible future employment opportunities were not particularly attractive, including:

But I have thought that for a change, we might look in the future
And visualize the time when he may be a local butcher.
Perhaps he’ll go to Peter Jones and stand behind the counter
And issue yards of silken lace for every bargain hunter.

A maiden wanders to his stand “three yards of lace,” says she
“I beg your pardon Miss,” he says, “reinforced, type B or C.”
“Perhaps you’d like it on the skew, or else like 1 in 8.”
But I can’t think that this is right, he deserves a better fate.\textsuperscript{43}

What Storrar did take on as a second career is unknown but it is apparent, from the poem, that a second career, in a second country, was not a source of unmitigated, pleasant anticipation.

An ad-hoc job placement network consisting of old university friends, ex-Anglo-Sudanese, family, and friends meant that very few had to resort to public announcements. Many large companies, town councils, and schools contacted Oxbridge when interested in hiring at the managerial level. Oxford University actually had a questionnaire that alumni could fill out when seeking employment so that, when contacted, the university could provide an appropriate list of potential applicants. Some of the Anglo-Sudanese used this.\textsuperscript{44} And yet, by 1950, although there were nine hundred and ninety-three Britons posted in the Sudan, and hundreds had already retired before them, there seemed to be no established custom of arrival and settlement, even an informal one, in the way that the rituals of departure—the parties, the testimonials, and the auctions—were passed down in the Sudan. Within two years, the mass exodus of Anglo-Sudanese would begin, but thirty years of returnees had not yet codified a process of return. It is curious that in a service that was explicitly set up for early retirement, and where, overwhelmingly, its officers did seek out second careers once they returned home, there was no official methodology of relocation for these men.

By 1953, the Ministry of Labour and National Service had established three offices in the country (London, Manchester and Glasgow) that dealt with “filling vacancies of an administrative, managerial, professional and senior executive type” as well as “an advisory service, which is available to older people who are making a major change in their careers,”\textsuperscript{45} within which the government was prepared to create a special Sudan Services Section, in the same way as the India and Burma Services Section set up years earlier. Lessons from that influx, however, had taught the Ministry that the circumstances of the returning Anglo-Sudanese would not be like that of other “older people who [were] making a major change in their careers.”\textsuperscript{46}

When Sudanization made a high number of returnees imminent, however, the Sudan Government, through the Sudan Agency, and
under the aegis of the Foreign Office, set up the Sudan Government Re-Employment Bureau. Geoffrey Hawkesworth retired as a Provincial Governor from the SPS in 1954, and was immediately asked to head the new Bureau. Some became managers and executives in the newly nationalized industries in Britain, such as coal and electricity, with a total of two hundred and sixty-three taking positions in commerce or industry. Forty took posts in government services of some kind. Although town government structures were seen as closed units, dedicated to internal advancement, the “new towns” in the postwar era provided an opportunity to ex-administrators. Both Basildon, Essex, and Bracknell, Berkshire did, in fact, employ ex-Anglo-Sudanese.

In many cases, a man’s new career would take him (and, perhaps, his family) out of Britain a second time. One hundred and sixty-two entered government or academic posts in colonial territories. Therefore the career choice made at twenty-one resulted in an expatriate lifestyle that lasted far longer than envisioned at the time. For some this was a burden. They had a very strong desire to return to Britain and settle down in a society that they had, in many ways, cultivated a continuing connection to while they were away. But reasonable employment for middle-aged generalists was not in abundance. Geoffrey Hawkesworth, after having helped hundreds of others to find work, had so much difficulty finding something for himself that he applied for the post of Chairman of the Civil Service Commission of the Federation of Nigeria. “This means selling my house and family separation during part of the next five years—in fact all those things I so much wanted to avoid. But at my age there is apparently no other choice.”

The Colonial Service hired some Anglo-Sudanese to help in the transition period of other African colonies nearing independence. More senior members were valued for their understanding of the difficulties of transition and so were valued for their experience rather than penalized for their age. “Most of the officials were between 26 and 60 years of age. The re-employment of those under 35 years presented no problem; but it was more difficult to resettle those who were between 35 and 45 and still more difficult for those over 45 unless they possessed some professional qualifications.” Fortunately for many of these men, Sudanese independence occurred at the same time as the discovery of and increased demand for Middle Eastern oil. The giant oil companies, such as BP and Shell, valued the generalist skills of ex-political officers
who could speak Arabic. Others acted as advisors and spokespeople for Middle East governments, and relocated, at least temporarily, to various Gulf States. Forty-three officials took positions in foreign states or international organizations.

I wish to note that I have not focused on the second career paths of the women in the Sudan Government because they usually retired from the service because of marriage and were, at that point, tied to the career decisions of their husbands. There are too few women who had full-length careers in the Sudan Government, and none with husbands (some with children), to assess whether they approached their return and professional development in a substantially different way than their male governmental counterparts. Having said that, it is interesting to note that Ina Beasley, a doctor of Education, applied for a position in the Sudan Education Service after leaving Burma, where she had been a college lecturer. Divorced and with a daughter at boarding school in England, she took the posting in the Sudan because, as she said, “I had been overseas before and thought I should like the opportunities offered.” She continued her expatriate career in the Sudan as the head of Girls’ Education, before returning to Britain in 1949, continuing her career as an educator. So, in her case, the Sudan was the second career. Another woman who had a full career in the Sudan, Elaine Hills-Young, was the Matron of Khartoum Hospital and then Principal of the Midwives’ Training School, from 1927 until 1943. Subsequent to retiring, she became the Principal Matron with the British Red Cross Commission for Refugees and was one of the first to enter Belsen death camp, in May 1945, to organize Red Cross teams to bring out the survivors.

Conclusion

Two issues are raised by the rituals of departure and the patterns of return for the Anglo-Sudanese. Firstly, there is the problematic nature of returning to a place in which one’s national identity requires that there is a consistent, exclusive and uncompromised attachment to the “home” culture, while your self-identification is inescapably tied up with experiences obtained in a foreign culture. I argue that the stark contrast between the elaborate rituals that marked their departure from the Sudan and the complete lack of any rituals of celebration to mark their return to great Britain suggests that the
Anglo-Sudanese felt, on some level, that it was necessary to deny their previous experiences in order to facilitate the continuity of their national identification. Nevertheless, the second issue raises questions about how successful (and, in some cases, how willing) they were to maintain that level of denial. The two women mentioned above, although atypical as colonial administrators, typify many in terms of their physical relationship to Great Britain and what that might mean in emotional and psychological attachment. Beasley sought out a second career outside of Britain because she liked “the opportunities offered.” Hills-Young returned to Britain during the war and worked for the Red Cross there. When the opportunity presented itself, however, she took up a position that would mean her departure yet again. It is unclear whether professional ambition or innate restlessness was the cause; in any case, the habits of a sedentary life, and the comforts of residing within a single cultural framework, were not sufficient draws to keep her “home.” But no matter how discreetly she and hundreds of others may have wanted to reinsert themselves into a very British life, they had not shared the uninterrupted narrative of that life and culture. Furthermore, they had experienced narratives of their own.

However much the Anglo-Sudanese might have wished to deny their “different-ness,” that did not mean it was possible, because customs, which are learned, and circumstances, which are changeable, do not remain in sync. So what is the result of this “different-ness?” Kirk-Greene asks rhetorically what the impact of returnees might be, but he assumes it is conservative because, “in social and attitudinal terms [. . .] the manners and mores of imperial life were . . . usually twenty years behind the times at home.”57 I would disagree with that assumption, or at least with its blanket application. While a culture may be more conservative in some of its practices, it may be more progressive in others. Robert Stack argues that “modes [of thought] are social in the sense that individuals producing them are influenced by society and the organizations or communities to which they belong.”58 An expatriate life, however, results in the production of modes of thought influenced by various societies, organizations, and communities. As a result, a mixture of modes is possible whereby different members of a group have different relationships to a territory and, therefore, to their community. “With . . . the complexities of social life which engendered such modes,
comes a high degree of uncertainty, detachment and skepticism about the significant relationships between social order and geographic area.”

Ultimately hopeful but also anxious, the Anglo-Sudanese marked their departure from the Sudan in such a way that the finality of that part of their lives was emphasized, but who they had become was celebrated, over and over again. They then attempted to abandon that self-identification once they returned by blurring the boundaries between “inside” and “outside.” A new life in Britain, particularly beginning in middle age, created regular opportunities for difference between the Anglo-Sudanese and their metropolitan counterparts to be apparent. Some, like G. L. Clark, embraced these opportunities. Others tried to avoid them. For men, the choices available for second career opportunities were as likely to be hampered by their Sudan experiences as to be benefited by them; so that it was very difficult to maintain the fiction that they generally shared the same life history as their peers. Wives, and perhaps even children, were also affected by the lost years of social interaction and community connection. And yet, although their initial strategy may have been to reinstate their Britishness by denying their return, most maintained their self-identification as Anglo-Sudanese for the rest of their lives. Their strategies speak of a desire to be “returned,” once and for all—to be British—in an uncompromised and unconflicted way. But perhaps their return, and that of so many other colonial personnel and their families, contributed in subtle ways to the creation of post-colonial Britishness, as well. This can only be discovered through the increased study and analysis of the process of colonial return and its impact on metropolitan societies, the returnees themselves, and their children, in the first decades of a post-colonial and increasingly multi-cultural Britain.

Notes

1 The term “invisible return” is borrowed here from Andrea L. Smith, who uses a similar term to describe returning colonials and their particular type of migrancy in the first volume dedicated to analyzing the particular experiences of these populations. Andrea L Smith, ed., Europe’s Invisible Migrants, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2003).


8 Andrea Smith cites the confining nature of the disciplinary practice of defining areas of study geographically as a key reason why there hasn’t been more work on the colonial return in “Introduction: Europe’s Invisible Migrants”; Stephen Lubkemann addresses identity negotiation, in “Race, Class, and Kin in the Negotiation of ‘Internal Strangerhood’ among Portuguese Retornados, 1975-2000”; and William B. Cohen explores the memory of empire in “Pied Noir Memory, History, and the Algerian War,” in Smith, *Europe’s Invisible
Migrants.

9 “In the case of the SPS, of course, they were de jure the servants of the government . . . never of His Majesty’s Government.” They fought against a Sudan equivalent to the sahib and memsahib personae. And yet it should be noted that the percentage of government positions occupied by Sudanese was far below the rate of Indians in the Indian Colonial Service. By 1952, only 41 of 136 district commissioner posts were held by Sudanese and all 39 governors and deputy governors were British. Smith, *Europe’s Invisible Migrants*, 15, 195.


11 Many authors have made me aware of the possibilities of textual analysis in the performative aspects of the Anglo-Sudanese return, but first and foremost Stephen Greenblatt. His efforts – in *Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) – to “look attentively at the nature of the representational practices that the Europeans carried with them . . . and deployed when they tried to describe to their fellow countrymen what they saw and did,” have guided me in my own forays into the difficulties of transporting hermeneutical practices away from and back to the metropole.


13 These “institutions of sociability” are central to the formation and maintenance of the bourgeois individual’s location in society, as discussed in Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger (London: Polity Press, 1989), 132.

14 HAW 8/3/17: Dagmar Mynors.

15 SAD 54/1/159: Storrar, in a letter diary entry, October 2–8, 1920, writes about a model of a horse’s head that he had made in order to hang on the wall and use to display various native artifacts that he has collected. In another sign of domestic concern, he writes in November of the same year, “I sowed all my vegetable seeds this week and also planted a lot of potatoes.” SAD 54/1/159. One of his bachelor colleagues, Walmsley, held the very first
thé dansee, in Atbara that same year, and Storrar had a photograph of the carefully laid out tables in Walmsley’s garden. SAD 54/1/84.

16 E. G. Sarsfield-Hall, *From Cork to Khartoum* (Keswick, Great Britain: the author, c.1975), Appendix, p. vii. “It was a tradition that a DC was on duty at all times.”


18 Due to the destruction of documents held by the Sudan Agency, it is necessary to extrapolate from shipping and transportation agreements undertaken by the Colonial Office. In 1949, Brian Carlisle was given an allowance of £40 to take his belongings to the Sudan. For normal leave passage, which did not involve substantial baggage, the allowances were smaller. See for example, CO 323/1042/7: Circular No. 163, May 8, 1929: Regulations regarding assisted passages to the Untied Kingdom” for Gibraltar. “No allowance . . . may exceed an amount equivalent to 50% of a 1st Class P & O return passage”; final leave usually granted a similar allowance to the initial outward passage.


22 SAD 57/1/100-280: Storrar, various entries, describing a total of seven farewell parties.

23 For Storrar, for example, Atbara was a sizable town and so there were various different communities within it that held parties for him. There was not, however, a differentiation amongst “non-British staff” as he calls them (SAD 57/1/271).

24 SAD 57/1/100-280.

25 See for example, SAD 533/1/35-7: R. E. H. Baily, testimonial by Bushara Abdulla, June 27, 1932; and SAD 57/1/272, Storrar, testimonial by Abdel Said Effendi Abdel Koddous, July 8–11, 1927.

26 For two articulations of this perception, see Deng and Daly, *Bonds of Silk*, 27, 29: “What I think . . . one is bound to remember is that the Sudanese are an extremely courteous people” (Gawain Bell); “The Arab in general is the most skilled flatterer in the world” (H. D. D. Henderson).

27 For example, “During 1954 and 1955, British officials and their wives flowed in a steady stream through Khartoum and out of the country. Auctions of furniture were held . . . almost weekly. . . . For days before our departure every meal was engaged in being entertained by our Sudanese friends in their homes. At the station at Khartoum there was a large crowd on the platform


29 It is difficult to prove a negative. However, the archivist of the Sudan Archive at Durham University, Jane Hogan, was consulted regarding this claim and agrees.


35 These were the concerns of Juliana Hill, wife of Richard Hill, who had worked for the Sudan railways and then taught at Gordon College. SAD G//S 1179, Box 4/2: includes letters from early 1949 from J. Hill to Prioress regarding cost of education for children; inquiries to placement agencies regarding work; discussion of where to settle down while husband’s job prospects still unsure.

36 Marigold Best, daughter of Reginald Davies, Dir. of Economics and Trade, retired 1935, interviewed by the author, February 3, 2003; Rowley interview.

37 SAD 752/16/4: W. Johnson, diary, c. 1954.

38 There was not a specific Thomas Cook publication for the Sudan. Others for the Middle East, India, and Malaya, however, show a general structure that was shared by all. Ship passage to and from the Sudan, for example, could be seen in the schedule for ships passing through the Suez Canal and down the Red Sea, stopping at Port Said, and then Port Sudan. The Sudan Agents papers are, for the most part, lost. So the detailed contracts between transport companies and colonial governments in other colonies at a comparable distance from Britain have been combined with the vaguer mention of such contracts on the part of the Sudan Government in recruitment and employment contract literature, to establish that similar contracts existed for the Sudan.

39 A. Dee, interviewed by the author, February 3, 2003. She remembers a boarding house in Chelsea used by returning colonials but no one else interviewed has any knowledge of such a place and I have found no mention of anything similar in any diaries or letters.

40 Rowley interview.

41 See for example, SAD 712/10/1–2: letter from D. M. H. Evans to G.
Hawkesworth, head of the Re-Employment Bureau, c. 1956. Evans identified his generalist skill set as an impediment to employment.

42 SAD 57/1/277: Poem written by Thompson, a storekeeper, on the occasion of the retirement of Brian Storrar, Railways and Steamers Department; most likely given at the Atbara Sports Club dinner held in Storrar’s honor on July 7, 1927.

43 SAD 714/6/2: D. M. H. Evans completed the Oxford Questionnaire in early 1954. In response, the Educational Secretary at the Oxford Appointments Committee, A. R. Wooley, asked, “Am I right in thinking that you are now in the same position as a number of other Oxford men from the Sudan who have been to see me?” For those who went to Oxford (and, one would assume, the other old universities), it was understood, therefore, to be a normal step in reestablishing a life in Britain and a second career to turn to one’s university for potential referral services.


45 Ibid.

46 SAD 719/13/18: Sudan Agency Memo, “Sudan No.3 (1956).”

47 Rowley interview.


50 Most notably Sir James Robertson, Governor-General of the Federation of Nigeria, and G. Hawkesworth,

51 SAD 719/13/18: Sudan Agency Memo, “Sudan No.3 (1956).”


53 SAD 719/13/18.


55 SAD 784/18/30: obituary for E. Hills-Young, saved by Helen Foley, who also worked for the Red Cross in the Sudan during WWII.


58 Stack, “Societal Conception of Space,” 47.
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There are only two ways of addressing topics in science: exclusive and inclusive. While exclusive areas of interest are almost reserved for specialists only, inclusive topics seem to be an all-welcome invitation to scientists from all sorts of disciplines. And of course, even ordinary people can contribute their part since it is all about experiences not as far away from their own lives as it may seem. Migration research belongs to the latter category and is continually regarded as a field of investigation which is predestined for interdisciplinary examination and collaboration. The scenery and the scope of interdisciplinary migration research are indeed impressive, both in terms of output and in terms of organizational constitution. Almost all social sciences claim a stake in migration research, and they all contain a subsection dedicated to migration processes. Therefore many migration anthologies consist of works from different disciplines; the difficulties of interdisciplinarity have become a topic in their own right.\(^2\)

But what is behind this irresistible attraction of migration? Several reasons are responsible for the ubiquity of migration in the social sciences and it is easy to see why migration has always been a field of interdisciplinary investigation. First and foremost, the definition
of international migration as a permanent change from one national society into another lends itself to interdisciplinarity. In addition, the conceptualization of migration as a holistic human experience affecting all aspects of social life renders the topic relevant to all social sciences. Surprisingly, the ample amount of research done on migration has done little to push migration studies to the cutting edges of analysis. Migration researchers have contributed very little to general developments within their disciplines. In addition, ideas originating from migration research have had limited influence at the core of their respective disciplines. Whatever the cause for this impotence, it is clear that interdisciplinarity in migration research has not served as a panacea bringing solutions to important empirical and theoretical problems in more general social science research.

This analysis seeks to reveal the most crucial factors for these omissions and imperfections. It will do so by pursuing the deliberately exaggerated argument that interdisciplinarity in migration research often means interdisciplinarity without disciplines. The disciplines involved in this analysis are history and geography. The text will lay out what these two disciplines have to offer in respect to interdisciplinary discussion about transnational approaches in migration research.

**Common-sense Concepts of Migration**

Two interwoven strands of argumentation seem to be responsible for the aforementioned paradox that interdisciplinary migration research fosters interdisciplinarity without disciplines. First, almost all definitions of international migration, however elaborate they are, can be condensed into one definition—that international migrations are a permanent move from one nation (or societal setting or place) to another. Yet this does not immediately delineate a scientific problem. Rather, the definition reflects a national or political point of view which perceives the modern world society as segmented into nation states. If the national/political definition is at all applicable to migration research, the definition itself has to be integrated into the scientific specification of the problem. Secondly, a glance at the common-sense conception of migration reveals that migration is frequently regarded as a holistic experience which affects all aspects of social life. This conception—which again does not delineate a disciplinary scientific problem—is reflected in comprehensive world histories of migration.
The historian Klaus J. Bade, who himself described his book *Migration in European History* simply as an endeavor to write a comprehensive migration history, repeatedly bases the justification for interdisciplinary approaches on the indisputable argument that “Homo migrans” exists since “Homo sapiens” exists and that migration is a human condition just like birth, reproduction, sickness and death.\(^5\)

These two conceptions of migration lead to important consequences within the field of migration research. Obviously, every discipline is involved in migration research and claims responsibility for this task. Historical migration research is as established as migration research in sociology, economics, educational studies, linguistics or in geography, to name but a few—the topics treated are migration patterns, migration decisions, economic development, social conflicts, social advancement, spatial differentiation, etc. Due to the politically formulated “problem of migration” as well as the general public interest in migration, funding for such migration research projects—and especially interdisciplinary projects—was relatively easy to come by compared to other fields of investigation in the social sciences. This was particularly true when the influx of migrants to Germany and to countries in the Western Hemisphere soared in the early 1990s and the talk of an integration crisis became widespread.\(^6\)

For Germany this was especially surprising since even today German administrations have not fully accepted the fact that Germany is a country of immigration. The funding of interdisciplinary migration research in Germany is even more unexpected when one considers that disciplinary boundaries at German universities are comparatively strict. Until recently, the strong internal differentiation of science prevented the establishment of new fields of studies like “cultural studies,” “gender studies,” or “migration studies.”

Hence, interdisciplinary institutes like the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) are the exception rather than the rule in Germany. In migration studies, however, they are not unusual: prior to the foundation of IMIS in 1991, interdisciplinary institutes for migration research were well known in other countries. The newly launched scientific European network, “International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe,” with 19 participating interdisciplinary institutes, is only the most recent example.\(^7\)
This institutionalization of interdisciplinary research resulted in the problem that the disciplines hardly ever reflected on: the question of whether and how migration is a problem for their research agenda at all and what their possible contribution to the interdisciplinary discussion might subsequently comprise. Most concepts deriving from this research were built too closely to the national agenda. The compliant takeover of the national agenda finally led to every discipline becoming entangled with what came to be known as the problem of “methodological nationalism.” Methodological nationalism refers to the assumption that the nation is the natural social and political form of the modern world. And indeed, depending on the discipline and its key themes, the unit of analysis or the unit of reference was more or less explicitly linked with the nation state. For example, the national society in sociology (research on social inequality and integration of immigrants); the nation state in politics (topics like citizenship); the national education system in educational studies (e.g. social advancement) or studies of residential segregation in geography, which once again implicitly linked the desirable community with a single local place.

Reflections on the historical contribution of geographical “knowledge” revealed that geographers contributed significantly to the production of the modern nation state. In rather crude accounts on the migration of peoples, for example, the explanation was assumed in a “natural diplomacy,” which made sure that landscape and people will meet according to a process of trial and error.

The criticism of the national trap interrupted participants in research projects from thinking narrowly within national cages. The hidden normative agenda of the nation-state was exposed and partly overcome. While nation-states primarily observe other nation-states and their national borders, the borderlines of people’s imagined geographies underline the mismatch between complex social geographies and the simplified concept of national borders. Though these problems are now widely acknowledged and important rectifications in theoretical developments were accomplished, two problems remained. Migration theory is still too closely linked to the zeitgeist; and the old but unregistered problem of interdisciplinarity without disciplines raised its head again when the apparently new paradigm of transnationality in migration research arose.
Transnationality: A View from Geography

Transnational approaches in migration research set a good example for the pitfalls in interdisciplinary collaboration in general and for the specific problems in the dialogue between human geography and history. The scene was set in the early 1990s when some anthropologists claimed that migration could no longer be conceptualized as a permanent change from one national society and place to another. Based on empirical findings it was argued that migration at the end of the twentieth century was marked by ongoing processes of pendulum migration, by migration networks and circuits, by back-and-forth migration, etc. Globalization processes enable migrants to build and maintain transnational social spaces going far beyond simple extensions of their home country and certainly involving more than one nation-state. Theories of unidirectional migration, of intergenerational integration and assimilation into one society, were called into question.11

Yet the story is not as simple as that. The state of the art in migration research varies considerably across disciplines and countries. Hence the use of the new approach for disciplinary developments varies as well. Having said that migration theories have always been very close to the zeitgeist, it is not surprising that all disciplines involved in migration research adopted the transnational approach in one way or another, which was de facto a specification of the globalization discourse in the 1990s. The truly interdisciplinary migration research yielded many arguments that exceeded all specialists’ competence, and even that of all disciplines. This was a result of the fact that the lines of argumentation were based on linguistic, cultural, and spatial turns, which occurred with considerable time lags in the different disciplines and which aimed at different empirical, theoretical, normative, disciplinary, or national strands of discussion. The new concepts caused considerable restlessness in all disciplines but, at the same time, they can be compared with murky storm clouds which began to darken the sky—the theoretical clarity gradually vanished.

The key term “space” brought growing interest for geographers to join the debate. However, even though metaphors like “transnational social spaces,” “ethnoscapes,” and “socioscapes” are useful to extend and confound common knowledge, the introduction of new terms and the play on words limited the connection to and the quarrel with well established theories of international migration and integration.
Additionally, old knowledge was lost as the new literature referred seldom if ever to older approaches, claiming a paradigmatic sea change instead. This is a deplorable situation considering that geographical migration research had long analyzed spatial differences of migration,\textsuperscript{12} had considered the simultaneity of two places in the migrants’ biographies,\textsuperscript{13} and had emphasized the importance of return migration.\textsuperscript{14} Although valuable insights into transnational migration processes can be gained by looking into the existing literature, this was rarely achieved because transnational approaches in geography, paradoxically, had backgrounds other than genuine migration research. Geographical migration research up to the early 1990s was closely linked with demographic research, which implied the use of highly aggregated quantitative data: push-and-pull-models, gravity or distance models, and economic models dominated the theoretical discussion. Even though these models attracted harsh criticism, they are still considered as the geographical contribution to migration research. And since these models still occupy large parts in the usual textbooks on population geography,\textsuperscript{15} they are, despite the criticism, reiteratively introduced as the geographical bid to interdisciplinary migration research.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, the initial impression of a quantitatively oriented and conservative geographical migration research is continuously reinforced.

The role and the impact of transnationality within geography can be best assessed by Robin Cohen’s general statement: “Migration scholars—normally a rather conservative breed of sociologists, historians, demographers and geographers—have recently been bemused to find their subject matter assailed by a bevy of postmodernists, novelists and scholars of cultural studies.”\textsuperscript{17} Katharyne Mitchell emphasizes the inherently transgressive quality of transnationality which made it an appealing topic—“transnationalism necessitates a crossing of borders, both literal and epistemological. . . . The term . . . provides numerous poststructural theorists the abstract positions of inbetweeness and movement necessary for the leverage of critique to be inserted into linear and containing narrative of time and space.”\textsuperscript{18} These and other discussions then caused the infiltration of “identity” and “culture” to evolve into a wider scope of geographical thought than formerly considered possible. In migration research, transnationality provoked researchers to consider various possible conceptions of space and their subsequent research agendas.\textsuperscript{19} It became clear that spatial definitions
of migration, that is, definitions that use the migrated distance as their distinctive feature (local, regional, national, etc.) remain unclear, boring, and unsatisfying. Instead these definitions must take the social constitution of the world society into account, especially the social production of spaces and borders. This implies the basic assumption that spaces have to be dissolved into the society, since they are socially constructed. Transnational approaches can thus take credit for decoupling space and society epistemologically in an unprecedented manner. Or, to put it the other way around, space—the location in space, the power to determine who is eligible to enter the national territory and who is not, and the ability to communicate the unity of a (national) space and a (national) society as something natural—provides an important set of factors and prerequisites. These factors legitimize the existence of nation-states and conceptualize migration as a disturbance of that allegedly peaceful situation. The processes of coupling space and society, however, are not addressed by the nation-state, since this is the blind spot of the observation. The discussions within geography (though not especially within migration research) led into the realms of highly elaborated theories on space and place and also yielded exceedingly interesting and fascinating theories about resistance and interventions from the margins or from positions in between. Resting very much on theorists like Homi K. Bhabha and Arjun Appadurai, the theories on narratives, subjectivities, and similar topics lost contact with mainstream migration theories, which always had a stronger focus on numbers, structures, patterns and systems.

Another problem being tackled was the highly disputable relation between “theory” and “reality.” A thought from Jorge Luis Borges’ inspector Lönnrot is instructive. The scene is set by a corpse in a hotel room; inspector Lönnrot’s assistant Treviranus is quick to offer a logical and simple solution, but Lönnrot objects:

“It’s possible, but not interesting. . . . You will reply that reality hasn’t the slightest need to be of interest. And I’ll answer you that reality may avoid the obligation to be interesting, but that hypothesis may not. In the hypothesis you have postulated, chance intervenes largely. Here lies a dead rabbi: I should prefer a purely rabbinical explanation, not the imaginary mischances of an imaginary robber.” Treviranus answered ill-humouredly: “I am not interested in rabbinical explanations; I am interested in the capture of the man who stabbed this unknown
person." Accepting that reality is not committed to being as interesting as theory; the problem of how interesting (in the sense of “uncommon” and “unexpected”) the theory must be is still open to debate. At this point the line of argument enters once more the lamentably vicious circle of interdisciplinary migration research without disciplines. Even within disciplinary boundaries it is an unfeasible demand to start always with the most contradictory and stubborn hypothesis.\footnote{In the context of interdisciplinarity, in which theories should primarily serve as a medium to exchange knowledge, one may sacrifice theories that are not immediately accessible to other disciplines. Not surprisingly, the impression of participating disciplines then remains superficial and does not portray the performance of the discipline in question. Additionally the often-claimed necessity of cooperation is pointless as long as a prior (theoretical) specialization has not taken place. Theories not immediately accessible to a wider audience cause yet another problem. The future of political advisories, so much loved in the field of migration research, is threatened if the advice is too Gordian and too unwanted (e.g., migration is hard to steer, and integration is both expensive and time-consuming).}

However, it would be too simplistic to reduce the poor theoretical grounding solely to a compliant takeover of the political agenda. Migration research itself often requires an amount of intercultural competences – such as language skills, the capability to decipher cultural codes, etc. – which might already overtax scientists. Joachim Matthes even argues that the success of the North American and European social sciences is only owed to the organizational power behind them and is not due to epistemological sensitiveness or even intercultural competences.\footnote{The requirements for interdisciplinary research add an extra load of work. Interdisciplinary discussions are harder to follow than intradisciplinary discussions.}

Historical Interventions

Leaving the problems of theoretical abstraction and elaboration behind, it can be concluded that transnational approaches provided a powerful tool to expose the hidden normative agenda of the nation-state and its implications for geographical theory. Yet historians must have been astonished at the force with which geographers, anthropologists and sociologists announced a new era of migration. Especially since
they did not only refer to the quantity of people on the move but argued in favor of a new quality of migration, which finally leads to the development of transnational communities and transnational social spaces. Historians, by contrast, argued that there is nothing new under the sun and that transnationality offers instead a good approach to understanding international migration during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—a positive proof of the transdisciplinary success of transnationalism. Out of the empirical richness of historical migration research they referred to examples which they have now submissively relabeled as transnational. Bade quotes more cautiously that half a century after the peak of Italian-American mass immigration these networks were used by the CIA for purposes of mass political manipulation. The CIA launched a campaign against the Italian communists and called Americans of Italian descent to write letters to their relatives asking them not to vote for the communists—around 10 million letters were sent in 1948. Günter Moltmann, a historian and specialist in American studies, had already examined the pendulum-migration patterns of German migrants to the U.S. earlier during the nineteenth century and concluded that the annual return migration rate to Germany fluctuated in its relationship to emigration between 4.7 percent in 1859 and 49.9 percent in 1875. Indications of lively back-and-forth migration can also be found in Charles Dickens’ account of a journey on a ship from the U.S. to Europe, depicting the situation as follows: “We carried in the steerage nearly a hundred passengers: a little world of poverty. . . . Some of them had been in America but three days, some but three months, and some had gone out in the last voyage of that very ship in which they were now returning home.” In the Balkans, for example, a pattern of seasonal migration called “pečalba” was well known and established at the end of the nineteenth century. Usually male household members left the village to work abroad, but maintained intensive relations with the family and returned in regular intervals.

Historians, however, have not spent much thought on finding an appropriate terminology to name these patterns of migration, leading to the problem that terms like “international” and “transnational” are used as synonyms and therefore deprived of any distinguishing features. Restricting remarks which limit historical claims in their universality are not natural, yet it is exactly that kind of knowledge which is so
desperately needed in other disciplines. Bade’s restrictions are thus helpful when he argues that the period on the eve of the First World War was dominated by proletarian mass migrations and that these migrations were determined to an unprecedented and never-repeated extent by the freedom to migrate across borders. But it is not on target to argue that Bade has shown that nothing is new in migration. These patterns might be labeled transient, transcultural, transregional, and whatever but hardly transnational. To surmount nation-states’ borders they have to exist and in this point that the global national order differs considerably from the global order at the end of the twentieth century—especially with regard to the social welfare systems.

In summary, historians thus occasionally failed to make their argument since they did not always reflect on their possible contribution to the phenomenon of migration. A situation which is even more deplorable since historical migration research is rich in detail and historians are using quite different sources in relation to geographers or sociologists. While the differences among, for example, geographical, sociological, or anthropological methods of data collection can frequently only be seen in the interpretation or in the utilization of the data, their differences compared to the sources historians use are much more evident. This difference and the experience of using historical sources are promising if it comes to interdisciplinary research.

Historical migration research faces problems similar to those of geographical migration research. As long as historians provide only descriptive accounts of different types of migration, out of different regions and over a range of eras, their research might be interesting but remains rather useless in the process of interdisciplinary exchange. Just as geographers are forced to specify their findings in relation to space, historians are forced to specify their results in relation to the specific historical situation. This is not to say that this kind of reflection has not taken place within history. The conceptions do exist, but the challenges posed by transnational approaches, including the fundamental criticism of the prime categories of nation, society, and community, were absorbed only half-heartedly. In the case of transnationality the interesting question would be: beginning at what time does the term “transnational” make sense? Questions like this certainly invoke discussion of further topics,
such as cultural identities and histories. Especially since nationality as a socio-cultural concept of identity—and the assumption that “in the modern world everyone can, should, and will ‘have’ a nationality, as he or she ‘has’ a gender”—has existed neither always nor everywhere. Answering the question also brings with it the task of relating these developments to the political dimension of the nation-building processes. Especially the establishment of national welfare systems evoked almost automatically the national regulation of migration, at least in the countries of the First World. Such an approach to historical migration research would exceed the mere task of registering migration events and behavior and would place migrations into the broader context of population history, economic history, and social and cultural developments in both sending and receiving countries.

Until recently descriptive historical studies have dominated the field and have flourished. They have focused on discrete events of migration and adopted a political or national approach: that is, they have usually used countries as the starting point of their investigation. Few attempts have been made to write a world history of migration, which might bear a critical examination. Apart from Bade’s work, which focuses on European migrations since the eighteenth century, two further books usually receive attention: Leslie Page Moch’s book, which places changes in migration in the scaffolding of landholding patterns, employment demands, demographic patterns, and the location of capital; and Dirk Hoerder’s volume, which is much broader in scope and tackles migration from the eleventh to the late twentieth century, including European and global aspects. However, all these and other books could benefit from introducing the term “transnational” as an analytical device in order to specify and thus to explain the historical circumstances under which migration has occurred.

**Conclusion**

This analysis started with rather pessimistic assumptions concerning the current situation in interdisciplinary migration research. However, the case of transnational approaches in migration research has shown that disciplines can learn from their own mistakes and from other disciplines. If migration researchers
are keen to contribute to scientific development in general, it seems to be necessary to do it with a strong and deep disciplinary backing. The process can be understood as a systematic exchange, which implies a back and forth between intra- and interdisciplinary discussions. The core questions are: “What can a discipline learn from other disciplines?” and “What can the discipline contribute to the interdisciplinary discussion?” The buzzword “transnational” helped geographers to specify the relation between space, culture and society. German geographers have been late in making a contribution to the discussion of space and migration and might have been benefited from an intradisciplinary discussion first. On the other hand, the interventions of historians accelerated the learning processes. Migration research is of interdisciplinary interest and we can do little without interdisciplinary discussions. However, we do need to define scientific problems first and think about disciplinary contributions. Only then can interdisciplinary research be inspiring and challenging. On the other hand, there is a completely different exit out of the dilemma treated here. The explosive force of “trans” could be extended to the discussion of disciplinary boundaries, resulting in a plea for an independently organized discipline which focuses solely on migration.

Notes

1 I am indebted to Itta Bauer, Noelle Noyes, Ulrich Vogel and Patrick Wurster who made valuable and thought-provoking remarks.
5 Klaus J. Bade, Migration in European History (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003),


7 The IMISCOE Network of Excellence is sponsored by the European Commission under the Sixth Framework Programme. Nineteen cooperating institutes should provide comprehensive theoretical and empirical knowledge that can form a reliable basis for policy. Inter-, multi- or transdisciplanirity is an unquestioned prerequisite for application.


19 In the case of migration and segregation, see Ronald van Kempen and Şule A. Özüekren, “Ethnic Segregation in Cities: New forms and explanations


29 Bade, *Migration in European History*, xii. In the second chapter of the same work, however, no conceptual difference is made between inter- and transnational migration.


Hard, Gerhard. *Spuren und Spurenleser. Zur Theorie der Ästhetik des*


Pries, Ludger. “The approach of transnational social spaces. Responding to new configurations of the social and the spatial.” Ludger Pries,


From the photograph, he looks like he could be the last man in the world. Scything the hillside on a farm in Windsor County, Vermont, he seems tiny, a man lost in an immense task on hill of moderate but indeterminate slope, in a field of unknown size, in a world of large vistas. The image was taken by WPA photographer Arthur Rothstein in September 1937 for the Farm Security Administration.¹ A man scything a hay field is not what we might expect in modern America. And lest we think he is scything only because the hay to be cut is on a hill, there are
other photographs taken of the same farmer in flat fields.

Apparently someone made a choice to do things this way. While a scythesman can work at a pretty brisk clip, this is not an option for speed. By 1937 faster mowing technologies had existed for a century. To choose to scythe a field in the face of faster technologies is, to quote Robert Frost, “to make a short job long for love of it, and yet not waste time either.”

There are over 160,000 photographs in the Farm Security Administration/Office of War Information collection in the Library of Congress, most of them of rural and agricultural scenes. They were taken by some of America’s best photographers between 1935 and 1945. Over 1,700 of these pictures are of Vermont subjects. The photographs from elsewhere in the U.S. tend to show farmers mostly working with tractors and tractor powered mowers, balers, choppers, and other farm machines. The pictures from Vermont show farmers working with horses, hay wagons, and scythes. Of the nine photographs of men working with or sharpening scythes in the collection, seven are from Vermont. I could find only two Vermont photographs showing farmers using tractors, one on a dead flat Connecticut River valley farm, the other of a man described as a merchant.

Lest we think this disparity is a function of the artistic tastes of professional photographers, the visual record documented elsewhere shows a pervasive, persistent use of animal technology in Vermont, sometimes side-by-side with gasoline power, long after it had died out in most other places. There were farmers milking their cows by hand in 1940 and plowing their fields with horses in 1960. Helen and Scott Nearing write of neighbors maple sugaring with oxen in the 1950s.

How do we explain people who continued farming small farms, usually with horses, well into the 1950s and beyond? Hidden amid the twentieth-century history of rural America is the story of thousands of farmers, more concentrated in Vermont than elsewhere, that decided not to change so quickly when others did and kept up their work with older ways well after others had given them up. Until the dairy industry shifted to bulk milk tanks in the early 1960s, many Vermont hill farmers soldiered on with small herds and a diversified approach to earning a living. A census of farms in 1951 showed that over sixty percent of the 14,523 farms still operating had 18 or fewer cows. A third had 7 cows or less. The tax listers’ report in 1957 found 9600 farms left. One third had 19 cows or
As late as 1940 only 15% of Vermont farmers had tractors.

The historian makes a grievous error in assuming that small farmers would have expanded if they had the capital, or adopted all the available technology if they were smarter. Vermont farmers were early adopters of telephones, automobiles and trucks, yet they kept them alongside their oxen and horses. There was a best way to do each task, an expertise that had been learned through generations of community farmers. The newest thing was never a necessity. The focus was on appropriate technology.

The historical literature of this area paints a simple picture, one that is colored by the legacy of Frederick Jackson Turner. Historians writing about late nineteenth-century New England have typically described it as in a period of decline. New Hampshire and Vermont are depicted as states where the rural economies were early in ruin and retreat, and where the young men went west in droves. As one scholar put it, “the decline of New England agriculture remains one of the best-known, generally accepted themes in American historical geography.” It is straightforward narrative. Improvident in their choice of land and farm practices, Northern New Englanders were unable to compete with the West. Unprofitable and sunk in their ignorance, small farmers continued in outdated practices until they disappeared from the scene. The hill people of Vermont were such perceived losers in the battle of modern assumptions that the Farm Resettlement Administration wanted to move nearly 25,000 of them in the mid 1930s, putting them on a par with Dust Bowlers and Southern share croppers.

The lone man with the scythe says something else. To get from that photograph back through Vermont history, to an understanding of who these people were and why they hung on, requires an inter-disciplinary journey to other places and other times for explanations of what took place. In taking this trip I have looked not only to old photographs for evidence, but literature, economics, demographics, anthropology, geography, environmental science, geology, migration theory, even business theory, for pieces of the model I was looking for. The Vermont hill farm culture left little first-hand testimony behind. Elite analysts like historians, sociologists, and political writers have had a great deal to say about them, mostly critical. What little exists in their own voice was due to ethnographers and popular writers
who talked with the last of them, as they were dying out.

As a world historian, I am emboldened to look for cause and connection wherever they may lie. The story of Vermont hill farmers can be found in European subsidies of sugar beets, in the rise to dominance of the New England woolen mills over the regional wool growers that put New England farmers in direct competition with overseas wool, in the investment mania in the American West in the 1870s and 1880s that drained capital out of the Northeast to fund prairie farms at usurious rates. The Corn Laws opened English markets to Canadian wheat, and apples, and cheese, and virtually closed Canada to Vermont goods. European beet sugar subsidies led to a worldwide glut that depressed maple sugar prices along with cane. The French invention of silage forced Vermont farmers into other difficult choices. Early on, their very local world was global.

Things that happened here mirrored, paralleled, and foreshadowed what happened elsewhere. Work from other disciplines allows us to put both rural industrialization and hill farm culture in perspective and to balance the weight of critical materials represented in the orthodox historiography. Comparing their experience to other places in the world that industrialized, or failed to, can help us understand how this culture functioned. In a place where direct or obvious evidence may be sparse, such a global view suggests what the structures of the culture may have been, what larger events may have impacted this group, and where to look for answers to the historical questions raised by their persistence and their demise.

There are several notions one needs to deconstruct to get at the history of rural Vermont. The first is the idea that an agricultural decline caused depopulation and farm abandonment. This runs into several problems even before we dissect it. The number of farms in Vermont actually increased into the 1870s. Land in farms only peaked in 1920. Moreover, in every U.S. Department of Agriculture survey of crop yields Vermont farmers placed at or near the top. So we should look elsewhere for reasons for depopulation. Another tenaciously held view is that Vermont farmers could not make a decent living. Several recent historical works have debunked this view. A third problem was the widely held perception of backwardness. From the 1870s on there was a broad literature of decline that I believe reflected as much a cultural shift to urban attitudes as anything that was happening in
the countryside.

In the past, regional historians have used demography to make the case of decline for northern New England. Census statistics, summarized at the town and county level, have been used to show that many towns showed stagnant population growth, or decline, as early as the 1830s. The 1860 census showed that 40% of those born in Vermont lived outside the state. Surely such demographic decline must have meant economic decline, farm abandonment, and environmental degradation.

Of course, there are other ways of looking at rural population decline. European historians have noted that when population growth accelerated in early industrial Europe in the rural areas it was mostly the industrial population that was growing, not the agricultural.11 Good arguments can be made that large families and employable children were much in the interests of industrial families, perhaps even more so as economies tightened and prices for their products declined. In a pure wage-labor environment, income is expandable only if more family members can be put to work.12

Anthropologists like Esther Boserup and Robert McC Netting have tied demographic increase or decline to changes in agricultural land use. Population increase will drive farmers from extensive to more intensive farming methods. Demographic decrease will reverse the trend. In some societies, like Tokugawa Japan after 1720, population stagnation eventually followed the intensification of agriculture.13

I have tried to look beyond the level of census summaries and try to determine the real trends underneath them. I created a census database for one town, New Haven, Vermont, for agriculture and industry for the decades from 1850 to 1870.14 The census material was supplemented by data from tax rolls, state reports and publications, newspaper and magazine accounts, and other secondary sources. From this database, I can analyze family persistence, family characteristics, changes in land use, occupational patterns, and the relative economic success of families and businesses over time.

There was a very large transient population moving through my study area even as population growth leveled off. Sons were leaving, not the sons of yeoman farmers so much, but the sons of tradesmen and laborers and tenant farmers. Other historians have noted the overwhelming transience of nineteenth-century rural America.15 Rural
population then consisted, in effect, of several layers. In one layer, the yeoman farmers, the property owners, hardly moved at all. Between 1850 and 1860 in New Haven less than 20% of the households moved away. Yet in another layer, that of the landless tradesmen, laborers, and tenant farmers, nearly three-quarters left. It was their children that made up much of the exiled 40%.

The first drops in population in Vermont may have had much more to do with the urbanization of rural industry than the decline of rural agriculture. This is underlined by the continuing growth of the last-settled Vermont hill towns, some of which were still increasing in population decades after traditional explanations would put them in decline.

With rural industry moving out of the countryside to larger towns and to the city, the transient layer of population boiled away. Mature towns declined in population. Farm families shrank in size, but the transient population shrank more.

Economic analysis allowed me to deal with the notion of growing impoverishment. Falling farm value and farm prices reflect the immense overproduction that came with the opening of the U.S. West and the globalization of commodity food markets. We can trace the effects as falling sugar prices were reflected in falling incomes from maple sugar and the expanded logging of maple sugar bushes. But farm income recovered as many dozens of local creameries popped up, creating a new system of milk collection, processing, and marketing. This transition can be reconstructed from agricultural census data and other sources to make estimates of farm income and costs that are comparable to the returns from farming elsewhere.

The draining of capital is traceable through banking and postal data. Eastern money, drawn by high interest rates, financed a mortgage boom in the West. Usury laws in the East exacerbated the problem. While rural capital helped finance industrialization in other places, in northern New England it did that while at the same time financing its own competition.

The farm abandonment that outside observers perceived everywhere was relative. Back pastures which made sense when raising livestock for market made less sense on dairy farms where cows had to be walked to milking barns twice a day. Land that couldn’t be easily fertilized was best left fallow. But many saw the changed landscape as a symptom of decline.
This takes us to the third notion: the demonization of the traditional countryside, a phenomenon of late-nineteenth-century America. Marshall McLuhan wrote, “The chief mark of modern man has been that he has gone through the landscape with his eyes glued to a guidebook, and could actually deny in the one anything he could not find in the other.”\textsuperscript{16} Literary sources and the politics of the Progressive Era allow us to trace virtually the same cultural stigmatization that occurred less than 100 years earlier in England. The progressive agriculture/rural society debate reflected the earlier rhetoric of people like Arthur Young and William Marshall, on the one hand, and William Cobbett, on the other.\textsuperscript{17}

In this case, two phenomena rose by the 1880s, side by side. Local color writers were travel writers who “discovered” peculiar out-of-the-way places for a national audience in magazines like \textit{Lippincott’s}, \textit{Scribners}, \textit{Appleton’s}, and \textit{Harper’s Weekly}. As the cultural historian Henry Shapiro writes, “Local color [describes] . . . the work of a generation of writers whose dialect tales and sketches describing little known or forgotten aspects of American life dominated literary production in the United States during the 1870s and 1880s.” Many of these writers had a tenuous grasp and little familiarity with their subjects. They placed their stories in bygone times, “before industrialization, before the homogenization effected by the railroad, [and] the national magazine.”\textsuperscript{18} The majority of these writers were urbanites, looking at isolated rural cultures from the outside.

At almost the same time there appeared in the national magazines a flood of “decline and decay” articles about New England between 1880 and 1900, stirring up popular concern about the decline of the region. Stagnant population, sales of surplus farms, declining traditional church congregations and shrinking towns seemed to make a stronger argument than farm consolidation and growing farm size, increasing farm incomes, or the continuing vibrancy of many rural social institutions like the Grange, local Athenaeums, farmers’ cooperatives, and growing fundamentalist churches.

Twenty-five of these articles are listed in \textit{Poole’s Index} alone.\textsuperscript{19} The aggressive outreach of the Protestant churches followed in the wake of the local color writers and feed the frenzy of doom and decay articles. The “otherness” of backwardness and isolation was converted into a world of poverty, illiteracy, and degradation, all of which, interestingly enough, required Church mission intervention.\textsuperscript{20} Not for the first time, rural New England became a proselytization opportunity. This blossomed
in the U.S. into the Rural Church and Country Life movements and the rise of rural sociology.

Geography, environmental science, even geology, offer other clues to the fate of rural Vermont. The nature of and access to roads offer good geographical reasons for why the first settled places were first, and at the other end, where the first farms abandoned were. Access to markets, even in the frontier period, was crucial. The creamery system made that access on a nearly daily basis a necessity. Mapping soil types also helps us understand settlement patterns. Understanding climate and the effects of climate change allows us to understand land use and viability in the marginal hill areas. Knowing the geology of these areas permits comprehension of why cropping eroded upland lands and why permanent pastures did not. An understanding of environmental linkages sheds light on why farmers moved downhill as their topsoil washed downhill and turned marshes into meadow. Deforesting the hills impacted the viability of water-powered mills and industry. Linkage to outside markets in the form of roads, railroads, and outside feeds and feeder stock, brought new pests, weeds, and diseases that made farming both more complicated and much more work. Innovation and business marketing theory helps us understand who adopted new technology and who did not, and why.

Eventually increasing centralization of industry and urbanization drained off the commerce and industry that made small towns viable economic units. Farmers became not a part of a local system but isolated producers connected precariously to distant industry. Bulk milk tanks and the need to meet new government and industry standards killed off the smallest producers, and the survivors hustled to get big enough to survive. An industrial system of animal feeding and production continues that process today.

The man with the scythe tells us that all these changes did not happen as long ago as modernizers and modernization theorists would have us believe. But we can only discover that if we cross enough disciplines to put together the picture of the larger historical puzzle. Yankee hill farmers were an embarrassment to the progressives of their time. In the uplands and hill towns of Vermont a small-landholder culture arose, prospered, then faced down the demands of modernity until long after one might have supposed that such folk were gone.
Notes

1. The image, held in the U.S. Library of Congress Farm Security Administration/Office of War Information collection, is online at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/fsahtml/fares.html.


4. “Economic Effect of Bulk Milk Handling in Vermont,” University of Vermont Experiment Station, Bulletin 581, June 1955, 25. The census was taken by the town listers.

5. “Small Farms in Vermont” (Burlington, VT: Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Vermont and State Agricultural College, 1961), 4.


Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).


14 Data are from the U.S. censuses of 1850, 1860, and 1870, supplemented with some vital statistics from the town of New Haven in the same period.


20 Shapiro, *Appalachia*, 56.

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Chapter 11

Reversing the Curse of Babel? International Language Movements and Inter-War Chasms

Carolyn Biltoft

The world was not a stranger to violence in 1914. By the time the shot rang out in Sarajevo, most of the earth’s inhabitants had experienced either domination’s jagged contours or warfare’s draconian march. Thinking themselves to be combat-hardened veterans, the nations bound within a Westphalian constellation of pacts, alliances, and imperial maneuvers mobilized for World War I in relative innocence—unaware of their impending entanglement in what would later be termed “total war.”

The First World War’s scope and scale was greater than any conflict that had preceded it. Partly due to the fact that a few imperial powers controlled vast territories and populations, World War I utilized both human and material resources from all over the globe. Africans, Americans, Asians, Australians, and Canadians fought alongside or provided assistance to Europeans in battles that took place primarily in Europe but also played out in Africa and the Middle East. Furthermore, developments in information technology, such as the telegraph and the popular press, kept people informed about the war’s unprecedented carnage that often failed to distinguish between soldiers and civilians. In 1932, after stating that the war had even affected “the lamas of Tibet,” the scholar Ramsay Muir maintained that, “Amid all its horrors, the war had this august and tremendous aspect, that it was the first event in human history
in which all peoples of the earth were not only involved, but knew they were involved.”

Understandably, when that war of attrition finally held its fire in 1918, a newly created world public opinion believed that human civilization would not survive another conflict like the one that had raged on for four interminable years. In 1919, the peace activist and historian H. G. Wells asserted that “it is not impossible to adumbrate the general nature of the catastrophe which threatens mankind if war-making goes on.” Thus, in the immediate post-war period, finding a strategy for lasting peace seemed more an urgent necessity than a utopian fantasy. Forging a settlement that pleased all vested parties, however, proved a contentious endeavor in itself.

The Paris Peace Conference that opened in January of 1919 witnessed an international vying over the rights to reconciliation’s blueprints and generated debates over who would or would not benefit from the Pyrrhic victory’s spoils. The Russian, Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, and Ottoman Empires lay in disarray or ruin and the Treaty of Versailles re-drew the world map with rather contentious geo-political boundaries. Furthermore, the great powers scrambled for a broken Germany’s erstwhile African territories. To be sure, the treaty left multiple problems unresolved and many a thorny issue spilled off the negotiating table and poured into the streets.

Before the Peace was even officially signed, Vladimir Lenin’s call for a world-wide socialist revolution and Woodrow Wilson’s public support for the universal right to national self-determination equally stoked revolutionary fires among oppressed, dispossessed, and colonized populations. Increasingly politicized mass societies created by the war’s mass mobilization, mass production, and mass consumption were waiting eagerly to see if the settlement would compensate them for their sacrifices and their losses. In 1928, Henry Noel Brailsford described the war’s aftermath as such: “The world during these years seemed malleable, and in their day dreams the will of each nation hammered it to its desire. Here a repressed nationality put forward its claim to independent life. There a nation with the wound of defeat in its memory aspired to the recovery of lost territory.” However, as Brailsford commented—despite and perhaps due to the post-war moment’s marked discord—all of the “sundered fragments of a divided race felt the call of the hour which promised their unity.”
In 1922, in the penultimate chapter of his book, A Short History of the International Language Movement, Albert Léon Guérard stated, “True: every man carries germs of death within, from the moment he is born, and so does every human institution—be it Church, nation, or language. The Problem is, once more: are the unifying forces stronger than the disruptive ones?” In posing this question Guérard was concerned with the world’s ability to overcome what he called “the curse of Babel”: a violent fission-force continually splintering the human race with misunderstandings, dissonance, and brutality. Guérard suggested that overcoming the language barrier was an important first step for re-capturing the spirit of cooperation that had once united mankind in its great, if hubristic attempt to build a tower stretching to heaven.

While language differences were not the only thing preventing unity after World War I, Guérard—along with official representatives of the League of Nations, various social and governmental organizations, and individuals on every continent—showed immense optimism in an international auxiliary language’s ability to serve as a palliating force amidst the horrifying “disruptions” of 1914 and its aftermath. This study is a preliminary exploration into how the Esperanto movement attempted to redress tense inter-war disunities. It suggests that exploration of Esperanto’s inter-continental path provides a lens for viewing post-World War I global paradoxes and tensions (internationalism vs. nationalism, imperialism vs. anti-imperialism, democracy vs. authoritarianism, utopianism vs. nihilism, etc.), which often involved the politics of language. While there were other artificial languages circulating at the time, Esperanto stands out both because it gained the widest constituency between 1919 and 1939, and because its particular claims and philosophical underpinnings spoke directly to inter-war insouciance.

If they look at it at all, scholars from outside the extant Esperanto-speaking and -promoting community have tended to equate the created language with half-baked utopianism at worst and naïve idealism at best. However, Esperanto held real appeal for various historical reasons and it is worthwhile to locate the movement in relationship to wider social, cultural, and political currents. Thus, this work constitutes an initial attempt to flesh out some still inchoate ideas that could potentially provide a fertile framework for more in-depth research.
Pre-War Linguistic Conflict and Zamenhof’s Vision

René Descartes made one of the earliest known statements about a universal language. Descartes thought that a constructed means of communication might have a democratizing effect on philosophical knowledge. While scholars and philosophers ruminated about the possibilities of creating new languages immediately following the idea’s Cartesian endorsement, the 1880s witnessed a new vigor and enthusiasm for the project. This was due in part to the revolution of the 1870s in international telegraphy and signaling codes and in part to the general scientification of western culture. The consensus among supporters posited that an artificial language should be simple and above all rational, constructed from a lexicon that could recall words from a number of different “natural languages.” Many enthusiasts praised created languages (such as Völapuk, for example) for their ability to function as an a posteriori rather than a priori mode of communication, tantamount to the universal language of science only potentially much more accessible to the general population.

Enthusiasts imagined that an artificial language might serve as the language of progress and a means of communicating in the ever-widening marketplace of imperial bourgeois capitalism. However, the Belle Époque’s “ever widening marketplace” was itself fraught with divisions and riddled with fault lines. As Anthony Smith asserted, despite its “universal logic” the new brand of capitalism “operated in a pre-existing framework of ethnic communities and states that were frequently locked in rivalry and warfare.” Thus, the period between 1870 and 1914 also witnessed a burgeoning of nationalist rhetoric and sentiment, as ethnic and linguistic “nations” attempted to capture states while existing states set about defining their nationhood, often along linguistic lines.

Eric Hobsbawn cited three primary social developments that led to novel forms of reinventing communities in terms of nationality. One was the resistance of traditional groups and cultures to the onset of modernity. The second was the rise of non-traditional classes and strata growing in the urban spaces of developed countries. And finally, unprecedented migrations (including imperial ones) that distributed vast diasporas of people across the earth, creating communities of strangers lacking what Hobsbawn called “the habits and conventions of co-existence.” When placed within the context of a racialized nineteenth-
Dr. Leder Ludwik Zamenhof was born in 1859 into a Jewish family in Bialystok, a city in Polish Lithuania whose population consisted of Russians, Poles, Germans, and Yiddish-speaking Jews. At the time, Poland was a part of the Russian Empire and Tsarist policy divided Poland along its ethno-linguistic lines. Zamenhof witnessed numerous and frequently-violent quarrels among these groups, which he thought resulted primarily from misunderstandings due to the lack of a common means of communication. As a result of his experiences in Poland, Zamenhof became interested in the subject of an international language but, the more he investigated, the more convinced he became that previous attempts at such a language were not suited to solving contemporary dilemmas satisfactorily. Thus, Zamenhof set about creating an artificial language of his own.

After considerable effort, Zamenhof published his book, Esperanto—meaning “one who hopes” in his new tongue—in 1887. Esperanto was considerably different in its aims from previously created lexicons. As Pierre Janten stated, “what sets Zamenhof apart from all other authors of planned languages is his own direct experience of social, racial, and religious conflict . . . human divisions and conflicts had caused him great suffering, and so he saw the creation of an international language as simply a first step toward a more general goal of peace.” Zamenhof hoped that Esperanto might eventually eradicate language discrimination altogether.

In his article, Language and Political Economy, S. Gal stated that linguistic practices can carry the very definitions of the kinds of social practices that maintain the interests of dominating classes. In this respect, the power-holder’s language provides or denies “access to valuable roles and resources attainable through ‘gate-keeping’ institutions,” such as schools and government positions. It is for this reason that Zamenhof and the increasingly wide following of Esperantists stressed the language’s relative neutrality; it placed all its speakers on even terms and could thus create more favorable conditions for achieving peace. In 1911 the First Universal Races Congress took place at the University of London. The conference organizers published a questionnaire, which asked; “How would you combat the irreconcilable contentions prevalent among all the
more important races of mankind that their customs, their civilization, and their race are superior to those of other races?"

One of the most frequent responses to this question was in fact a cry for the implementation of an international language, especially Esperanto.

In his 1911 article commenting on the conference proceedings, Professor Ulysses G. Weatherly of Indiana University stated that, “the sessions of the congress furnished a striking illustration of the utility of a world language.”

In succeeding years the Great War’s terrors solidified Esperantists’ claims about nationalism’s dangers and they began to promote their language as a means to creating international accord.

The Star of the East? Esperanto in the Post-War Period

The Esperanto movement benefited from the immediate post-war wave of pacifist sentiment. Members of the Universal Esperanto Association in a number of nations believed that their best chance for official support rested in the newly created League of Nations. Guérard stated that Cosmoglotta would “probably strike its deepest roots in those places and for those activities that are directly under the control of the League or Association of Nations.” Guérard thought that the League would function much more efficiently if it used an artificial language as an instrument of impartial international administration.

In 1922, the League of Nations quite seriously debated if and in what capacity its participants would associate themselves with the Esperanto movement. The publication on Esperanto as an international auxiliary language stated:

The committee agreed with the signatories recognizing the serious linguistic difficulties which impede direct relations between the peoples, and in desiring that an international language should be taught in all the schools—a simple and easy language which the children would learn side by side with their mother-tongue, and which would serve the future generations as a practical means of international communication.

The report admitted that it would touch on too delicate a question if the league established the supremacy of one national language over another. The goal was not to replace national languages but simply to ameliorate international cooperation.
In most cases, linguistic conflict grows out of what language will be used for public purposes. Because imperial sprawl, global war, and the rise of mass media together created something of a global public space, or what Anderson calls a shared sense of global “simultaneity,” choosing a language for world political purposes was embedded in barbed terrain. Thus, the League considered the ways in which Esperanto, when used solely as an auxiliary tongue, had already fostered international communication. Again the report stated:

The world disaster . . . which brought whole nations face to face, made more tragically evident the need for an international language in the world of the Red Cross, relief work among the wounded, the prison camps, and the intercourse between allied armies. In the great internment camps in Siberia, thousands of men of all nationalities learned Esperanto in order to get acquainted with each other and with their Japanese guards.28

The report went on to cite a number of statistics about the countries that were slowly implementing the teaching of Esperanto into their school curriculum.29 Some of the reported benefits included the argument that Esperanto could be an easy first step for “Orientals”—something of a gateway to learning other languages. Furthermore, a delegate from Latvia thought that Esperanto, “being a logical language,” might help to develop “logical thought” among otherwise “irrational” populations.30

In spite of the League’s pragmatic stance, the Esperanto movement itself continued to stress the language’s ethico-religious aspects. In 1922, in the periodical Amerika Esperantisto, one contributor spoke in very religious overtones, praising the amount of support that Esperanto had acquired in Eastern nations:

In a new sense today, the Esperanto star is becoming the star of the East. Whether it is Near East or Far East, our movement finds ready ears and open minds . . . . There is a story dear to every child heart in Christendom, of three wise men of the East who journeyed on and on over
countless difficulties seeking a star . . . and they came at last to the place they sought, where a world-regenerator lay new-born . . . Not a few of the trusted Magi of the east are pointing warningly to the cataclysm of 1914-1918 as presaging the destiny of our Western age of Machines . . . Hark we the wisdom of the East . . . Learning Esperanto is a step and a large step toward a universal brotherhood; toward a union of men’s minds.”31

The League of Nations bracketed most of this (rather Orientalist) ethico-religious discourse, and focused instead on how Esperanto might fit into the League’s goal of securing international cooperation without sacrificing the principle of self-determination on peace’s altar.

If the movement wanted official support, however, it would have to bend in part to the League’s functionalist perspective. Thus, many Esperantists began stressing how the language’s neutrality left ample room for the expression of national identity and culture. As Guérard stated:

> There is not a country, there is not a patois, that cannot claim its sacred right to existence, and that does not contribute its might to the common treasure. Cosmoglotta, far from leveling, legitimates differences, is meant to restore fair and friendly competition, to save the numerically weak, to prevent waste of energy in the crushing of rivals . . . everyone will also have two languages, his mother tongue and the common, neutral medium of all.”32

However, the relationship between the national and international was not a seamless one. Nationalist movements and other dissenting voices began to rise up to assert their discontent even as the League and Esperantists were touting the virtues of international cooperation. The idea of a harmonious mosaic of independent nations working together to put an end to war began to crack and crumble before the foundation was even laid. As Noel Buxton stated in 1922 in a book entitled *Oppressed Peoples and the League of Nations*: 
Great engines of propaganda were brought to play on world opinion by the Allies and the effect was double edged. The colored peoples, some of whom fought side by side with the whites for the avowed objects of war—liberation of nationalities and the realization of democracy—did not fail to learn the lesson. The white man is reaping the fruits of his war of propaganda. Today the struggle of the Oriental peoples in many cases is being fought on the ground of national self-determination.33

In addition to the colonial discontents, the war and the peacetreatmentgeneratedanumberofethno-linguisticminorities when they re-drew the map of Europe. Thus nationalists’ claims began asserting themselves in contradictory tones. Sometimes nationalist sentiment asserted itself against the oppression of the empire or the state. Many colonized or ethnically organized populations asserted that a truly cooperative internationalism would never be possible until all the peoples of the earth first had the right to nationhood. However, independence movements often suppressed, oppressed, or even eliminated their minority populations in forging their claims to national self-determination.34

Given nationalism’s continuing importance, certain sectors of the Esperanto movement moved from showing the compatibility of Esperanto with self-determination to illustrating its compatibility with a healthy patriotism. An unnamed Lithuanian author, who called himself a spiritual Esperantist, wrote this statement in Amerika Esperantisto in responding to the accusation that Esperantists were bad patriots:

In the opinion of tribal jingoists patriotism consists of hatred of everything which is not ours . . . and therefore they say that Esperantists do not love their country. Against this lying, ignoble, and slanderous accusation we protest most vigorously, we protest with every fibre of our being. . . . While pseudo patriotism is part of that common hatred which destroys everything, true patriotism builds up, preserves, and makes everything happy.35
However, whatever Esperanto’s compatibility with a certain kind of nationalism, it was the “pseudo-patriotism” that the above author denigrated that seemed to triumph. In the late twenties and thirties, German Esperanto associations sometimes made concessions to the Nazis. Despite those concessions, Hitler still railed against the Esperanto movement in *Mein Kampf*:

> As long as the Jew has not become the master of other peoples, he must speak their languages whether he likes it or not, but as soon as they become his slaves, they would all have to learn a universal language (Esperanto for instance) so that by this additional means the Jews could more easily dominate them.³⁶

This raises some questions about the power of the national hold over people’s hearts and minds. Esperanto did find real and wide appeal on almost every continent. Its promise of neutrality provided a certain amount of hope for colonized and oppressed populations who had been forced to use the colonizers’ tongue as well as for populations who wanted to be able to compete in the global market on more even terms. It attempted to provide answers to some questions that loomed large over the entire inter-war period: if you have something you want to say to the world, either in prose or in the form of a political statement, what language will you use? Will you use the language of your oppressor? Will you use your native language when most of the world does not speak or understand it? In this way, Esperanto had a functional draw; however, it simply could not compete at an official level with the allure of a more vigorous linguistic nationalism.

Anthony D. Smith has asserted that national culture, with its own ethno-linguistic base and set of historical facts and monuments, provides a solution to the problem of personal oblivion; it surmounts the finality of death and ensures a measure of personal immortality.³⁷ It is with this ideal that the power of language worked itself into cracks and fragments of the inter-war period and provided both a refuge and a battle cry. Esperanto, for all its promise of unity, did not give people a history—the very thing they needed for a legitimate national claim. One could not compete in the inter-war period without a nation of one’s own. Language and nation provided a place to hide in the storms of times. An Armenian poet perhaps best articulated language’s power:
The Armenian Language is the home
And haven where the wanderer can own
Roof and Wall and nourishment
He can enter to find love and pride
Locking the hyena and the storm outside.
For centuries its architects have toiled
To give its ceilings height.
How many peasants working
Day and night have kept
Its cupboards full, lamps lit, ovens hot.
Always rejuvenated, always old, it lasts,
Century to Century on the path
Where every Armenian can find it when he’s lost
In the wilderness of his future or his past.\textsuperscript{38}

This study has attempted to provide a preliminary outline of the global politics of language in the inter-war period. Additional research should make it possible to explore more deeply the ways in which language constituted part of the dynamic between oppression and resistance, the colonizer and the colonized, the majority and the minority, and the national and the international. Beginning from the idea that World War I helped to create a global public sphere, I hope to further investigate the ways in which language (both international languages and mother tongues) became one of the primary strategies for buttressing personal and group identity as well as political claims in a new and often confounding “age of globality.”\textsuperscript{39}

Notes

My sincere thanks go out to Patrick Manning, Robert Tignor, Gail Stokes, Jerry Bentley, Gyan Prakash, and Steven Kotkin for their invaluable insights and comments. If I have not fully attended to all of their suggestions, I hope to do so as this work continues.

\textsuperscript{1} For works on total war and its impact, see Raymond Aron, \textit{The Century of Total War} (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954); Anna Bramwell, \textit{Refugees in the Age of Total War} (London: Routledge, 1995).


Latin America alone remained out of the line of fire. Its economy, however, was adversely affected by the wartime halt in world trade.

The war officially killed seven million people (both soldiers and civilians) and wounded thirteen million others.


11 Ibid.


13 Cecelia Lynch recently asserted that ever since the publication of E. H. Carr’s The Twenty Years Crisis, scholars looking at international relations in this period have tended to cast its many complexities into simple binaries—realism vs. idealism, scientific man vs. power politics, moral man vs. immoral societies. See Cecelia Lynch, Beyond Appeasement; Interpreting Interwar Peace Movements in World Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

I am presently working from limited sources. Most of the secondary scholarship was produced from inside the Esperanto movement and is written mostly in Esperanto. Learning Esperanto will greatly expand the resources with which I can work. Furthermore, this essay works primarily from sources written in the western Hemisphere. Esperanto was a European-led movement and the disadvantage of not having the non-European sources is that I can mostly only speculate about the movement’s significance to non-western nations.


The very political equation between language and science generated a number of movements for the standardization of various national languages at this same time. For example, in the late nineteenth century in Italy, the state adopted the Florentine dialect and promoted it above the other dialects via education and the military. Similar instances took place elsewhere at the same historical moment.


Janten, *Esperanto*.

Ibid., 25.


Ibid., 322.

28 Ibid.
29 The report cited Albania, Bulgaria, Brazil, Belgium, China, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia as countries actively using Esperanto in their educational systems.
30 *Esperanto as an International Auxiliary Language*, 22.
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Examining the Swine Flu Program Through Scientific and Medical Literature

George Dehner

World history is a discipline that crosses geographical and temporal boundaries to understand and examine historical events and peoples. Crossing another type of boundary can be useful in world historical research: the boundary that separates various disciplines. Interdisciplinary research provides fresh insight and a new set of tools for addressing historical events. This study introduces a few examples of the use of scientific and medical literature in the study of world history. These examples are drawn from my examination of the responses to the discovery of swine flu in 1976. The identification of swine flu in New Jersey, and its relationship to the feared 1918 Spanish influenza, sparked a national effort to immunize “every man, woman and child” in the United States.¹

Yet the United States was virtually alone in responding this way and no other nation engaged in widespread immunizations. Both groups, responders and non-responders, claimed a scientific basis for their decisions. It soon became apparent that to address these dichotomous decisions required immersion in the scientific and medical literature of the influenza virus. A/New Jersey/76 (the technical name for the virus) appeared in the midst of preparation for, and expectation of, pandemic influenza. This framework was vital for appreciating the decisions reached.

An interview with prominent influenza expert Edwin Kilbourne reinforced the importance of a basic familiarity with the virus and the theories developed to describe its pattern. Dr. Kilbourne, a noted
influenza researcher for over fifty years, discussed a conference in Cape Town which had brought together influenza virologists and historians writing on the Spanish flu. Kilbourne noted, “Both groups learned a lot from each other, but most of the knowledge, I have to say, came from the virologists to put the history in perspective. It is amazing to me how insular and isolated they were in their thinking: that they can write whole theses on an epidemic and know nothing about the virus.”

This is not to say that only virologists can write about diseases in history, but that knowledge of the virus, bacteria, pathogen or parasite can be important for understanding historical events and practices. Science and history are not so far apart. These areas of overlap—“observed facts systematically classified” and “continuous methodical record” in the dictionary definitions for science and history, respectively—are particularly apt for the study of influenza. Consciously, as in science, or unconsciously, as in history, both areas of inquiry examine the past with an eye to predicting future behavior. Scientists (and some historians too) craft models that are predictive. The scientist tests this model experimentally, observes and records these results. The various tests and observations and their reporting in disciplinary journals can be read as a type of primary source, because this reporting is also a dialogue with scientific colleagues. A key component of scientific modeling is the ability to repeat and validate evidence. When scientists propose a model and present data to support it, they are inviting others to support or dispute this model. What can become tricky is when the same set of observed events is used to draw different conclusions, both sides claiming a “scientific” conclusion.

**Influenza Theories**

Scientists were very reliant upon the history of influenza in creating their models. Although influenza has been afflicting humankind for centuries, it was not until Shope’s experiments in the 1930s that the disease was determined to be a virus. The ability to study the virus itself required new technologies that did not become available until the 1950s and 1960s. Therefore, although influenza had a long history of infecting humankind, only in the recent period prior to 1976 had scientists been able to identify and examine it. Since the discovery of the viral cause of influenza, there were believed to have been three pandemic years: 1946 (mistakenly identified as a pandemic), 1957 and
1968. Through a procedure known as seroarcheology (testing the blood for antibodies to previous virus exposure), scientists were able to trace influenza infections back to the 1880s, which brought three additional pandemics under observation, 1889, 1900, and 1918.

A simplified discussion of influenza will help clarify this process. The outer coat of the influenza virus is comprised of two proteins: hemagglutinin and neuraminidase. Although there are many combinations that exist in animal populations, there are a limited number that are infective for humans (labeled H1, H2, H3 and N1, N2, N3). One gains immunity to influenza by surviving infection. This infection leaves telltale antibody markers in the blood. Influenza viruses are unstable, and slight changes in the virus occur randomly upon replication. These slight changes are known as viral “drift.” Occasionally, dramatic changes occur in the virus: these viral reassortments or recombinants are called viral “shifts.” For example, the 1957 “Asian” flu was caused by a H2N2 virus that was a “shift” from the prevailing H1N1. This dramatic change sparked a pandemic because it was a new virus to which no one had immunity.

From this relatively thin set of observed data, influenza virologists crafted two theories. One became known as the “eleven-year cycle theory,” and the other was the “fifty-year recycling theory.” Both theories were very important in the creation of the immunization campaign and therefore bear close examination.

The “eleven-year cycle theory” was championed by Edwin Kilbourne and theoretically sought to explain the observation that pandemics apparently erupted every eleven years. This theory proposed that the introduction of a new virus sparked a pandemic since no one had immunity to the new strain. This new strain spread so rapidly and efficiently that it crowded out competing strains of influenza. Over the next decade the population built up antibodies to the predominant strain (punctuated by epidemics of slightly changed viruses or “drifts”) resulting in a decline of influenza cases. Thus, when viral reassortment created a new virus (viral “shift”) a pandemic was sparked again and this new virus became the predominant strain. In 1976 the 1968 “Hong Kong” flu was nearing the end of its eleven-year cycle and, according to this theory, a new pandemic strain ought soon to appear. Coincidentally, the very same day that the New Jersey cases were typed as swine flu (a radical change from the “Hong Kong” strain), the New York Times
published an editorial penned by Edwin Kilbourne describing this theory.\textsuperscript{8}

The “fifty-year recycling theory” approached the appearance of influenza pandemics in a similar fashion. This theory was grounded on the fact that there are a limited number of influenza strains that are infective to humans. Perfect immunity is gained by catching and surviving the infection or by vaccination. In the human immune system the host is able rapidly to create antibodies to neutralize the invader. When a related but different influenza infection occurs, the body is able to respond somewhat quicker than normal, but not as rapidly as with perfect immunity. This reaction, known as imperfect immunity, is readily seen in the immune-system response to viral drifts. This may or may not prevent individual infection, but overall it serves to dampen the spread of cases, preventing pandemics. The recycling theory was built upon these two aspects: a limited number of strains infective to humans and perfect and imperfect immunity to various strains. This theory argued that a pandemic strain was ready to reappear once the vast majority of the population had no immunity to the strain; for example after the immune population has died (50–60 years after the disappearance of the strain type).\textsuperscript{9} This theory developed from observations that in the 1957 pandemic those born before 1889 were more resistant to the infection. In 1968 it was observed that those born before 1900 were least likely to get the disease. Subsequent testing revealed that both the 1889 and 1957 pandemics were caused by the same general type of flu strain (H2). It was found that the 1900 and 1968 pandemics were also caused by the same general type of influenza strain (H3). The elderly population was less likely to be infected because these new viruses were similar to the pandemic strains previously experienced. So from these observations, the theory predicted that the next pandemic strain would be similar to the 1918 pandemic strain (A/Swine). It had already been determined that the 1918 Spanish flu was caused by a swine type virus.

Supplementing these two theories was the history of the 1957 and 1968 pandemics (proving that interdisciplinarity can be a two-way street). The 1957 and 1968 examples were useful not only for revealing more of the secrets of influenza pandemics, but also for the successes and failures of public health attempts to mitigate the pandemic. This ‘continuous methodical record’ of government and non-government reactions to the pandemic comprised a critical component for developing a template
for future pandemic responses. In both these pandemic years, radical new strains, viral “shifts,” appeared late in the previous flu season and sparked a few infections (late winter in 1957 and early summer in 1968). In the ensuing flu season, these new strains burst into global pandemics. The 1976 swine-flu cases in New Jersey were discovered in February, the end of the flu season in the northern hemisphere.

When the swine-flu cases were uncovered in New Jersey they fit both the predictive theoretical models perfectly. It was about ten years after the previous pandemic year of 1968, and the viral strain was swine. These theories were tested against the previous data of 1957 and 1968. As in 1957 and 1968, the new strain appeared approximately eleven years after the previous viral shift and was a recycling of a strain predominant about fifty years earlier. In both examples a small number of cases appeared before breaking out in widespread epidemics. Therefore, the New Jersey cases were a harbinger of the coming pandemic. In order to forestall or blunt this pandemic, immediate steps would have to be taken. In 1976 the only preventative step was immunization. Because a pandemic strain (probably swine) was not only anticipated but also expected, the United States medical community quickly moved to the decision of a massive immunization campaign. This is the context for evaluating the rapid and apparently outsized response by the United States to the discovery of a novel flu virus.

One Experiment, Two Responses

The role of the paradigm in Thomas Kuhn’s examination of scientific revolutions revealed the changeability of scientific “facts.”10 “Facts” can be as malleable in science and medicine as in history. A similar relationship can be detected in the interpretation of results from experiments. In 1976 an experiment was used to bolster two wildly divergent conclusions. These conclusions were used as supporting evidence for those who decided on a massive immunization campaign and those who decided not to.

The experiment, undertaken at the Common Cold Unit in Salisbury, England, was very simple.11 Six volunteers were purposely exposed to the A/New Jersey swine-flu strain. The volunteers were monitored to see if they caught the virus, the course and severity of their infection, and whether they were able to infect others. The results were as follows: all six became infected with the disease. One had a moderate case of
the influenza, three had mild cases, one had a very mild infection and one showed no symptoms at all (although subsequent tests revealed the person had contracted the disease). All six, including the asymptomatic patient, shed the virus via their nose and mouth, meaning all six could infect others with the disease. These results and the experiment were not disputed. But the conclusions drawn from this experiment were markedly different.

For those nations that decided against a vaccination campaign (every nation other than the United States), the crucial result of this experiment was the mildness of the infection. None of the volunteers developed a severe response and five out of the six of the infections ranged from mild to nonexistent. The conclusion was that this was not a dangerous strain. This experiment received prominent display in the World Health Organization Consultation on Influenza (April 7–8, 1976), and underscored the WHO’s recommendation that can best be characterized as watchful waiting.¹²

But in the United States, which by the time of the experiment had already begun preparations for a massive immunization program, the experiment demonstrated how infective this new strain was. All six had become infected with the virus and all six, including the asymptomatic patient, were able to infect others. This was a highly transmissible and infectious virus, and was likely to spread rapidly through a population with no immunities. This experiment justified an immunization campaign to create immunity in the population.

Because these two dramatically different conclusions were drawn from the same experiment and were used to bolster opposite responses (to vaccinate or not to vaccinate), debate over this experiment played out in the medical and popular press. The first responses were attached to the experiment. The authors of the study, A. S. Beare and J. W. Craig, concluded that, “it seems possible that the outbreak in the U. S. A. was an isolated event and that the virus will not become established in man.”¹³ Eminent influenza researcher Charles Stuart-Harris described the plan to vaccinate those between the ages of 20 and 50 as “highly questionable” in an editorial in the same edition of The Lancet.¹⁴ Geoffrey Schild, head of the virology unit in one of two WHO Coordinating Centers for Influenza (Atlanta was the other) called the United States’ vaccination program a “somewhat immoderate response” to the Fort Dix phenomenon.¹⁵
The first reaction by U. S. researchers to the experiment was to emphasize how the experiment supported their program. Michael Hattwick, Chief of Respiratory and Special Pathogens at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), stressed that the key part of evidence was that “all six seroconvert and spread virus via nose” and that this virus “will be very infectious.” For the Chief of the CDC’s Bureau of State Services, J. Donald Millar, “The study was too small to draw any definite conclusions as to the overall impact the swine flu may have on the general population, but did indicate that ‘it is quite infectious.’”

Domestic and international criticism mounted as it became clear that the United States was the only nation responding to the New Jersey cases with an immunization campaign. Now the proponents of immunization began to attack the scientific reasoning of those not immunizing. Referring to the Common Cold Unit tests, Edwin Kilbourne, in a letter to the *New York Times*, stated, “To project an assessment of relative viral virulence from six cases is laughable,” and “Unfortunately, the definitive assessment of viral virulence can be made only by observation of the virus as a natural infection in epidemic form.” J. Donald Millar’s response to the June 9th *New York Times* article, “Experts Question U.S. Plan for Mass Flu Shots,” noted that the author of the article, Mr. Walter Sullivan, “omits reference to the very significant fact that none of the European governments mentioned has the vaccine production and distribution capability for doing a nationwide campaign. Thus it is hardly surprising that these governments should ‘question the wisdom’ of a country that has the capability and chooses to use it.” In this view, the decision of non-responders was not scientific but political.

It was difficult to determine the merits of the scientific arguments adopted by the opposing specialists. This was both because it was a limited experiment—only a data set of six volunteers—and because influenza has been described as an “impure science.” It was then impossible (and remains so today) to determine exactly how an influenza virus would respond in the human population. Too many aspects of this virus remained unknown. Therefore, understanding the context in which this scientific debate was being waged was crucial for appreciating the different conclusions. When the results of the experiment were reported to U. S. researchers, the experts had already decided upon a massive immunization program. Viewed through this prism the experiment bolstered how infectious this virus would be. But
this type of immunization program—a massive effort to manufacture, purchase, distribute, and deliver a vaccine—would test the limits of vaccine-producing nations, and would be expensive. Many nations were suffering the effects of a global recession prompted by the oil crisis of 1974. The strictures of the economy can be glimpsed at a conference for a working group on pandemic influenza held in January 1976, coincidentally a few weeks prior to the discovery of the swine-flu strain. In an article entitled “Morbidity and Mortality Surveillance—England and Wales,” it was clear that public health funds were at a premium. The author, Alan Tranter, stated, “The earlier identification of new viral strains would require considerably more resources, which are unlikely to become available in the present economic situation affecting the U.K.” Viewed from this angle, the mildness of the disease seemed most significant and supported the decision not to create a massive vaccination campaign.

It was important to recognize that neither group was falsifying data. Scientists have an honor code that relies on accurate renditions of the evidence. It was a serious charge to label a response unscientific in that community. But both conclusions can be legitimately drawn from this limited experiment. The key was that the results were viewed from different observation points. The U. S. medical community had pledged itself to an immunization campaign; from its vantage point infectivity was key. The WHO and other national health organizations decided not to mount such an effort; therefore, the mildness of the disease loomed largest. The science and the context are important in evaluating the debate.

As is well known, swine flu did not burst into a pandemic. The United States immunization campaign was harshly criticized, and both the decision and the decision-making process were dissected in great detail. The WHO decision—and the process to reach that decision—has largely escaped such detailed investigation. The United States was wrong about a swine-flu pandemic for the right reasons. Although the eleven-year-cycle theory has been abandoned and the fifty-year recycling theory has been questioned, the core rationale for the program remains intact. A/New Jersey offered pandemic potential and the only protective option for the public was vaccination. The WHO made the right decision for the wrong reasons. Virulence cannot be determined in the laboratory and the influenza surveillance system could not reliably provide enough
warning to distribute a protective vaccine. The lessons of the swine-flu program are thus unclear. We are left with the conclusion that influenza remains a slippery disease.  

Conclusions

There are several sets of conclusions to draw from the intersection of the medical and social sciences. Some of these conclusions are more closely applicable to the study of disease in history, but some have relevance to the larger field of research in world history.

When researching a disease in history it is important to recognize that the disease is a character in the story too, and an unpredictable one at that. Knowing the features of the pathogen, how it is spread, how it changes, what environments it thrives in is useful in examining historical impact. It is easily seen in influenza, which is an unstable virus that periodically causes pandemics, but other examples could include the role of malaria in Angkor Wat, the connection between tuberculosis and colonialism, and the global spread of the HIV virus. Diseases are an important component in world historical research and knowledge and appreciation of the organism itself is useful in examining these historical events.

It is important for researchers to be conversant with the language of the scientific and medical community. Researchers speak to one another through the dialogue of published results. This is the forum for testing hypotheses, announcing results and provoking debate, much like historians do. Occasionally, the specificity of the discussion and debate is dense and opaque, also much like the work of historians, but one need not be fluent in a language to be able to sketch the outlines of a conversation. The scientific community frames its discussion in data. For example, United States health officials were engaged in creating a large-scale immunization campaign; therefore, the infectivity of A/New Jersey seemed the most relevant data from the Common Cold Unit experiment. Other national health system officials, not inclined or unable to mount such a program, seized on the data supporting a mild infection. The contextualization of data is key for appreciating scientific recommendations. This contextualization of data is also useful for spotting the differences between recommendations and policy. Frequently scientific recommendations are modified and simplified in creating policy. In the swine-flu case the hypothesized
likelihood of a pandemic flu changed from possible to probable to certain. These changes evolved as the recommendation moved from scientific and medical circles to the political arena. These changes were not merely the result of simplification, rather they were part of an effort to paint the appearance of swine flu in the most dangerous light possible.

Finally, the use of scientific models illustrates the merits and demerits of such a framework, which is particularly relevant for world historians. The predictive scientific model can be a valuable template for world historical research. A universal, large-scale theory is crafted from localized collections of data. This theory is created to describe patterns of interactions, which are tested by data sets. The hypothesis, along with the evidence, is posted in a forum that invites testing, discussion and refinement of the hypothesis. This repeated testing and accumulation of data makes the hypothesis stronger and more useful. This collaborative model may have use for a discipline with such broad areas of research and integration.

However, as the preceding examples make clear, the scientific model can be flawed. The hypothesis might be crafted on too small a sample of data to adequately test the proposal, or the predictive nature of the model may lead to the uncritical acceptance of the data that fit the model. The predictive model may skew the interpretation of data and lead to political rather than scientific conclusions. These dangers lurk whenever a hypothesis becomes confused with fact.

Scientific and medical literature can be usefully incorporated into historical research and serve to clarify world historical studies that overlap these fields. In addition, the scientific model, with its testing by a community of scholars, presents a useful template for world history researchers who search local archival sources in order to understand broad patterns and connections. Interdisciplinary instruments can help to make world history operations a success.

Notes

1 President Gerald R. Ford, “The President’s Remarks Announcing Actions To Combat the Influenza,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 12, 13
The Oxford English Dictionary defines science as “2. a knowledge acquired by study, acquisition with or meeting of any department of learning” and “4. a . . . a branch of study which is concerned either with observed facts systematically classified and more or less colligated by being brought under general laws, and which includes trustworthy methods for the discovery of new truth within its own domain.” The OED defines history as “learning or knowing by inquiry” and “a written narrative constituting a continuous methodical record, in order of time, of important or public events.” The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., prepared by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); s. v. “science” and “history.”

Undoubtedly a companion of humans since the origin of dense, settled communities, definitive epidemics of influenza can only be identified from the 1500s. For a listing of pandemic years of influenza prior to the twentieth century, see Edwin Kilbourne, Influenza (New York and London: Plenum Medical Press, 1987), 6–7 (chart 1.1). The lack of previous examples has more to do with the vagaries of historical descriptions of symptoms than with the lack of the virus.


In the late 1960s it was believed that the years 1968, 1957, 1946, 1929, 1918, 1900, and 1889 were pandemic years sparked by viral “shifts.” See Kilbourne, Influenza, 272. Subsequently 1946 and 1929 were determined not to have been years of pandemic outbreaks of influenza.


Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962); for debate on Kuhn’s concepts see Erich Von Dietze, Paradigms Explained: Rethinking Thomas Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).


Personal copy in the possession of the author.
15 David Perlman, “The Flu Shot Program Poses a Dilemma,” San Francisco Chronicle, 5 April 1976 (collected from Box 44, Unlabeled Binder, blank tab, RG 442, NARA’s Southeast Region).
16 J. Lyle Conrad’s handwritten notes dated 6/15, Box 37, Folder entitled “ACIP Flu Meeting, March 1976,” RG 442, NARA’s Southeast Region.
17 Dennis Tolsma’s handwritten notes dated 4/22, Box 31, File entitled “Influenza Staff Meeting Notes—D. Tolsma,” RG 442, NARA’s Southeast Region.
20 Emphasis in the original. Millar quote from letter to editor of the New York Times, 15 June 1976 (collected from Box 1, Binder entitled “NIIP Reading File,” RG 442, NARA’s Southeast Region).
25 Phrase is borrowed from the Neustadt and Fineberg, Swine Flu Affair.
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Creating the “New Man”: The Chinese and Cuban Revolutions in the 1960s

Yinghong Cheng

The fundamental goal of communist revolution is not only to create a new society, but also a “new man.” This perfected person, hammered out of struggle, would put society over self and moral over material incentives. My research is to create a book-length study of the communist experiment of social engineering aimed at creating such a “new man,” through comparing China and Cuba in the 1960s and situating them in a world historical context.¹

The malleability and perfectibility of human nature—the philosophical premise of communist social engineering—is embedded in European intellectual tradition: Enlightenment, Marxism, Utopianism, and the ideas of Russian radical intellectuals in particular. Politically, the short-lived French Jacobin regime was the first government to experiment with such ideas. But it was in the Soviet Union and under the Bolsheviks that the ideas were put into practice on a national scale and across a time span of four decades, with the “Soviet Man” emerging in the 1930s as a robust socialist builder. However, as the country experienced an economic and social transformation in the 1950s and 1960s, the character of the “Soviet Man” became softened and even tainted by increasing application of individual incentives and material rewards.

In the 1960s, a more radical and thoroughgoing social-engineering project of creating a new man started in China and Cuba. Mao and Castro, as well as Guevara, were fervent believers in human malleability and
perfectibility. Driven by economic needs and alert to the “Soviet lesson,” the Maoist and Castroist regimes took as a primary target on their political agenda the creation of an incorruptible new man, who would perpetuate revolutionary militancy in peacetime and create economic miracles with political devotion. As their most intensive effort in social engineering, they launched nationwide campaigns in the 1960s: the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and the Cuban Revolutionary Offensive (1968-1970).

The global response to the Chinese and Cuban endeavors varied. Based on their own experience, the Soviet leaders deplored them as desperate and fruitless. Western intellectuals, alienated from their own societies, hoped they would create an alternative human model. Third World leaders saw the Chinese-Cuban campaigns as inspiring efforts at educating and mobilizing the masses, which might serve the political and economic needs of their newly-independent countries, hampered by limited economic and technological resources.

**Background: From the Enlightenment to the Soviet New Man**

The idea of remaking people sprang directly from the Enlightenment. The main emphasis of the Enlightenment was the science of man: that is, the study of human nature, how it is formed and how it interacts with society. Most Enlightenment thinkers held a materialistic view of the human mind: it was a mechanism determined by and responding to the environment—a “blank tablet,” as Locke’s famous phrase put it. Claude-Adrien Helvétius, a French Encyclopedist and one of the founding theorists of modern education, proposed the notion of environmental behaviorism, which attributes all intellectual and moral capabilities to external education. For the public interest, Helvétius advocated mass political education instituted by the state, expressed in his sanguine dictum, “l’éducation peut tout.” But it was Jean-Jacques Rousseau who directly addressed the issue of reshaping human nature from a political perspective and saw that task as a responsibility of political elites:

> One who dares to undertake the founding of the people should feel that he is capable of changing human nature, so to speak; . . . of substituting a social and moral existence for the independent and physical existence we have all received from nature.²

Therefore, “making citizens” has been considered by some authors as
the main thesis of Rousseau’s political theory.\textsuperscript{3}

The first regime in modern history attempting to change human nature by using state power was the Jacobin government. Robespierre, as one author states, “saw himself as a messianic schoolmaster, wielding a very big stick to inculcate virtue.”\textsuperscript{4} His enthusiasm about making people “virtuous” was reflected particularly in his meticulous concerns for a state-sanctioned education, which would provide a uniform physical, mental, and moral training for all girls and boys from five, who were to live in boarding schools and be cut off from their families.\textsuperscript{5}

The communist regimes in the twentieth century appreciated and inherited all the above ideas and practices. Helvétius was recognized as a great materialist in analyzing the human mind; Rousseau was regarded as the greatest revolutionary thinker before Marx; while the Jacobins were seen by the Bolsheviks as their own predecessors.

Following the Enlightenment thinkers and the Jacobins, Marx contributed to the vision of the new man by proposing relevant philosophical premises. Marx held a materialist and environmental-determinist view on human nature. As he put it: “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.”\textsuperscript{6} In such arguments he clearly shows the consistency of his thought with that of the Enlightenment thinkers. Furthermore, Marx argued that since human nature is determined by social-class relations, it is logical that human nature is not a static substance but a result of continuous social change. “All history is nothing but the continuous transformation of human nature,” as he put it.\textsuperscript{7} In addition to philosophical premises, Marx provided some practical proposals for future social engineering, especially the integration of education with productive labor at early ages. He believed that such integration would “raise the working class far above the level of the higher and middle class.”\textsuperscript{8} Marx’s educational concepts became the goals for the socialist education in the twentieth century.

The Russian intelligentsia of the 1860s and 1870s was another important contributor to conceptualization of the new man. This estranged intellectual elite, expelled from politics by the tsarist regime, was heavily influenced by Enlightenment ideas, and developed a materialist and monistic world-view which made it view people as “a creature made up exclusively of material substances.” Nikolay
Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky’s novel, *What Is To Be Done?*—*The Story About The New Man* (1861), coined the term and portrayed its characteristics. Rakhmetov, the hero of the novel, is a totally dedicated and relentlessly self-disciplined revolutionary who even sleeps on a bed of nails to train his willpower and endurance. Chernyshevsky’s “new man” was a great inspiration for young revolutionaries, including Peter Zaichnevskii, Serge Nechaev, and Lenin. Lenin once acknowledged that Chernyshevsky was more influential in his youth than Marx, because his book “is a work which gives one a charge for a whole life.”

Forty years after Chernyshevsky’s novel, Lenin published a political pamphlet under the same title: *What Is To Be Done?* It had a more urgent political goal: in order to overcome the “economism” in the socialist movement that had diverted workers’ attention from political struggle, revolutionary ideas had to be injected into the working class from outside, by a well-organized and centralized communist party. The task of developing class “consciousness” to prevail over people’s “spontaneity” through education and indoctrination thus became a major element of creating the communist new man. Echoing Lenin’s call, the revolutionary author Marxim Gorky published his novel *Mother* in 1907, describing how an illiterate housewife of a working-class family is enlightened by revolutionary ideology and transforms herself into an ardent and conscious fighter, thus providing a new type of “new man.”

The October Revolution of 1917 opened the door for the Bolsheviks to embark on nation-wide social engineering. The Bolshevist vision for the new generation of citizens can be found in Leon Trotsky’s words:

Man will at last begin to harmonize himself in earnest. He will try to master first the semiconscious and then the subconscious process in his own organism, such as breathing, the circulation of the blood, digestion, reproduction, and, within necessary limits, he will try to subordinate them to the control of reason and will. Even purely physiologic life will become subject to collective experiments.

Therefore, Lenin’s project of replacing “spontaneity” with “consciousness” attained a psychological and even physiological dimension. Other Soviet leaders expressed their vision of the new man in their own language, often metaphorical. Stalin said, “We communists
are people of a special mold. We are made of special material.” Bukharin proposed that the goal of the revolution was to “alter people’s actual psychology.”

The Bolsheviks approached their goal of the new man through multiple methods, including ideological indoctrination, political socialization of the young generations by organizing them into the Communist Pioneers or Youth League, educational reforms emphasizing integration of work with study, model emulation, and literary and artistic promulgation of the new man’s qualities. A typical Soviet new man was described by Nikolai Ostrovsky, a veteran and paralyzed Red Army solider who wrote an autobiographical novel as a last service to the revolution in his bedridden years. The novel’s title, That’s How Steel Was Tempered (1935), echoed Stalin’s metaphor, and Pavel Korchagin, the protagonist of the novel, soon personified the “Soviet Man.”

But in the 1930s, as rapid industrialization became Stalin’s priority in order to give “socialism in one country” a sound economic foundation, individual incentives began to be adopted. Thus Stakhanov workers, the model workers of the 1930s, were often showered with high wages, prizes, bonuses, special housing, and vacations. This socio-economic change blurred the distinctions between revolutionary consciousness and individual incentives; it was therefore criticized by Trotskyists who had been expelled from the Soviet Union in the late 1920s. But it was in the late 1950s and the 1960s, as the Soviet Union went through a more profound social transformation—resulting from de-Stalinization, modernization and urbanization—that these changes became more comprehensive and institutionalized, with justifications provided by new ideology. The discussion on “Liebermanism” in the early 1960s, for example, advocated adopting market mechanisms, independent management, and individual incentives. As a result, the images of bureaucrats, technocrats, and working-class “aristocrats” gradually replaced that of the old-fashioned Soviet Man. While leaders in Eastern European countries were inspired by such changes, China and Cuba not only rejected them as revisionist and regressive, but began to see their own revolutions as continuing the mission of creating the communist new man that had been abandoned in the Soviet Union.

“Be Mao’s Good Soldiers”—Creating the New Man in China

The concept of human malleability and perfectibility existed in Chinese culture long before the communist revolution. The Confucian
ideas of ren and xiao are essentially moral characteristics, cultivated through constant self-reflection and rectification. For the intellectuals, officials and gentry, the role models were “jun zhi,” a well-educated gentleman with all the virtues, or “sheng ren,” a moral saint. Confucian texts were intensively studied because many believed they had power in the individual’s moral transformation and character building, particularly in the case of Neo-Confucianism. For commoners there were numerous, less sophisticated models to imitate, associated with specific social or family duties, such as filial piety or faithfulness. The necessity of reshaping human nature was explicitly expressed by prominent Confucians. For example Xunzi, who lived in the era of Warring States, once likened human nature to warped lumber, to which carpenters often had to apply heat, steam, hammering, bending and other methods to straighten it out.\textsuperscript{13} In modern Chinese history, many intellectuals were inspired by Hegelian and Kantian philosophical discourse on the relationship between the ideal human type and the rejuvenation of national spirit, as well as Nietzsche’s “superman.” They began to envision reshaping Chinese character as an essential part of a nationalist revolution, expressed as xin min (new people) in Liang Qichi’s words, xin qing nian (new youth) in Chen Duxiu’s words, or shao nian zhong guo (young China) in Li Dazhao’s words. Under such influences, Mao and his like-minded friends established xin min xue hui (New People’s Study Society) in April 1918. In addition, Li Dazhao introduced ideas of the Russian intelligentsia, especially the “Going to the People” movement, asking the Chinese youth to imitate the Russian example and enlighten the Chinese people.\textsuperscript{14}

But as the Chinese communist movement proceeded, the reshaping of national character in the light of nation building gradually gave way to cultivating political and ideological qualities of communists. Mao and Liu Shaoqi, the Party’s organizational leader, along with many others, were believers of environmental behaviorism. The distinctive character of environmental behaviorism in China was the emphasis on thought reform. It was in the Yenan Rectification Campaign of the early 1940s that the Chinese communists first succeeded in remolding people through large-scale and developed techniques of thought reform, consisting of intensive ideological studies, confession of politically incorrect ideas, exposing personal history, criticism and self-criticism. The psychological effect on the individuals was so profound that many
of the participants felt reborn when they completed the processes of the campaign. Gao Hua reported that, “everyone found their new identity and ultimate meaning of life—they would belong to the Party not only in terms of ideology, but also body and life without reservation.”\textsuperscript{15}

With the communist triumph in the Civil War and control of state power, creating the new man became a primary goal of the Party, parallel to construction of the new society. In addition to the thought reform techniques developed in Yenan, the Chinese communists borrowed such Soviet practices as the Communist Pioneers and Youth League (they established these organizations before 1949 but institutionalized them nationwide thereafter). Wu Yunduo, a paralyzed veteran, was called “China’s Nikolai Ostrovsky” because he, like his Russian counterpart, wrote a book using his own example in his bedridden years to teach young generations to devote themselves to the revolution.

But from the mid-1950s, as Chinese communists aspired to explore their own road towards communism, they began to treat the post-Stalin changes in the profile of the Soviet Man as signs of revolutionary degeneration. They engaged in ideological polemics with the Russians from the late 1950s. It was against this background that, in the early 1960s, a surge of new models of the Chinese new man suddenly submerged China’s newsstands, bookstores and theaters. These models, many of them articulated by Mao himself, represented different occupations but demonstrated essentially the same traits of the Chinese new man.

Wang Jingxi was the model for all industrial workers and cadres. Wang was the leader of an oil-drilling team—“The Heroic 32111 Drilling Team,” as it was officially named—in Daqing Oil Field in Manchuria. The oil field was opened up in the early 1960s, to help make China independent of Soviet oil supplies. Wang’s exemplary role was first to inspire his workers to overcome otherwise insurmountable difficulties by applying Mao Zedong thought. Armed with Mao’s thoughts, Wang demystified “bourgeois geological stereotypes” such as that China was poor in oil—“I don’t believe all oil is deposited under the ground of foreign countries,” as he put it—and he criticized those “experts” who always sought reference in “thick foreign books.” But as a model worker and team leader, his more important character was devotion and sacrifice. One legend holds that when a concrete mixer was not functioning properly, he used his body to mix up components of concrete in the pool to put down a sudden eruption in one of the oil
wells which was threatening the whole infrastructure of the well. For this heroic act he was officially dubbed “the iron man.” It was to a great extent due to his exemplary work that Mao issued a directive in 1964: “In industry learn from Daqing.”

Similarly, Chen Yonggui and his Dazai brigade were selected for the Chinese peasants to imitate. In Dazai, a village on the slopes of Taihang Mountain in Shanxi Province, the natural elements were remarkably unfavorable for agriculture. But with tremendous courage and sacrifice Chen, the party secretary of the village, led the villagers through a number of campaigns to level mountains, construct terraced fields and reservoirs, and complete networks of dikes, dams, and canals. The success of these massive campaigns enabled the villagers to achieve self-reliance; more importantly, through the campaigns they were transformed from individual farmers into collective socialist peasants. Mao issued a directive in 1964 to promote Dazai: “In agriculture, learn from Dazai.”

The most outstanding models of the Chinese new man, however, were soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army. If the images of Wang Jinxi and Chen Yonggui were mostly associated with economic production, then the young soldiers’ profiles were completely ideological. For example Lei Feng, a sub-lieutenant who studied Mao’s works every day, used them to guide his daily routine. Lei expressed a loyalty to Mao and the Party that was “romantic in an adolescent vein,” in the words of Sheridan. As Lei put it, “I am like a toddler and the Party is like my mother who helps me, leads me, and teaches me to walk. . . . My beloved Party, my loving mother, I am always your loyal son.” Lei Feng had a popular metaphor comparing revolutionaries to screws (“never-rusted screws”)—humble but indispensable, they remain dutifully wherever they are anchored. Lei died in an accident when he was on duty. When his story was reported, it drew Mao’s attention and he issued a directive: “Learn from comrade Lei Feng.” It seems that the Party needed more models with heroic sacrifice, so the army commemorated a number of them. For example Wang Jie, a squad leader, covered an accidentally detonating grenade with his body to protect others in a training session. Liu Yingjun, a soldier, stopped a loaded wagon dragged by runaway horses to protect children in the street at the cost of his own life. Ou Yanghai, a platoon commander, pushed a horse loaded with ammunition out of the railway track to avoid a collision between it and the approaching train. He was hit by the train and died. The revolutionary virtues personified by these
young soldiers were summarized by Lin Biao, the defense minister and the main advocate of Mao’s cult: “Read Mao’s books, listen to Mao’s words, do what Mao asks, and be Mao’s good soldiers.”

The efforts to transform the people in the light of the new man further intensified in the Cultural Revolution. What differentiated the Cultural Revolution from previous campaigns was the program of large-scale resettlements and relocations. From 1966 to 1976, millions of cadres, intellectuals, and students were “sent down” to the countryside to be “reeducated” through physical labor and living with peasants; conversely, millions of workers, peasants, and soldiers were sent to government offices, cultural and scientific institutions, and all kinds of schools to take up positions left by those “sent down” and assume responsibilities of management and teaching. These resettlements and relocations were meant to change fundamentally the social environment which valued education, experience, expertise, and seniority and was associated with hierarchy, reward, comfort, leisure, and the sense of superiority. The idea was that thought reform and model emulation were insufficient to fashion people into the desirable shape, and that more radical and sweeping changes had to be made in the society’s infrastructure to root out the undesirable environment once and for all.

“Let Them All Be Like Che”—Creating the New Man in Cuba

As in China, the notion of the new man in Cuba was rooted in the nationalist discourse. For Jose Martí, the father of Cuban nationalism, the Cubans had tremendous potential to be spiritually uplifted, but in practice moral indifference and political inertia typified the nation. National independence would never be achieved unless the whole nation’s character was changed. Sociabilidad (sociability) and dignidad (dignity) were thus central to his political thought, which referred to “a reawakened social conscience supported by totally selfless conduct.”

As John M. Kirk points out,

Martí was well aware of the pressing need for sweeping political reforms in the Patria, but also realized that in order for them to be successfully instituted it would be necessary from the outset to inculcate into every Cuban citizen certain moral qualities which together would result, he hoped, in a heightened moral consciousness and would eventually lead
to the formation of a “new man.”

Martí’s contemporary nationalists also raised the question of Cubanidad (Cubanness). For example, Diego Vicente Tejera (1848-1903), a political activist and prolific essayist, believed that Cubans needed a new socialist spirit that could only be developed through education. From 1897 to 1899, Tejera gave ten public lectures for the Cuban exile community in Key West, Florida, emphasizing the cultivation of new Cuban character and capacity.

Cuban communist leaders inherited Martí’s view on the issue. But as believers in environmental behaviorism, they attributed the undesirable characters of Cuban people to old social environment. As Castro put it, “Man comes from capitalism full of selfishness; man is educated under capitalism amidst the most vicious selfishness as an enemy of other men, as a wolf to other men.” But the Cuban leaders were also confident in human malleability and perfectibility. As Guevara once put it, “I believe the simplest way is to acknowledge his unfinished nature. He is an unfinished product.” Castro was even more optimistic: Gabriel García Márquez, the Columbian novelist and a close friend of Castro, once said that “He has the nearly mystical conviction that the greatest achievement of the human being is the proper formation of conscience and that moral incentives, rather than material ones, are capable of changing the world and moving history forward.”

Especially after the revolution was officially declared to be Marxist in the spring of 1961, it became clear that reshaping Cuban national character was to be conducted by bringing the people, the younger generation in particular, up to the level of socialist and communist morals. Like the Chinese, the Cubans transplanted organizations, institutions and practices created in the Soviet Union to educate the whole population with Marxist ideology. But as the Cuban leaders intensified their efforts to establish socialism in a relatively short time, they began increasingly to feel the confines of their material foundations: lack of industry, capital, and technology. Therefore the Soviet model of economic development, emphasizing material rewards in stimulating economic construction, posed a dilemma to the Cubans: should they adopt similar policies at the risk of compromising their goal of the new man? Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, the president of the state, noted in a critical tone that “Ever since 1962 . . . Russians have spoken less and
less of communism and more and more of profits and the restoration of
market mechanism.”

The confusion and tension were reflected in the “great debate,” a
response to the Soviet discussion on Liebermanism in the first half of
the 1960s, which divided Cuban leaders into two camps. On the one
side were those who persisted with “moral incentives,” led by Guevara,
for whom revolutionary consciousness was too dear to be mixed
up with noncommunist motives. On the other side were leaders of
agriculture and foreign trade, who argued for the necessity of adopting
limited “material incentives” to stimulate production at the current
developmental stage. The debate was halted 1965 by Castro, who was
sympathetic to moral incentives but was worried about the damage the
debate could have brought to the party’s unity.

Although no one won the debate, in practice moral incentives were
more acclaimed and implemented than material ones. Volunteer work
and socialist competition were organized as government-supervised
campaigns and individual workers, office staffs, students, teaching
faculties, and even soldiers were asked to sacrifice their weekends.
Cuba’s education went through transformation after the revolution,
aimed at eliminating distinctions between education and production,
and between school and society, in order to bring up new generations
of “all-round” socialist laborers, instead of intellectuals, bureaucrats,
and technocrats—as the Soviet system produced. The government
established numerous boarding schools in the countryside to replace
day schools in cities, and work-study programs to replace full-time
institutions.

As in China, model emulation was a main approach in Cuba’s new-
man project. The most outstanding collective model was the Isle of
Youth, located 60 miles off the Cuban coast. In 1966, approved by
Castro, the island was handed over to the Young Communist League to
create a model community for future Cuban society. Within a couple of
years, more than 50,000 young people settled down on the island, with
citrus and cattle as their main products. On this island, the communist
principle of “from each according to his ability, to each according to
his needs” was put into practice. Most consumer goods, including
housing, were free. Money was almost useless, except for recreation
and entertainment. According to one official description, on the
island, “each man makes his daily contribution without watching
the clock.” The exemplary lifestyle on the island was not only for domestic emulation, but also served as a showcase of Cuban communism for foreign visitors. Pinares de Mayari, a mining area, was another example of a collective model developed in the mid 1960s. About 7,000 volunteers, most of them women, lived and worked in accordance with communist principles with free food, clothing, and housing. In addition to these settlement models, there were numerous mobile models, most of which were in the semi-military form of “brigades,” serving as vanguard work units and sent to wherever work conditions were difficult or manpower was in demand. The “Youth of Steel” Brigade, for example, was formed in 1966 by 700 university students and 300 professors, to build coffee plantations and highway systems. It was reported that, in the breaks, as they lay on the ground “under a warm sun, the students review their lessons.” Therefore the brigade was also regarded as an example of higher-education reform.

As in China, Cuban models for individuals were revolutionary martyrs and exemplary workers. The most venerated model was Che Guevara himself. Guevara’s commitment to the new man was legendary even when he was alive. He was the director of the Cuban National Bank and the Ministry of Industry at the same time, but he refused to accept the salary for the former ($1,000 per month) and just had the one for the latter ($200 per month). He never abused his privileges, declining to allow his family to use his government car, even when his children were in medical emergency. Ultimately in 1965 he resigned his position, going back to battlefields, and died in Bolivia. Guevara was disappointed that Cuban workers were not as enthusiastic as he hoped in turning themselves into the new man, and he became skeptical about the feasibility of creating the new man in peacetime. His resignation and ultimate sacrifice can be interpreted as his last effort to enhance the awareness of creating the new man under extraordinary circumstances. After Guevara’s death, his legend was used by the regime to educate the people on how to be a new man. As Castro urged the Cuban youth, “let them all become Che.”

The 1960s witnessed a steady escalation of revolutionary militancy as the regime intensified its efforts aiming at creating the new man, and climaxed in the “Revolutionary Offensive,” from 1968 to 1970. The Revolutionary Offensive came with an economic goal—to bolster sugar
production from six or seven million tons on average to 10 million tons. But the underpinning of the campaign was by no means economic. Castro’s more profound concern was to galvanize the people with a tangible material goal, and in the course of the campaign the people would be mobilized to the fullest and organized in a military manner. This mobilization would help create an atmosphere of state emergency and clear out all undesirable environmental factors corrupting Cuban people and impeding the growth of the new man.

The campaign started in mid-March of 1968 with the elimination of street venders: they were denounced as social “worms” and were blamed for distracting workers from their regular obligation and causing delinquency. In the meantime, the old debate on “incentives” was renovated with the triumph of moral incentives over material rewards. Castro linked the debate to his faith in the new man. “If it is admitted that man is incapable of learning, of developing conciencia, then those brainy economists will be proven right: the revolution will fail.”

Elimination of street venders and reiteration of moral incentive paved the way for the next step: large-scale relocation and militarization of the whole population. Guevara once envisaged the necessity of militarization of the country in peacetime and regarded it as an effective way to create the environment for the new man. As he put it, “Society as a whole must become a huge school.” When the harvest season started in early summer, most urban dwellers—workers, cadres, all kinds of professionals, and students—were organized into “brigades” and deployed to cane fields. The whole country was mobilized to the fullest and put into a warlike situation: administrators and party secretaries were given military ranks and labor forces were organized into military units. In order to create a real wartime atmosphere and stimulate workers’ “battle spirit,” daily work began with the sound of combat alarm, and some factories at night were even blacked out for a while to create the effect of an air raid. Such regimentation was maintained for two years, until the summer of 1970, when Castro publicly acknowledged the failure of the goal of the ten-million ton sugar harvest.

**Global Responses to the Communist New Man**

In a century of social and spiritual crises in the West and of anxious search for expeditious paths to modernization and nation-building...
outside the West, the communist experiment of creating the new man had global repercussions. For those who became disillusioned about Western society, the communist new man stood in sharp contrast to their materially spoiled and spiritually unfilled countrymen. Ella Winter, an American journalist who visited the Soviet Union in the early 1930s, devoted a chapter in her book *Red Virtue* to “Designing the New Man.” In it she stated, “The new man is planned as the new society is projected.” Sidney and Beatrice Webb, the well-known British Fabian socialists, visited the Soviet Union in the mid-1930s and immediately published *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?* (The question mark was dropped in the second edition.) This book too has a long chapter on “The Remaking of Man.” The Webbs were impressed by Soviet leaders’ belief in the mutability of human nature and were thrilled by a slogan on the walls of the Moscow Sports Clubs: “We are not only rebuilding human society on an economic basis, we are mending the human race on scientific principles.”

In the 1960s and early 1970s, afflicted by various social and cultural problems, many intellectuals and social activists in the West were drawn to China and Cuba, seeking alternative societies with greater moral fiber. Arthur Galston, an American scientist, reflected that “Visiting China . . . reawakened some of my youthful idealism and made me question some of the deep-rooted cynicism prevalent in our society.” John K. Fairbank, the Harvard historian, assessed the Chinese revolution in the 1960s as “a far-reaching moral crusade to change the very human Chinese personality in the direction of the self-sacrifice and serving others.” Western visitors noticed that Chinese women showed little interest in fancy dresses and applied no make-up; even more so, as Orville Schell observed, “revolutionary attributes” had replaced physical ones in many women’s consideration for marriage partners. But such a moral achievement did not stand for itself. Rather, as Paul Hollander observed, for many Western visitors, it was a manifestation of “wholeness,” or “the sense of identity and community, meaning and purpose in life.”

A similar appreciation came from Western visits to Cuba. American political activist Huey Newton pointed out, “there you get this singleness of purpose, from the university to the cane field.” As Saul Landau put it, “Cuba is the first purposeful society that we have had in the Western hemisphere for many years.” The most impressive model of the new man, however, was that of the leaders themselves: young, energetic,
and charismatic. Jean-Paul Sartre concluded from his midnight conversations with Castro and Guevara that they were “night watchmen” whose dedication and tirelessness had overcome basic human needs. For him, Guevara was “the most complete man of this time.” Members of the Venceremos Brigade, an organization of American students and intellectuals who started visiting Cuba in the Revolutionary Offensive in search of political inspiration, were convinced that “Cuba is developing whole generations of Fidel. . . . We are now entering into the era of the true human history—the New Man.”

The communist new man was also an inspiration for the Third World leaders, especially in the Africa of the 1960s. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, a key representative of the first generation of the leadership in the continent, contrasted the behavior of Tanzanian students trained in the West and the East (referring to the socialist countries). He concluded that “the West is too individualistic” and all the textbooks “talk about rights, rights, rights, and no duties,” while “the Eastern countries have African needs: a stress on duty.” As Nyerere made inspection tours to the construction sites of the Tan-Zan Railway and other China-supported projects, he was impressed by the enthusiasm and efficiency the Chinese workers and technicians demonstrated, in an apparent contrast to his own people’s attitude toward the work. He reaffirmed this view in two visits to China: “On my first visit I said in Shanghai, after I had witnessed the revolutionary spirit of the Chinese people . . . I wished all the people of Tanzania could come to China and witness for themselves what a determined people can do.” In line with Nyerere’s view The Nationalist, the Tanzanian government newspaper, claimed that “we would like to ask the people of the entire world to do a little more serious soul searching about the People’s Republic of China.”

Conclusions

The sources and the impacts of the communist experiment of creating the new man are of world historical importance. The belief in human malleability and perfectibility, the philosophical premise of the communist experiment, was deeply rooted in various cultural traditions, but only in modern times was it transfused with ideology and put into practice by political power. The intensity and endurance of the efforts to change human nature in communist regimes reveal an aspiration—the fanaticism of moral crusade—that cannot be fully understood within
a “socialism versus capitalism” framework. The moral and spiritual qualities of the communist new man were sympathetically echoed worldwide, as opposed to egocentric and materialistic characteristics resulting from modernization.

The communist experiments of remaking people failed to achieve the desired goals, as became evident in the fundamental policy reversals in the former Soviet Union, China, and even to some extent in today’s Cuba. In assessing such experiments, therefore, it is off-target to debate whether human nature is malleable or perfectible to the extent desired by those social engineers. Rather, what should be discussed in the first place is whether such morally-driven social engineering is moral itself.

Notes


3 For example, see Zev M. Trachtenberg, Making Citizens: Rousseau’s Political Theory of Culture (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993).


5 Mona Ozouf, Festivals and the French Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 198. Such festivals and rituals include parades, gatherings, speeches, songs, music, collective recitation of the Declaration of the Rights of Men, burning or venerating symbols, etc.


9 Dmitri Volkogonov, Lenin: A New Biography (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 20. In the Soviet years the book was officially listed as the one most recommended for students and was translated into many languages in the socialist camp.

10 Leon Trotsky, Leon Trotsky on Literature and Art (New York: Pathfinder
The Soviet economist Lieberman gained brief prominence in the early 1960s for promoting market reforms within the Soviet system of central planning.

Great Learning, one of the Four Classics of Confucianism, states: “When the ruler, as a father, a son, and a brother is a good model, then the people limit.”


“Going to the People” was a Russian revolutionary campaign of the 1870s.

Hughes, The Great Learning, 435.


Lei, Diary, 96.

Sheldon B. Liss, Roots of Revolution: Radical Thought in Cuba (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 40–41.


Ernesto Guevara, Man and Socialism, 338.


Granma Weekly Review (Havana), 23 March 1968.

Bernard, Theory of Moral Incentives, 125.


Paul Hollander, Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the


38 Yu, China and Tanzania, 96.

39 Maurice Meisner, when he was making connections between the Russian intelligentsia and the Bolsheviks as well as the Chinese communists, pointed out the world-historical significance of this new type of revolutionary. According to Meisner, these ‘‘new men’’ were an elite of young intellectuals who were capable of imposing their socialist consciousness on the historical reality and providing guidance for the masses. . . . The ‘new men’ of the intelligentsia were to be only catalytic agents in a revolutionary process in which all would become ‘new men’ in a new and just society.” Maurice Meisner, Marxism, Maoism, and Utopianism: Eight Essays (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 83.

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In April of 2004 there gathered in Boston a group of two hundred people devoted to the study of world history: university faculty members, graduate students, teachers at all levels of education, and professionals in publication and testing. This was one of a growing number of meetings of people seeking to advance the study of global perspectives on the past—meetings of the World Historical Association and its regional affiliates, sessions of the American Historical Association and the Historical Society in the U.S., meetings of historians in several other countries, and meetings of teachers and other scholars in the humanities and social sciences. Participants in these meetings share an interest in strengthening the formal study of the human social order over time, in global and interconnected terms. The call for papers to the Boston conference gave emphasis not simply to the study and teaching of world history, but to the problem of creating institutions for research and advanced study of world history. As individuals, these scholars and teachers have made efforts to document and analyze global patterns in history. But while their numbers have grown steadily, they still find repeatedly that the academic world around them gives low priority to studies of the past in global framework.

World history is on the horns of a dilemma. On one hand, global historical studies are revolutionizing the understanding of the human past. Here are two examples. Geneticists are demonstrating that humans are very closely related to each other, that our ancestors emerged in
eastern Africa some 200,000 years ago, and that humans have a consistent pattern of biological mixing since then. It will be up to historians to square our newly confirmed genetic unity with the beliefs of recent centuries in racial distinctiveness and racial hierarchy. For more recent times, historians have led in identifying the unity of global economic systems since the sixteenth century and the suddenness of the Great Divergence, in which North Atlantic economies shot ahead of the rest of the world at some time in the nineteenth century, so that historians must now rewrite the balance of world regions in modern times.²

On the other hand world history, despite its accomplishments, has not become a priority for historians, for social scientists, or funding agencies. Academic priorities leave world history as a curiosity, a set of topics for tinkering by individual scholars, and not a terrain of broad relevance meriting coordinated investigation with substantial resources.

My purpose here is to address the growing community of world historians with an exploration of this dilemma in study of world history, looking back over the past ten years and forward for the next decade. I review and even celebrate the activities of the past decade; I offer predictions on the dilemmas and directions of the next decade, and some suggestions on what historians, as individuals and in groups, can do to influence the direction of our field. In my opinion, if we world historians succeed in creating strong institutions for research and study in our field, we can speed the creation of an improved, multidimensional, and interactive understanding of human society. If we fail to create such institutions, world history will remain frozen at the level of an overstuffed classroom experience and an arena for amateur speculations by gadflies at the margins of a global society that believes it has no past. I think it is probable that world history will reach its potential of becoming a substantial field of global knowledge. But I also think it is possible that world history might fail to advance significantly, and leave humanity without a sophisticated, planet-wide analysis of its past.

The Last Ten Years of Building World-historical Studies

I begin with a personal approach to building world history, because that is the story I know best. In the fall of 1994 the PhD program in history at Northeastern, with its emphasis on world history as a primary field, welcomed its first three students. At the same time the World
History Center was formally proposed and informally launched, through its hosting of an NEH-supported program of lectures and workshops in world history, with Alfred Crosby as convenor. Formal recognition of the center by the university required a four-year wait.

The program’s first success was that of staying alive for ten years. It brought in an average of three PhD students for each of the first seven years and kept most of them. Faculty, graduate students, and project employees designed, researched, and completed an instructional CD-ROM on migration in world history. Through the World History Seminar, over 70 public presentations were held over the course of ten years. In graduate instruction, faculty and students made progress in figuring out a way to balance and order a mix of global, area-studies, and multidisciplinary aspects of a PhD curriculum. The students completed PhDs and got tenure-track jobs in history departments, an achievement of particular significance. Faculty, teachers, and students created a World History Resource Center and through it provided programs of professional development for hundreds of teachers locally and nationally. The World History Center hosted the millennial WHA conference in Boston on the Northeastern University campus, and hosted four professional-development Symposia in association with other New England organizations. The sum total of these activities brought in over two million dollars in external funding.

The obstacles encountered in the course of this work, however, were numerous and sufficient to restrain the program seriously. The hope of building a faculty strong in world history turned out to be illusory. The list of distinguished world historians ready to accept appointments at Northeastern included Andre Gunder Frank, Alfred Crosby, Ross Dunn, Xinru Liu, Lauren Benton, and Maghan Keita. But a combination of university budget cuts, administrative disregard for history, and tepid interest in world history by department members with other priorities on their mind left the Northeastern department without these famed historians. Other candidates, notably in Middle East history and a departmental chair candidate, successfully sought offers from Northeastern for the purpose of getting counter-offers elsewhere. Inter-campus bargaining gave these candidates nice raises and left the Northeastern program with no gain. Fortunately the Northeastern program was able to have Adam McKeown as assistant professor from 1998 to 2001.

Meanwhile, the administration declined to provide any ongoing
support for the World History Center. The university president proposed to close the doctoral program in 1997 and the university administration imposed five graduate reviews on the department in ten years. The Education School, transfixed by math and science, could never cooperate effectively in preparing teachers of world history. The Massachusetts State Department of Education lost interest in world history after three years. The World History Center applied twice to the World History Association for recognition as an affiliated organization, and the proposal was declined in each case. Inside the department, jealousies and turf battles became more serious as university disinterest became manifest. The creation of a new doctoral program was proved feasible, but the institutions of the graduate committee, with its tasks of recruiting, record-keeping, fellowship allocation, mentoring, and placement, never became strong or stable.

In late 2002, with a history faculty that had fallen from 19 to 12, with only one world historian, and no support for the World History Center, I exercised my option as center director and decided that the center should close rather than continue in an impaired state, and so informed the dean. Ironically Northeastern awarded two world history PhDs in 2003 and awarded five degrees in 2004, the fruit of earlier investment in these students. The PhD program remains in place, but on a smaller scale than before.

**The field of world history in the U.S.** For the U.S. as a whole, the success of the *Journal of World History* brought the convening of annual conferences of the WHA starting 1992. The National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) responded to a range of local proposals and provided substantial funding for teaching world history, especially at the collegiate level. H-WORLD, the online discussion group through H-Net, came online at the end of August 1994. Very soon thereafter, the National Standards in world history were published along with those in U.S. history. The storm of debate thereafter, while apparently threatening, did not halt and may even have furthered the expansion of world history as a field of study in U.S. high schools in the late 1990s. This implementation of world history curricula was the biggest change in secondary education during the 1990s.

The WHA held its first conference outside the U.S. in 1995, in Florence. The Northeastern PhD program joined those of Hawaii, Rutgers, and Ohio State, and was followed by programs at a growing
number of institutions. Book publication in world history has expanded dramatically, with series from M. E. Sharpe, Cambridge, McGraw-Hill, Routledge, Hawaii, and others. The AP World History course held its first exam in 2002, the largest new AP course ever. Among new journals are the online *World History Connected* and the forthcoming *Journal of Global History*. The *American Historical Review* opened a section on global history in its book reviews. The AHA Nominating Committee took the important step of including world history in its rotation of fields for the first time in twenty years, so that Howard Spodek and I were nominated in 2003 as candidates for vice president of the Teaching Division.

Yet the expansion of world history in the U.S. has been no less problematic than was the case at my home institution. University programs emphasizing world history have come and gone over the years. Wisconsin, Chicago, Northwestern, Johns Hopkins, and other programs in the past had some years of activity in world history and then declined. The World History Association maintains itself, maintains its affiliation with the AHA, and maintains relations with the National Council of Social Studies (NCSS), but has been otherwise unable to do outreach to other organizations. The WHA has not been a member of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS), or the National Coalition for History (the historians’ advocacy group). World historians, though believers in interdisciplinary study, have no formal ties with area studies associations or disciplinary associations outside history. Formal preparation for teachers of world history exists only at a few institutions. At the graduate level, there exists no high-level research center with an array of faculty resources and research materials. Area-studies programs support language training for their students; no such encouragement for language study exists for students of world history. Neither is there any formal system for disciplinary training or field work for graduate students in world history. While there is a cosmopolitan dimension to the community of world historians, the formal discourse in world history is English-only, and includes no clear ways to link it to discussion in other languages.

Part of the peculiarity in the development of world history is that, because of its generality, it has no clear social or economic constituency. Where national, ethnic, or gendered histories draw ready interest from the groups concerned, and while economic interests support studies in
chemical or medical history, world history gains support from world historians. This organizational characteristic, which may have strengths as well as weaknesses, will not go away, and I think it is important to study its implications for academic politics.

**Academia in U.S.** Now I expand my narrative to the next level of breadth, academic life generally in the U.S. Here there have been many changes of benefit for world history in the past ten years. World history has been accepted as a major teaching field, if not as a research field. Historians have turned to work that crosses frontiers of every sort, and in other fields, trans-disciplinary research has grown in importance. The American Historical Association has conducted four major conferences, two for researchers and two for community college teachers, on connections in history and the humanities. Further, the AHA’s major review of graduate education promises to strengthen graduate education generally, and is giving substantial attention to world history. In sum, the excitement brought by all the new knowledge appearing in so many fields leads, at a certain point, to recognition that the new knowledge has a temporal dimension, and in that regard it brings further expansion of historical studies. There is an opportunity for world historians to lead in coordinating and theorizing this new knowledge.

On the other hand, the near total lack of institutional support for world history remains a crippling restraint. Much of the void in institutional support has to do with the lack of regard for history as a research field. In many universities, selected historians ascend to high office in the administration because of their individual dedication, organizational and communication skills. But history departments do not receive and often do not request resources for expanded research. Historians, working as individuals in archives, are themselves partly responsible for this reputation: they ask only for a few travel dollars, and produce book after book of worthy research and interpretation. But for the work of preparing data on the history of the world, anyone can see that it would take substantial funding.

Historians may appeal for individual research or travel awards through the National Endowment for the Humanities or Fulbright. Historians (but not world historians) have done well with the individual-level MacArthur awards. The Social Science Research Council’s “international” dissertation fellowship competition makes awards almost exclusively to area-studies candidates working on small-scale
In the rare cases where a university administration is willing to seek external funds for history, historians have been able to win NEH Challenge Grants, providing endowments as high as $5 million that generated an annual income stream reaching $50,000 per year in the times of high interest rates. The money for larger research teams, however, comes from the National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and major private foundations, which rarely support history. Further, the system of peer review at NSF, organized by discipline, means that to obtain funding historians have to gain the approval of sociologists, economists, or geographers over projects from their own discipline. This structure crowds out new fields or those making connections across fields. Some new fields have been able to gain a place at the NSF table—behavioral neuroscience, for instance—but not world history.

Much of the problem in gaining access to research funding for world history lies in the inactivity of world historians in seeking support. But to the degree that world historians get active, they encounter formidable obstacles—within their departments, within their universities, and within the institutions that allocate support for research. World historians need to analyze the global system of research and research support, in order to understand how to find resources to advance their work.

Academia globally. University systems are growing and strengthening in prosperous areas of the planet: the universities of the European Union and China stand out in this regard. The expansion of electronic communication has been of immense importance in setting up long-distance links among scholars, and has enabled some otherwise isolated scholars to become productive and even central figures. Even in regions living with modest growth or fiscal stringency, the numbers of universities and students if not their budgets have grown significantly. The universities of Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and the Arabic-language universities are of particular interest in this regard. UNESCO, itself seriously underfunded because of great-power rivalries, remains nonetheless the most central organ of international dialogue in the social sciences and humanities.

Yet there is hardly the beginning of an international consortium of scholars or universities in the study of world history. The lack of structure for any multilingual discourse in world history restrains the breadth of analysis and understanding among English-speakers as among all others.
I have emphasized pessimism as much as optimism in this report. On one hand, powerful forces are creating the new knowledge that is taking the form of world history. On the other hand, society’s members and leaders have power to marginalize global knowledge and restrict their view of the past to bite-size pieces. How is one to resolve the dilemma?

Well, we could just wait to see what happens. Or we could apply our intellectual skills to resolving it. I favor putting our minds and our shoulders to the issue in two ways. First is conceptualizing the global patterns in the world along with developing a system for studying them. Second is doing the organizational work of building institutions and alliances that will enable world-historical studies to thrive. I turn now to each of these, and argue that an emphasis on graduate education provides the most effective way to link the two and resolve the dilemma in favor of encouraging the expansion of learning about global historical patterns.

**Conceptual challenges.** I begin to address the conceptual challenges of global thinking with that most basic of world-historical insights: that one should look across the boundaries within human society to understand more of the past. If the insight is fundamental to interpretive strategy, much of its value leads to incremental rather than fundamental changes in our view of history. U.S. historians are becoming cosmopolitan enough to recognize that the French and Spanish Louisiana colony should be seen as part of the early history of what became the U.S., but many still decline to consider the global patterns in silver trade, sugar trade, emancipation, and imperial rivalries that conditioned the Louisiana Purchase. As in U.S. history, so also are historians of China now reformulating the history of the Middle Kingdom to show it as part of the world. Of these incremental yet significant additions to breadth in our interpretations of the past, one may ask how many are provided by world historians, and how many are emerging regardless of the efforts of world historians.

More basically, one may ask: how much should one focus on incremental changes, and how much on a major overhaul of world historical interpretation? The understanding of human evolution and human occupation of the earth, and of the early modern global economy and the subsequent Great Divergence, require conceptualization on a different scale. To imagine the possibility of a major overhaul of world
historical studies, one needs to develop and debate typologies of world history. The debates of the recent H-WORLD Forum centering on my *Navigating World History* convinced me of that. Here is a start.

Spatial analysis of historical connections is complex enough: it addresses large regions and small, regional comparisons and interactions, and patterns of the global space. Along the **axis of space** world historians have long since joined the debate of national vs. global frameworks for history, and we are beginning to address more explicitly the linkages of global and local. Space, however, is only one dimension of the issues to be considered by world historians. Alongside the complex dimension of space one must consider the dimensions of time and topical breadth, each with its complexities. Along the **axis of time**, world historians are beginning to develop long-term interpretations of historic change, and are working up to a critique of the overwhelming focus of existing historiography on the past two centuries. The group that calls itself “global historians” seeks to address the future, and to use the dramatic transformations of the present as the measuring rod for historical studies. Along the **axis of topical breadth**, we face the question of which topics to emphasize (from cultural to geological) and which disciplines to use and combine in exploring them. The three dimensions or axes of space, time, and topical breadth make explicit the
immense potential range of world historical studies. Summarizing to this point, there is a growing understanding that the “global” in global history means not just the range of regions, but the range of time frames and the range of topical emphases and interactions.

But there exist at least three more dimensions to world historical study, each involving a roughly equivalent level of complexity and analytical choices. The fourth dimension is the overall scale of analysis, from short-term and local to long-term and planetary, with many possibilities in between. Even studies in Big History shift their scale: from treating the whole cosmos to analyzing a single planet for a mere century. The fifth dimension is that of the philosophy of the analyst, where one encounters approaches ranging from materialist to idealist, positivist to post-modern, empiricist to theoretical, and secular to spiritual. Will one approach win out? We cannot yet see whether we are headed toward philosophical coherence or cacophony, but we certainly need to sharpen our minds, our vocabularies, and our abilities to hear each other to be ready for the next decade’s work on the philosophy of world history. Within this dimension lie the questions arising from Benedetto Croce and Antonio Gramsci on whether world historians are creating a vision of global citizenship that produces obedience to certain interests. The sixth dimension to historical analysis is that of
verification. It is difficult enough to develop a historical interpretation at global scale, but readers will remain skeptical of conclusions until they see confirmation of the logical consistency and empirical documentation of the argument, along with a demonstration (according to a defined logic) that the argument is a more effective explanation than alternative interpretations.  

These six dimensions are too many to keep in mind at once, but one cannot arbitrarily drop most of them. We need to find ways to simplify our analysis, yet maintain contact with the global. For instance, David Christian recently offered a simple, one-dimensional index of the degree of globality of an author’s approach: an index ranging from zero to ten. Another simplification would distinguish horizontal approaches to world history (linking regions or comparing time periods) from vertical approaches (linking local to global). Or one could categorize world historical studies into those at local levels, the intersocietal level, the species level, and the maximal or big-historical level. World historians must choose repeatedly whether to emphasize comprehensiveness or seek to find the key simplifications that render a complex world understandable. While I love elegant simplifications of big problems when they show up, I think that the basic skill of the world historian is practice in keeping all the major aspects of a problem in mind.

Reflection on the elements of this typology—on the several dimensions of world history—may bring exciting discoveries about world history, discoveries that will make us think much differently about ourselves and the possibilities that we face. As candidates for elegant simplifications or discoveries in world history, I offer four arguments from my recently completed survey of human migration. They felt to me like an enticing hint into the frameworks and results that can emerge from studies of world history. First, the communities of early Homo sapiens can be interpreted not as isolated bands of a couple dozen people, but as language communities encompassing several hundred people who sustained regular communication with each other. Second, migration can be treated as a human instinct to the extent that, with the existence of language communities, a certain number of people in each generation moved from one language community to another, and learned the language and customs of their destination community. Third, the individual and social learning generated by such migration may account for much of the flexibility and adaptability that characterizes humans in contrast to all other mammals, and suggests that both migration and social learning have been central to our habits since the African Eve. Fourth, the
evidence of language gives independent and perhaps decisive information on the paths taken by humans crossing the continents and occupying the planet.25 These four generalizations, while arguably providing the basis for a long-term interpretation of human migratory processes, must nevertheless be developed in considerable complexity and comprehensiveness before the world historian is done with them.

Debating the typology of world history will help us not only to develop new interpretations of history but also to make decisions on the direction of the field. Should we emphasize a major overhaul of world historical studies or give priority to incremental changes in the field? Should world historians label their research enterprise as “global studies” rather than “world history,” to get in touch with other disciplines and escape the isolation and underfunding of historians? The danger would be that of separating ourselves from the millions of students in courses on world history. Should we emphasize the subfields of world history? If so, how should we define the subfields of world history: by discipline, by time period, by scale, or otherwise? While comparative studies of nations or empires differ greatly from planetary studies of culture or ecology, world historians are a small community, and recognizing subfields risks decreasing their influence.

**Organizational challenges.** The organizational challenges to be faced in building world history are imposing. One major function of historical studies is to help members of society to understand social relations in the setting of the human environment. Our social leaders persist, however, in thinking that there exists one world in physical terms, but many separate worlds in social terms: physics, geology, and biology are global, but we have American history, Chinese literature, and anthropology for indigenous peoples. Globalization studies of short time-frame will provide some insights, but will fail to identify long-term patterns of continuity and change. When world historical insights are seen as a positive result of recent analysis, these benefits are seen as materializing without cost. In short, investment in a well-organized, long-term analysis of human society is given the lowest priority by those who see history as a way to celebrate the past but not to analyze it. The willingness of the U.S. Congress to put unprecedented though still small amounts of money—over $100 million in each of the last five years—into teaching American history (or sometimes “traditional American history”) shows how clearly history is pictured as an exercise in belief rather than in knowledge.26 Even UNESCO, with its global heritage sites, foregrounds the celebration of the past rather than analyzing it.27
An example of the continuing dilemma of funding world history emerged at the Boston conference of April 2004, through the failure of an attempt to organize a panel on research funding. Beginning in December 2003, I invited representatives from major funding institutions to a panel on the question of how a rising field can work to obtain research funding. I wrote and called to NEH, NSF, SSRC, the American Council of Learned Societies, Ford Foundation, Carnegie Foundation, and Spencer Foundations. Only NEH responded with interest, and was too short on funds to allow a representative to come. The session had to be cancelled. This for a research-agenda conference with 190 participants, sponsored by the World History Association and the American Historical Association.

What will it take to build up world-historical studies as a rigorous, collaborative, successful field of research, able to support teaching at a high level? What will it take for this promising field of study to gain substantial research funding? The strategic choices we face, in trying to build world-historical studies, may be categorized into patient and impatient approaches, and into individual and collaborative approaches, using individual resources or based on external funding.

There is the patient work of individual analysts, slowly learning global insights out of regional training. That is the main way in which the literature on world history has developed. World historians have lost an immense amount of time, however, as each writer has had to reinvent basic principles of global analysis. On the other hand, we have by no means exhausted the benefits that will come from this approach—the recent AHA conferences on Connections and Seascapes show how much wonderful insight comes from self-trained world historians.28 Then there are the impatient plans of public officials to impose a world-history curriculum throughout school systems, without planning or professional development. By hurrying and cutting corners they have saddled most students of world history with inadequate course materials and unprepared teachers. So the question of where to apply patience and where to apply impatience in the development of world history is most complex. My own approach is to suggest impatience with creation of the basic outlook of the world historian and the basic institutions for study of world history, and patience with the development of insights and results within the structure of those ideas and institutions.

For instance, there still has been no definitive step taken toward investing in a world history faculty or in training students or providing research funds
in world history, although some promising steps are now being taken, as I will indicate later on. Yet I recommend strategic impatience with this state of affairs, and insistence that world history be recognized as a research field, and rapidly so. On the other hand, for those of our students and colleagues who have taken on world history as an area of serious interest, I counsel patience in allowing them to pursue their studies and develop their ideas, rather than have short-term battles about what is precisely the right way to analyze world history.

Overall, I favor a mix of conceptual and organizational work to shore up a basic focus on research and teaching. One can be certain that world history, however fascinating, will remain a complex and challenging arena of study, so that we cannot plan on making definitive breakthroughs any more than we can plan on working within massive research centers. There will be no Watson and Crick to discover the double helix for world history. Instead, world historians will have to develop new and more complex metaphors for discovery. We will need to demonstrate the worth of incremental advance in multiple areas of knowledge at the same time. If world historians can demonstrate that problems in world history are of broad intellectual and social significance and achieve significant research results addressing these problems, then a determined organizational effort to gather support for such research will probably meet with success.

Time is on the side of expanded attention to world history. But some timepieces do not budge until pushed.

The Next Ten Years: Dreams, Predictions, and Suggestions

Making predictions and recommendations is risky, but it is a way to test the logic and the specifics of one’s analysis. In this third section of my review of the field of world history, I offer projections on the number and type of doctoral degrees in world history to be completed in the next ten years. I expect a hiatus in the development of new scholars in world history, but I also expect that growing international linkages of world history programs will ultimately overcome the current blockages to the development of world history as a thriving research field. In the meantime I offer suggestions on how individuals can advance their skills in world history in and out of formal programs.

World history in U.S. In my opinion, the single most important task in the advancement of world historical studies is the training of specialist world historians at the doctoral level. I am trying to draw boundaries across the fuzzy landscape of higher education to distinguish three groups: those
with formal specialization in world history as a major field (with four or more graduate courses in world history plus supplemental courses in regional history and interdisciplinary studies); those with formal training in world history as a minor field (who have one or two graduate courses in world history plus course work in their major field); and those without formal training in world history who have read actively on their own. In the ten years from 1994 to 2004, as I estimate it in Table 1, 17 PhDs were awarded in the U.S. to majors in world history, 12 of them at Northeastern.

Table 1. Estimated Past and Future PhDs in World History from U.S. institutions, 1994-2014

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<th>World History Specialists</th>
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1994-2004 Total Specialists: 17 Total Minor Field: 16

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2004-14 Total Specialists: 26 Total Minor Field: 38
There may be more from other institutions than I know about, but other institutions have been extraordinarily shy in identifying world history as the major field of their PhDs. I am guessing that a roughly equal number of PhDs with minors in world history were granted in the past decade, for instance from Rutgers University.29

At the current modest rate of expansion, I estimate a 50% increase in the next decade: that the new programs of universities in the U.S. will produce another 26 PhDs with majors in world history in the ten years from 2004 to 2014. The creation of new programs in world history at institutions with no more than one or two specialized world history faculty members leads me to expect that most of their graduates will have PhDs with world history as a minor field. I expect that they may produce about 38 additional PhDs with minor fields in world history. Assuming that all of these gain and keep employment as world historians (whether in universities or beyond), the total number of degree-qualified world historians would rise from 17 specialists and 33 total in 2004 to 43 specialists and 97 total in 2014. I expect that most publication in world history by junior scholars will come from those with specialization in world history rather than from those with minor fields in world history. That means that the 43 specialized world historians as of 2014 will publish most of the new research in the field by junior scholars for the following ten years, up to 2024. This small group will remain a fraction of one percent of the roughly eight thousand history PhDs completed in each decade in the U.S.31

Perhaps in the following decade, ending up in 2024, there will be a more significant number of world history PhDs. If substantial PhD programs specializing in world history form and expand in the years from 2008 to 2018, they should produce increased numbers of world history PhDs in the period from 2014 to 2024. At the most optimistic we might hope for 80 specialized world history doctorates to be granted in that decade, giving us a total of 120 world-history specialists and perhaps twice that many with world history as a second field. That would at last be over one percent of all history PhDs, though not as much as one percent of practicing historians.

Of course there will be many more self-declared and self-trained world historians, among junior scholars and among maturing scholars whose interests broaden from their initial areas of emphasis. Doubtless some of them will become distinguished leaders in the field. But the
strength of the field will be limited by the number and the depth of those with the highest level of training. The smaller the number of world-history specialists, the slower world history will advance beyond its current, dominantly amateur, organization and discourse.

I do not mean to be disrespectful of the potential of self-trained world historians to make substantial contributions to the understanding of the global past. But neither do I want to underestimate the formative power of a doctoral education. When a doctoral candidate goes through coursework, exams, and a dissertation that puts top priority on understanding a national experience, or focusing on the early twentieth century, or privileging post-modern theory, or emphasis on political and economic factors rather than cultural factors, or focusing only on English-language literature—those priorities become habits. They become the lens through which the scholar views all subsequent academic issues.

Fortunately there is mid-life crisis, that revaluation of life’s direction that comes in the forties even to those who received their PhDs in their thirties. Mid-life revaluation is a time for significant rethinking—even revolutionary changes in outlook. But the scholar at mid-life generally does the reading and analysis informally and on a self-taught basis, rather than with the intensity of graduate school, so that new investments in study at mid-life do not match those of graduate school. In any case, what I am looking forward to is seeing the new perspectives that emerge from the mid-life crises of scholars who had specialized initially in world history.

I expect, therefore, that there will be a sort of hiatus in world historical research for the next decade. The field has advanced significantly based on the energies of those who have adopted world history in mid-life. I do not expect that the field will experience any further leap ahead until it is led by a significant number of scholars who are world historians from the start of their academic career. Once enough of the world-history specialists are tenured and publishing their second books, one may hope to see the strengthening of a high-level discourse based on new research into global patterns. That will take about twenty years from now.

**Academia in U.S.** To help us through this oncoming hiatus, here are two institutions on which world historians may rely. The World History Network, created by the World History Center and supported by a grant from NEH, is a website intended to link as wide a range of world
historical activities as possible, both in research and teaching. At best, it will assist in knitting researchers and teachers in various regions of the world into a network able to strengthen the inquiry and exchange of ideas about world history. It includes, for instance, a registry of research in progress and of curriculum projects, reports on recent research, and links to resources on interdisciplinary research methods. But it cannot work for long as a volunteer structure, and will require ongoing funding to do its job well. Second, the World History Association formed in 2003 a Research Committee under the leadership of Jerry Bentley. Discussions leading up to the creation of this committee included such ideas as seeking post-doctoral fellowships to be associated with graduate programs in world history, holding agenda-setting conferences on world history, and encouraging other sorts of collaboration among institutions.

Academia in the U.S. does seem to be moving toward recognition of world history as a legitimate and significant field of study. The AHA’s co-sponsorship of the Boston conference of April 2004 was an unusually strong statement by an organization that grants few endorsements. Similarly, the AHA report on graduate education is an unusually energetic and well thought-out effort to advance the quality of doctoral studies and now of MA studies. The world-historical plank of the report was debated at length, and came out rather strong. At the same time the AHA has shown through its journal and its programs that history beyond the national paradigm is no monopoly of world historians.

Within the field of history, the next decade will see the establishment of patterns for world history appointments. Will world history be treated as another region? Will topical appointments in transnational subjects such as environmental history cause history departments to move away from the strictly geographical model of past appointments? Some departments, especially smaller ones, will hyphenate world historians with regional specializations. But if no major departments in the decade to come create positions specializing in world history, in one way or another, the university system will have confirmed the failure of world history to become a research field.

Yet another test comes in the area of research centers. In the U.S., where multidisciplinary centers—especially area-studies centers but also other multidisciplinary centers—have been spectacularly
successful producers of knowledge, the absence of any global studies centers giving significant attention to historical studies stands out like a sore thumb. The model is so clear and so well established that the absence of any significant centers is a clear statement that world history is seen as insignificant. The two centers that stand as counter-examples to my generalization are the Fernand Braudel Center at Binghamton, founded 1976, and the Institute for Research on World Systems at the University of California, Riverside, founded in 2000. Both are led by sociologists and have made major contributions to global studies. Neither has received large-scale funding or energetic collaboration from other disciplines. As an additional institution showing some promise, the University of California multicampus research group on world history has had several years of funding for regular meetings and some additional support.

Let us turn to the immediate future for U.S.-based doctoral programs in world history. The AHA online guide for 2004 listed 14 departments announcing programs leading to PhD degrees in world or global history. Of these, University of Hawaii, Washington State University and Northeastern University are the most likely to award degrees within the next two years; Washington State University, with about ten doctoral candidates specializing in world history, is currently the largest program. The History Department at New York University has gathered several leading historians with strong credentials in transnational history, but has chosen to restrict world history to the M.A. level, while emphasizing Atlantic history and African Diaspora history as doctoral fields. The University of California at Los Angeles has recruited a formidable array of world historians, but has yet to announce a structured, global program of graduate study. Columbia University, however, announced a new PhD track in International and Global History in 2004. Thus, it appears that a wave of doctoral programs in world history may arise by 2010, which may be able to produce as many as a dozen world history PhDs a year beginning 2015. That would be the end of the current hiatus.

Perhaps it is by going beyond the national perspective and emphasizing transnational academic connections that world history can make the most immediate progress as a research field.

*International discussion of world history.* International discussion of world history takes place through H-WORLD and other discussion lists, through print journals, through informal contacts, and through
the growing number of participating institutions. Nankai University in China and Osaka University in Japan have each renamed a department as the “Department of World History.” In each case a department was formed out of numerous historians with specializations outside of the home country; some department members have interest in world history as a discipline. At the London School of Economics, Patrick K. O’Brien has used his Centennial Professorship to build a faculty and an MSc concentration in global economic history. In addition, O’Brien led in obtaining a multi-year grant from the Leverhulme Foundation that is sponsoring ten conferences at cities around the world, gathering leading authorities on global economic history. In Japan, Shingo Minamizuka of Hosei University has led in the creation of the Research Institute for World History, an independent non-profit organization conducting world historical research. In addition, there are active groups at Macquarie University in Sydney, at Leipzig University, at Leiden University, at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, at the University of the Western Cape in Cape Town, and elsewhere. And, as noted earlier, the World History Network, Inc. was formed in 2004 in Boston as a nonprofit corporation intended to facilitate worldwide collaboration in world-historical research.

To restate this growing interest in world-historical research in terms of nations rather than institutions: among the nations with significant numbers of world historians and at least some institutional presence of world history, in addition to the U.S., are Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, India, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. There are other and smaller national groups, including individuals such as Victor Julius Ngoh, the Cameroonian scholar who has published at least two world histories in his own country.

The main international forum for discussing history is the International Congress of Historical Sciences, which meets every four years (2001 in Oslo, 2005 in Sydney). A complex and largely European-dominated process leads the ICHS, and it makes decisions slowly. I think it would make sense for world historians to make an organized effort to arrange the holding of sessions on world history at the 2009 meeting of ICHS, and if not then go all out for 2013. At the same time, the World History Association, along with other groups of globally oriented historians, should consider seriously whether to create an organization parallel to
ICHSA worldwide congress of world historians.

In addition to talking with each other at the transnational level, world historians may think of talking to transnational institutions and their leaders. UNESCO needs to have some formal connection to organized world historians. The private foundations of wealthy individuals and successful corporations are looking for worthy causes. Paul Keeler, in the U.K., succeeded in drawing on private and governmental interest in funding a historical presentation of connections across the Islamic world to build “The Golden Web,” and from that level extended his work to join in a much more comprehensive Electronic Cultural Atlas Initiative. My own grant-writing efforts included a search for funding for a world history databank, creating systematic social-scientific data for world regions over the past several centuries. The World Bank and other international organizations will ultimately see the need for investing in such research.

Recommendations for individuals. From the point of view of individual world historians, we do not know what will happen, and we cannot be sure that the world around us will shift its priorities to make world history a more central topic. In attempt to advance world historical study in this uncertain scholarly world the optimum approach, which I call Plan A, is for the individual world historian to work as part of a group. The alternative, Plan B, is for the individual to work effectively though alone.

Let me begin with faculty members able to work in pairs, teaching in programs where advanced students take one or two courses in world history in studying to be teachers of world history or PhD candidates with world history as a minor field. These faculty members, in association with colleagues in area-studies history and other disciplines, can hope to build an effective single-campus program. Such a program is in place at Rutgers, led by Michael Adas and Allen Howard. Arguably the teacher-preparation programs at California State University – Long Beach and San Diego State, at undergrad and MA levels, fit this category. In another such collaboration at Osaka University, Shigera Akita of the Department of World History and Kaoru Sugihara of the Department of Economics share a World History Seminar which brings speakers from Japan and overseas. These institutions have much to gain with collaboration among each other and with other institutions active in study of world history.
Then one can imagine faculty members in groups of four or more, whose students take four courses in world history along with regional and interdisciplinary courses and complete global dissertations to become specialists in world-historical research. So far it has proved virtually impossible to create groups of this size, and I think that only in exceptional circumstances can this vision reasonably be pursued on a single-campus model. The faculty members seeking to train world-history specialists will have to devote substantial energies to creating and sustaining linkages to other doctoral programs and to allies in other disciplines and to fund-raising. I do salute those senior scholars who are going back for another try at creating programs of world-historical research: Terry Burke at Santa Cruz, Zhang Weiwei at Nankai, Mathias Middell at Leipzig, and Patrick O’Brien and his colleagues at LSE. I hope we will soon learn how many such individuals need to be in regular contact before their efforts are sufficient to create programs effective in training of specialist world historians.

There are a few young scholars—notably Adam McKeown at Columbia, Marnie Hughes-Warrington at Macquarie, and Heather Streets at Washington State—who have focused on global issues from the beginning of their careers and who have gained secure bases at major universities where their colleagues are willing to go beyond toleration and provide active support for their work. Without assuming that they will be able to make the one-campus model work for world history where it has failed before, one must note the immense potential in prestige and productivity that can come from their work. Let me also note the energetic and effective work of Stephen Rapp at Georgia State, where the Program in World History and Cultures has potential to become a substantial research program, and of Kerry Ward at Rice, where plans for graduate study are developing with particular support from Gale Stokes.

Many other world historians must work as individuals, given institutional situations that do not enable them to work either with colleagues in world history or with advanced students in the field. For senior historians, whether still employed or in retirement, it is a question of whether the pens can still keep up with the minds, and if so then continuing to publish is as worthy as ever. William McNeill and Alfred Crosby provide examples of continuing output and new
ideas, book after book. I am not shy about stating my own views about such a path: my preference would be to work in a group of world-historical specialists, in research and graduate training, with adequate institutional support. But I do not control that choice, and my Plan B would be to emulate McNeill and Crosby and find a way to carry on individual research and writing.

For young scholars who are devoted to world history but who do not yet have the prime positions that guarantee them a smooth path, I do want to suggest some priorities. Publish—put out those pieces of research you have completed, large and small, and let them add to your own experience and the wider discourse. Conceptualize—think about the boundaries and shapes of world history, and ways to study and explain the patterns. Collaborate—learn how to work together, and how to get past the inevitable difficulties of sharing projects. Experiment with the various types and levels of collaboration, with old friends close to home and with new acquaintances far away. Travel—world history is more than travelogue, but the benefits of frequent and distant voyages should not be underestimated. Travel gives you new perspectives and new connections, and a fresh look at your home. Read—there is no way to read it all, but every bit of reading helps. Study languages by improving the languages you have and learning a new language every once in a while. Study new disciplines—there is no reason for your learning to be restricted to learning the next operating system on your computer. Better to take on a new social science or a new area of cultural studies, whether it is faddish or just conveniently at hand. And, of course, teach—teach as wide a range of courses in world history as possible. The exercise will do you good. Some balance of these activities will keep the world historian alert, perhaps even content, and ready to participate in any larger ventures in the field if and when such larger ventures coalesce.

Conclusion: A Potlatch for the Moment

I had really hoped, as late as the beginning of 2001, that the World History Center could have a continuing existence, and that I might avoid seeing yet another turn in the ten-year cycle of global study rising and then dissipating at an isolated institution. But when it was clear that Northeastern University would not have the resources or the faculty for a major center, my response was unhesitating: better to close the center and leave a memory of its vision than let it carry on as a parody of itself.
My decision came in the fall of 2001. Implementing this sunset took over two more years, because each of the responsibilities of the Center—to doctoral students, to funding agencies, to colleagues throughout the history profession—needed to be concluded in an orderly fashion. The idea of a ceremony to wrap it up, some upbeat statement about the future of the world-historical enterprise, came later.

The Boston conference on “World History: The Next Ten Years” was of course an academic meeting. In another way, however, the conference was a sort of academic potlatch. The term “potlatch” comes from the peoples of the Northwest Coast of North America and refers to “ceremonial distributions of property to guests specially invited,” often marked by carving of totem poles. Franz Boas of Columbia University, the founder of American professional anthropology, wrote of the potlatches of the Kwakiutl especially in his 1894 visit to their towns on Vancouver Island. It is a sensible ceremony.

Through hard work and good fortune, the associates of the World History Center had built up a substantial fund of resources and ideas over a decade: books, records of scores of teaching workshops, records of graduate courses, dozens of grant proposals, the collaborative experience of a score of world historians and another score of talented and imaginative center staff members. The Center even brought in some revenue from sale of the Migration CD. With the conference and its aftermath, the directors of the Center gave away as much as possible of its property as gifts to friends and associates, and carried on discussions about giving away the remainder. Rates for the conference were kept low, so that the Center gave away the last of its funds in bringing participants together for a discussion that was hoped to be productive. Food and drink were presented and consumed in profusion, to add to the quality of the celebration. The World History Center website became an archive at the end of June 2004 as the Center itself closed—the website remains online, but as a read-only site, not to be updated thereafter. It includes a totem pole on its home page, in memory of the occasion of the closing conference. The potlatch was so that participants would remember the occasion, and in hope that the gifts provided and the experience shared would provide all present with systematic encouragement to maintain their own energies in building this fascinating field of
study that is world history. The point was to enjoy the moment. Who could tell where we would all be in another ten years?

Notes

1 This chapter was delivered orally at the conference on “World History: The Next Ten Years” in Boston, March 13, 2004. It has been revised and updated since then. The references to the past decade and the next decade remain roughly appropriate and have not been changed.


3 These past activities of the World History Center are documented in its archival website, http://www.worldhistorycenter.org.

4 At the World History Association conference in June 2004, NEH staff member Judith Jeffrey Howard distributed a list of roughly 90 awards made by NEH since 1900 that had some connection to world history.


7 I was elected, and serve a three-year term, 2004–2006.

8 Studies in world history were carried out at the University of Wisconsin under Philip Curtin in the 1960s and 1970s; at the Johns Hopkins University under Philip Curtin from the late 1970s to the 1990s; at the University of Chicago under William McNeill and Marshall Hodgson in the 1960s, with McNeill continuing to the 1980s; and at Northwestern University under Leften Stavrianos in the 1960s and 1970s. In all these cases, the departure of the leading individual led to lapse of study in world history.

9 At latest report, officers of the WHA were discussing the possibility that the
organization might join the ACLS.

10 The AHA sponsored research conferences on “Interactions: Regional Studies, Global Processes, and Historical Analysis” (2001) and on “Seascapes, Littoral Cultures, and Trans-Oceanic Exchanges,” (2003); it sponsored summer seminars for community college faculty on “Explorations in Empire” (2001) and on “Trans-Oceanic Exchanges” (2003).


13 Hawaii Pacific University won a National Endowment for the Humanities Challenge Grant that helped to provide funding for an endowed faculty position in world history.

14 UNESCO contributions in world history include the selection of World Heritage sites (http://www.unesco.org), a web portal for archives: (http://www.unesco.org/webworld/portal_archives/pages/Archives/), and a web portal for libraries (http://www.unesco.org/webworld/portal_bib/Libraries/).

15 Some promising new developments are discussed below.

16 The H-WORLD electronic discussion list is formally open to submissions in any language, and in its early years included a few postings in French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and German. With time, however, its postings have been in English only, though bibliographical citations are occasionally in languages other than English.


21 See especially Manning, Navigating World History, 297–312.


24 Patrick Manning, “Patterns in Human Migration,” unpublished paper.


26 On Teaching American History grants, see the U.S. Department of Education

27 On UNESCO global heritage sites, see http://www.unesco.org.

28 See note 9 above.

29 Thanks to Allen Howard for the list of Rutgers PhDs with world history as a second field.

30 Columns 2 and 3 show PhDs with world history as major field awarded (to 2004) and projected (after 2004) from Northeastern University and from other U.S. institutions; totals are shown for the decades 1994–2004 and 2004–14. Columns 4 and 5 show PhDs with world history as a second field awarded (to 2004) and projected (after 2004) from Northeastern University and from other U.S. institutions; totals are shown for the decades 1994–2004 and 2004–14. Figures are approximations as I best surmise.


33 Bender et al., The Education of Historians; see also the report of the Committee on the Master’s Degree, on the AHA website, http://www.historians.org, by search or at http://www.historians.org/projects/cmd/Dustbin.pdf.

34 Of the main articles published in the American Historical Review in 2004, over 20% include a significant emphasis on world-historical perspectives, by my count.

35 The Fernand Braudel Center at Binghamton University is directed by Immanuel Wallerstein (http://fbc.binghamton.edu/); the Institute for Research on World-Systems at the University of California, Riverside is led by Christopher Chase-Dunn (http://www.irows.ucr.edu/).

36 This multicampus research group on world history has held regular meetings, though its results have not been made widely available; see http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucwhw/.

37 The AHA’s new and comprehensive online guide to PhD programs is available at http://www.historians.org.

38 Newly arrived at UCLA are Bin Wong, Sanjay Subrahmanyam, and Anthony Pagden. Other active researchers in world history in that department are Richard Von Glahn and Christopher Ehret. The University of Hawaii, similarly, has Jerry Bentley, David Chappell, and Herbert Ziegler as world history specialists and other faculty members with active interest in world history.

39 Zhang Weiwei and Chen Zhiqiang from Nankai attended the Boston conference in March 2004.

40 http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/economicHistory/GEHN.htm.


42 Key figures at these institutions include Marnie Hughes-Warrington and Adrian Carton at Macquarie, Pier Vries and Fred Spier at Leiden, Mathias Mittel at Leipzig, Diego Olstein at the Hebrew University, and Leslie Witz at
the University of the Western Cape. On the World History Network, see http://www.worldhistorynetwork.org, “about us.”


44 On the Electronic Cultural Atlas Project, see http://www.ecai.org/.


46 Visiting speakers address students and faculty in the Department of World History and then address a combined audience of historians and economists, thus emphasizing an interdisciplinary approach.

47 UCLA and Hawaii, as noted above, are potential exceptions, as is LSE in the field of global economic history.


50 Patrick Manning, project director, *Migration in Modern World History, 1500-2000* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2000). This instructional CD-ROM, containing 400 documents, 60,000 words of text and 1000 questions, was produced at the World History Center beginning 1995 with support from the Annenberg/CPB Project.


52 Elizabeth Ten-Dyke spoke extemporaneously and eloquently (following the March 13, 2004 presentation of this paper) on the meaning of the potlatch ceremony and its applicability to the World History Center and the Next Ten Years conference. I am grateful for her comment and her insight.

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